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INTRODUCTION
The following dissertation has as its purpose an inquiry into
the concrete significance of the "turn" in Heidegger's work.

The 1928

lecture course entitled Metaphysische Anfangsgrtinde der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz yields essential clues to the solution of the problem
of the turn, for Heidegger introduces, in this text, a distinction
between ontology and metontology [Metontologie] which provides a basis
for understanding the transition from the early to the middle period in
his work.
The usual formulation of the turn as a "turn from Dasein to
Being" is inadequate either as a representation of the progression of
Heidegger's work or as a characterization of the sense of the turn
itself.

According to this perspective on Heidegger's work, usually

called the "developmental" view, in the initial phase Heidegger focused
upon transcendence as foundational of thought and world; in the later
phase, he shifts to a "Being-centered problematic"l.

David Krell2

speaks of a "developmentalist bog"3 with reference to the image of the
turn as an advance from phenomenology to "the other thinking"; presumably this formulation is meant to characterize Richardson's position in
Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought.

The worst version of the

developmentalist view, according to Krell, is that of Bollnow and
L6with; for them, in the later Heidegger "a mystical and mystifying
contemplation of pure Being replaces existential analysis"4.
Krell correctly insists, against every parody of the turn, that
1

2

Heidegger continues in his later period to emphasize the "antic
fundament"5 that supports the thinking of Being.

Surely one can ask,

however, whether some view of Heidegger's "development" isn't possible
which neither runs roughshod over the central concerns of each phase of
Heidegger's work, nor which neglects the textual evidence that essential changes occur in Heidegger's approach.

Krell, in his own discus-

sion, fails to account for or even recognize the change of approach
manifest in Heidegger's middle- and late-period texts.

In opposition

to the developmentalist view, he says only that "'Heidegger-II' introduces humanity (der Mensch) into his texts far more liberally than does
the 'Heidegger-I' who analyzes Da-Sein"6.

Apparently content with

merely disputing the claim that Heidegger turns from man to Being in
his later work, Krell fails to recognize that it is precisely the problem of the "antic fundament"

which leads to the crisis in Heidegger's

work to which the turn is a response.
Even while suggesting that the changes in Heidegger's thought
arise from an increasing concern with the problematic of finitude,
Krell takes a rationalistic view of the effect of this issue on Heidegger's thought.

For he holds that, because Heidegger is aware quite

early ("in 1924 or 1925"7) that the project of ontology is threatened
by the concept of the finitude of time, "the difficulty is whether the
word Kehre in the developmentalist sense can mean anything at all any
more"8.

Krell seems actually to suggest that if a determinate set of

problems can be found which Heidegger addresses in his work, then there
is no need to attempt to characterize and account for the manifest
changes in his work.

Thus in his essay "Heidegger's Ostensible Turn-
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ing," we find the following remarks:
By now the disadvantage of all such developmentalist
approaches--whatever semblance of order they provide--ought to
have become apparent. Whether we subdivide Heidegger into two or
three or even more parts, the problem remains that the moment we
begin to think about any element of any part that element itself
turns back and forth to all the remaining elements of Heidegger's
thought . . . . Each element of Heidegger's thought turns, showing
itself in sundry perspectives. These turnings seem to have had
no first beginning in Heidegger's career; they certainly have no
final end once we ourselves begin to turn with them.9
That the elements of Heidegger's thought remain, in a certain sense, a
constant set, and that Heidegger explores these in different ways at
different times, "turning" back and forth among them, is undoubtedly
true but of rather minimal significance by itself.

What philosopher

doesn't reexamine the "elements" of his thought over and over again?
Krell's remarks here trivialize the issue.

They offer no clue concern-

ing a question which demands a response in this context:

Given that

there are changes in Heidegger's thought--i.e., reformulations, manifest in the texts themselves, of the issues of central concern in
Heidegger's problematic--how can they be characterized and accounted
for?

It is not at all necessary to suppose, as Krell so strangely

does, that the problem of the turn can be formulated only in terms of a
change of focus from man to Being (or vice versa) and that it can be
answered by saying that Heidegger's attention moves from one element to
another at different times.

The notion of a "turn" has already entered

into the tradition of Heidegger scholarship; the usage of this word is
legitimate, as long as it is understood that we cannot presume that we
already know in what the turn consists, in any concrete sense.

Perhaps

the characterization of neither the ''developmentalists" nor those who,
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like Krell, simply oppose them, is correct.

The root of the problem,

we maintain, lies in the polemical, and quite "unphenomenological"
choice offered us: to defend the identity of the "matter itself"
throughout Heidegger's career, and thus to be charged with having to
find evidence that his "thought" never changes: or to take Heidegger's
work as though a series of position-papers were being offered, so that
his "philosophy" changes depending upon whether its focus is transcendence, truth, or time.

I!!! a textual issue:

The question of the turn is, however, first of
Through what changes of focus, transpositions, or

reformulations are we conducted as we proceed along the vectors encountered in, and even constitutive of, Heidegger's texts?

And the ques-

tion of unity would then no longer ask about the "unchanging content"
of Heidegger's work, but about what fundamental inquiry, pursued with
ever-deepening insistence, is responsible for precisely those changes.
What would it mean to deny that essential changes occur in the
course of Heidegger's work?

Presumably it would mean that Heidegger

could, if he liked, have written Qn the Essence of Truth in 1926, or
The End of Philosophy in 1930.

Let us suppose, then, that he could, in

some literal sense, have written down these words at the beginning of
his career.

Would that fact help us to understand any of these texts?

If we are to suppose that it means anything to call Heidegger's work a
"path" of thought, then the sequential character of his work is to some
degree constitutive of its meaning, and must therefore be taken into
account in any interpretive inquiry.

Heidegger himself says, in the

Letter to Richardson, that "the reversal is in play within the matter
itself"lO.

One of the functions of The Metaphysical Foundations of

Logic is to show how the turn arises as a consequence of the fulfill-
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ment of the ontological project.

MFL is a transitional text, in which

Heidegger deliberately gathers up the work of his "early" period into
an interpretation which prepares for the coming "turn."
Before proceeding to our own reading of this and other relevant
texts, let us look briefly at what Richardson, with his presumably
"developmentalist" view, has to say, in fact, about the "reversal" in
Heidegger's thought.

The turn from the phenomenological approach to

"There-being"ll results, according to Richardson, from Heidegger's
recognition of the primacy of Being in the disclosive process; the
latter is now conceived as essentially historical:
Being discloses itself to and in its There, but since it
is Being that holds the primacy, Being is conceived as sending
itself unto its There. We may speak of this self-sending as
proceeding from Being and call it a "self-emitting," or, i f we
may be permitted a neologism to designate a completely new
concept, a "mittence" (Geschick) of Being. We may speak of it,
too, as terminating in There and therefore call it a "committing" or "com-mitment" (Schicksal) of There to its privileged destiny as the shepherd of Being.12
Richardson understands the thinking of Being not only as fundamentally
"historical" (in the sense of the Seinsgeschichte) but also as addressing the concealment or withdrawal intrinsic to "Being":

"To think

Being, then, will be to think it as a mittence, not only in its positivity but in its negativity."13

Indeed, the turn is demanded precise-

ly by the original experience of the "negativity" of Being, and is the
result of carrying the analysis through to its end:
What is more, this transformation is not an arbitrary thing,
determined by extrinsic circumstances. Much less is it an escape
into a new problematic necessitated by the dereliction of the
old. Rather, the transformation of Heidegger I into Heidegger II
is born out of a necessity imposed by the original experience of
Being as finite (negative). For the shift of focus from Therebeing to Being (which, as far as we can see, characterizes the
decisive difference between the two periods) was demanded by the
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exigencies of the hermeneutic analysis itself, as soon as it
became clear that the primacy in the Being-process belongs to
Being itself. And when was this? Precisely when the author
began to meditate the negativity of truth as such. This we take
to be the genuine sense of the "reversal" in WW, for it was then
that he began to appreciate the full import of what it means for
concealment somehow to precede non-concealment in the coming-topass of a-letheia.14
What is missing in Richardson's account is an indication of what
specific "exigencies" demanded the "shift of focus"; a precise characterization of how the experience of Being as finite requires the transformation of Heidegger I into Heidegger II; and a concrete understanding, in the light of Heidegger's texts, of what it means to turn from
"There-being to Being."

Richardson's recognition that there is a

"shift of focus" from transcendence to the problem of "mittence," and
that a more radical experience of "negativity" plays a role in initiating this shift is undoubtedly correct.

Yet Richardson offers, in fact,

little more than a topical outline of themes relevant to the question
of the turn.

When we examine the texts more closely, we will find that

the formula "from Dasein to Being" is not of much help as a characterization of the turn, the so far unexplored "logic" of which we are
seeking in the present undertaking.
Although Heidegger's later texts are increasingly concerned with
the language appropriate to thinking the "withdrawal" of Being, the
question for any interpretation of the meaning of the turn is how
Heidegger's increasing concern with "negativity"--a questionable term,
in any case, with reference to Heidegger's thought of "withdrawal"-emerges in Heidegger's work and how it is developed in the sequence of
his texts.
We shall attempt to retrace a part of the movement of Heidegger's
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thought, as it manifests itself on the basis of the view that Heidegger
himself offers of his early work in the (recently translated) Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.

There we find that Heidegger defines die

Kehre on the basis of a concept of metaphysics to which he assimilates
his own early work.

Thus it is, for the Heidegger of The Metaphysical

Foundations of Logic, at the culminating moment of the development of
the first part of metaphysics--ontology--that the turn, as the selfoverturning of ontology, occurs and gives rise to the second part of
metaphysics, which Heidegger calls "metontology" (Metontologie).

Here

is how Heidegger characterizes the moment of this change, or metabole:
What must be kept in mind, particularly with regard to fundamental ontology, is that it is precisely the radicality and
universality of this central problematic, and it alone, which
brings us to realize that these problems are indeed central; but
for that very reason they are in their import and essentiality
never the sole problems. In other words, fundamental ontology
does not exhaust the notion of metaphysics.
Since Being is there only insofar as beings are already
there, fundamental ontology has in it the latent tendency toward
a primordial, metaphysical transformation which becomes possible
only when Being is understood in its whole problematic. The
intrinsic necessity for ontology to turn back to its point of
origin can be clarified by reference to the primal phenomenon of
human existence: the being "man" understands Being15; understanding of Being effects a distinction between Being and beings;
Being is there only when Dasein understands Being. In other
words, the possibility that Being is there in the understanding
presupposes the factical existence of Dasein, and this in turn
presupposes the factual extantness of nature. Right within the
horizon of the problem of Being, when posed radically, it appears
that all this is visible and can become understood as Being, only
if a possible totality of beings is already there.
As a result, we need a special problematic which has for
its proper theme being as a whole [das Seiende im Ganzen]. This
new investigation resides in the essence of ontology itself and
is the result of its overturning [Umschlag], its metabole. I
designate this set of questions metontology [Metontologie]. (MFL
156-57 /199 )16
The locus of the turn from Heidegger's early to his middle17 period is
specified here, not as anything like a turn from Dasein to Being, but
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as a shift from the problematic of ontology to that of "being as a
whole."
Our task is to show how the turn arises, as an issue, in relation
to Heidegger's inquiry into the twofold structure of metaphysics.

The

turn is the locus of what we shall call the "dynamic" relation between
the two parts of metaphysics, ontology and metontology.

Heidegger

assimilates his own work to the concept of metaphysics operative in The
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic; thus the turn must be interpreted
from the twofold structure of metaphysics.

Heidegger's first account

of ontology and "theology" simply establishes the relation between them
in a thematic, external way, and refers to Aristotle's two definitions
of metaphysics.

What is at stake here is the possibility of a "repeti-

tion" of metaphysics.

But Heidegger's aim in repeating metaphysics,

following the "reduction" of philosophy to metaphysics (the Destruktion), is to recover the source of philosophy as such.

Metaphysics, in

MFL, means philosophy in its source--its essence, that grounding
"activity" which gives rise to philosophy.

Thus, in its repetition,

metaphysics becomes the "metaphysics of Dasein."

The turn arises out

of the encounter with the source; it is with the fulfillment of ontology that the necessity of its "overturning" appears.
In the Appendix to MFL, Heidegger speaks of a metabole.

The

relation between the two parts of metaphysics becomes a "dynamic" one
as ontology is overturned (umkehrt) into metontology.

Thus it is our

task to trace, first in MFL and then in certain of Heidegger's other
works, the development of the relation between the two parts of metaphysics.

The turn in Heidegger's work can be understood in terms of
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this development:

The turn from Heidegger I to Heidegger II takes

place with the completion of the metabole of ontology into metontology.
The following summary of the five chapters of the dissertation is
intended to serve as an extended statement of its thesis:
The first chapter, essentially an exposition of Heidegger's own
Introduction to the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic explains the
meaning of "metaphysics" for the early Heidegger, and shows how Heidegger conceives of his own project as aiming toward a retrieval of the
twofold structure of metaphysics.

Ontology, the "first part" of meta-

physics, concerns the interpretation of the Being of beings, "being as
such"; theology (metontology) concerns the relation of man, as Dasein,
to "being as a whole."
In Heidegger's discussion of metaphysics ontology is incorporated, as one element, or one pole, into the larger twofold structure.
Thus ontology is displaced from its central role in Heidegger's
thought.

This displacement (or overturning), however, is effected not

by adding a newly discovered element to the framework of Heidegger's
thought, but by following the internal "logic" of the development of
ontology.

The new investigation "resides in the essence of ontology

itself" (MFL 157), and arises with the very fulfillment of the ontological project.

But in Heidegger's Introduction, the relation between

the two parts of metaphysics is first presented in "static" terms as
the relation between Aristotelean "ontology" and "theology."
Heidegger makes it clear in his Introduction that he means to
undertake a repetition (Wiederholung) of this relation.

It is through

repetition that the relation between the two parts of metaphysics is to
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become "dynamic," i.e., that the metabole is to be effected.
Thus, the second chapter shows how Heidegger begins to expand
upon the twofold relation within metaphysics in the course of his
Destruktion of Leibniz's monadology.

In the Destruktion Heidegger

dismantles Leibniz's logic down to its ground in ontology; at the same
time, he shows how Leibnizian ontology, characterizing the Being of
beings as drive, leads immediately to the problem of the individuation
of drive, i.e., to the problem of the concretely exisiting monad.

In

his discussion of the monadology, Heidegger emphasizes the transformation, in Leibniz's thought, of the traditional metaphysical concepts of
"possibility" and "actuality."

The problem of metaphysics becomes that

of the relation between what Heidegger calls "possibility" and "possible actuality," i.e., between the Being of the monad as drive and the
individuation of drive in a unique apperception of the "world."

Rei

degger shows the internal relation between these two parts of metaphysics.

As drive, the monad represents (perceptio) a multiplicity to

itself in a unifying act (appetitio) which grasps its own relation to
the multiplicity in the very act of unification (apperception).

Here

the relation is immediate or internal, as it were--the theory of drive
as possibility, properly understood, calls for the theory of apperception, which is concerned with the individuation of the monad in relation to a potential multiplicity.
The twofold relation--between the general characterization of
Being in terms of the "drive" of the monad, and the individuation of
drive in the particular monad, is reduplicated in Heidegger's "retrieval" of Being and Time in UO of MFL.

Thus the third chapter takes
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up Heidegger's formulation of the problem of metaphysics as that of the
relation between what he calls the neutrality of Dasein and concretely
existing Dasein.

Heidegger calls the twofold the "meta-physics of

oasein"(139)--metaphysics is now the metaphysics of Dasein.

If ontol-

logy "repeats" the Leibnizian problem of drive, then metontology repeats that of individuation, or the concretization of ontology.
The neutrality of Dasein signifies the dimension of fundamental
ontology, which Heidegger interprets, in ,10, in terms of possibility,
essence, and origin.

The concept of neutrality occupies the place of

the traditional metaphysical concept of essence.

Neutral Dasein, like

the Platonic form which is separated from its instances by the chorismos, is "separated" in relation to the concrete facticity of that
humanity, i.e., existing Dasein, which it makes possible.

"The pecul-

iar neutrality of the term "Dasein" is essential, because the interpretation of this being must be carried out prior to every factual
[faktische] concretion" (136/171-72).
What is at issue in fundamental-ontological inquiry is the
"source" of the Being of factically existing Dasein, the transcendental-horizonal structure which makes its understanding of Being
possible.

But precisely because the neutrality of Dasein means its

possibility, and does not "exist" as neutral (137), the origin cannot,
in the end, be thought in separation from concretely existing Dasein.
Thus metaphysical neutrality is "not an empty abstraction from the
ontic, a neither-nor"; it is rather the "authentic concreteness of the
origin, the not-yet of factical dispersion" (137).

Here the same

internal transition takes place that Heidegger discerns in Leibniz's
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monadology, where the theory of drive demands an immediate transition
to the problem of the individuation of the monad.

The monad is always

individuated, and in its individuation constitutively "reflects" a
world.

Similarly, as the "potency of the origin," Dasein is itself

already "dispersed" (zerstreut), in every case, into a manifold, in
relation to which it has the potentiality of existing "concretely,"
i.e., effecting a concrete disclosure of that manifold (as a world).
Thus, in the recapitalation of ontology in tlO, something like a
transition to "metontology," i.e., to the problem of being as a whole,
occurs.

However, the significance of this transition--wherein lies the

whole problem of the turn--is not addressed here.

Yet the problem of

history (in a sense not yet encountered in the treatment of historicity in Being and Time, since historicity is a function of neutral
Dasein) looms on the horizon.

The problem can only become an issue in

its own right when the principle that "neutral Dasein never exists" is
thought through to the end:

For the situatedness of every project,

including that of fundamental ontology, raises the question of whether
it makes sense to think of transhistorical Dasein as foundational of
history.

In this sense, the Q!:_Oblem of history is that of the "origin"

of a multiplicity of historical disclosures of the "meaning of Being,"
when all disclosure is essentially historical.
the Seinsgeschichte:

This is the problem of

how to think origin without addressing a source

"transcendent" to history, i.e., to the series of unconcealments of
Being.

Heidegger's middle period is characterized by the attempt to

think the problem of origin in a resolutely "anti-metaphysical" way, i f
by metaphysics we mean the attempt to ground history in something
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superior to or other than history.

Even the residue of ontic thinking

that remains in the grounding of Being in Dasein--where Dasein is the
metaphysically privileged "being"--is rejected in the inquiries of the
middle period.
Heidegger has tried to show, first in his Destruktion of Leibniz
and then in his retrieval of Being and Time, how something like a
transition to the problematic of concretely existing Dasein is implicit
in the fulfillment of the ontological project.

Section 10 indicates,

furthermore, that it is necessary to think the neutrality of Dasein
before the issues connected with the factuality of its concrete existence can be addressed.

The overturning of ontology is not possible

apart from the full development of ontology.

In ontology, the language

of metaphysical questioning is articulated for the first time.

Thus it

would be impossible for metaphysics to "begin" with a survey (say) of
the characteristics of a multiplicity of concretely existing "Daseins"
--because one would not know where to look:
is ontological in character.

The very concept of Dasein

The significance of the concreteness of

factically existing Dasein can only become evident as the result of
ontological inquiry.

It begins to become evident that ontology has as

its aim its own overturning, and is at the same time an essential
prerequisite for that overturning.
Chapter IV shows the internal connection between ontology and its
overturning into metontology.

The inner significance of ontology lies

in its Umschlag into metontology.

The transition from ontology to met-

ontology takes place in both a formal and a radical sense; the latter
is the Umschlag proper.

14

We have seen, in connection with Heidegger's interpretation of
Leibniz's ontology, that there is an internal relationship between
ontology--in Leibniz's case the ontology of drive--and the theory of
the individuation of the monad, i.e., the doctrine of apperception.

We

have also been able to find in ,10 of MFL evidence of a necessary transition between the ontology of neutral Dasein and the inquiry into "the
authentic concreteness of the origin, the not-yet of factical dispersion" (MFL 137).

These transitions remain "formal," in the sense that

the "overturning" is in each case is required by the nature of the
ontology, but does not yet effect an undermining of the ontological
project as such.

In Chapters IV and V, we find that the completion of

the ontological project in the fullest sense requires the transition to
a new method of inquiry; the fulfillment of the project exposes the
limitations of a transcendental-horizonal investigation.

Heidegger's

inquiry into the origin of metaphysics is shifted onto a new ground.
It is no longer an ontology, a transcendental-horizonal inquiry into
the source of the meaning of Being, i.e., into the nature of Dasein as
the ground of metaphysics, but a metontology:

an inquiry into how

metaphysics arises from the midst of "being as a whole."

This shift is

the key to the meaning of the "turn" from "Heidegger I" to "Heidegger
I I."

Chapter IV shows how the transition takes place, both formally or
logically--the fulfillment of ontology in the "Temporal science"
requires a return to the concrete significance of temporalization, or
the "individuation" of Dasein--and radically, for the finitude of time
also casts doubt upon the concept of Dasein as fundament, as ground of
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the possibility of metaphysics in general.

To use the language of 110,

neutral Dasein never "exists"; Dasein is always individuated or "concrete," so that the very concept of a Dasein which, as such, serves the
metaphysically privileged position of ground is called into question.
Heidegger is fully aware of the issue in Metaphysical Foundations of
Logic:
[P]rojection of the basic ontological constitution of Dasein must
arise by constructing one of the most extreme possibilities of
Dasein 1 s authentic and total capability of Being. The projection
is directed towards Dasein, as a whole, and towards the basic
determinations of its wholeness, even though Dasein in each case
is only as existent. To put it another way, attaining the metaphysical neutrality and isolation of Dasein as such is only possible on the basis of the extreme existentiell involvement of the
one who himself projects. (MFL 139-40)
Ontology is itself a "metontological" project.

Ontology, like any

other metaphysical project, reveals "the essential finitude of Dasein's
existence . . . through and in the service of each possible totality"
(140).

Thus ontology is a finite project, in service to a "totality"

of beings.

It does not stand outside a concrete (historical) config-

uration of beings, but itself belongs to a "time and place," mani
festing its own "perspective," its own manner of "apperceiving" beings.
The ontological project required the construction of a model of Dasein
--an "extreme construction"--standing outside of time and "place," and
providing the ground for every possible interpretation of the meaning
of Being.

(Thus, in Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger locates

the origin of the interpretation of Being as "production" in the productive modes of Dasein 1 s comportment.)

But the fulfillment of the

ontological project shows that such an ahistorical concept of Dasein is
doomed to failure.

Not only does neutral Dasein never "exist," the
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finitude of time makes nonsense of the very concept of the ontological
neutrality of the ground, and thus undermines the possibility of something like a transcendental-horizonal inquiry into the foundations of
metaphysics.

The attempt to grasp Dasein as a whole shows, in the end,

that Dasein cannot be "grasped" as a whole, making its self-transparency the prelude to a "science of Being."

The turn represents the

radical re-origination of the project of "founding" metaphysics,
undertaken now as an inquiry into the very possibility of anything like
a questioning about the origin of metaphysics.

For there can be no

origin--neither metaphysical, nor historically manifest--outside the
"whole of beings," no privileged standpoint from which to ask about the
foundation of metaphysics.

Because there can be no such privileged

standpoint, Heidegger in the middle period rejects the possibility of
the type of inquiry which would locate the ground in relation to any
specific Seinsverstandnis.

Thus in the middle period Heidegger under-

takes a radical inquiry into the "problem of origin."

How can an

origin be thought which is not itself entangled in metaphysical
representations of origin?
itself"?

Differently put--how can we think "Being

Thus this enterprise continues, in more radical fashion,

Heidegger's attempt to distinguish Being from beings, to refuse to
Being any name that derives from beings or even being as a whole.

The

radicalization of the "question of Being" means that the source of the
history of metaphysics can no longer be conceived to be Dasein, the
concrete site of a specific understanding of Being (metaphysics), nor
can it be conceived on the model of an abstract or neutral meta-being
outside the sequence of the concrete, historical disclosures of the
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meaning of Being.

To question "Being" for its own sake, then, means to

undertake the continuing radicalization of the question of Origin.
That questioning begins--or, rather, is re-initiated, on the
basis of the failure of ontology and its overturning--in essays written
at the end of the early period.

In particular, it is in On the Essence

of Truth that Heidegger begins the inquiry into the origination of
metaphysics in the midst of the whole of beings.

Thus On the Essence

of Truth is a "metontological" treatise, and it opens up the questioning that continues through the middle period of Heidegger's work.
The radicalization of fundamental ontology, with its discovery of
the finitude of time, results in the turning back of ontology into the
"metaphysical ontic" from which i t arises and "in which i t implicitly
always remains" (MFL 158).

The metontological problematic concerns the

happening of metaphysics--or, in On The Essence of Truth, of the disclosure of beings--in the midst of being as a whole.

The turn means

the re-origination of the question of the origin of metaphysics on the
basis of the metontological problematic, following the overturning of
the transcendental-horizonal inquiry.
"Finitude," now, is no longer a property of Dasein but of being
as a whole.

Heidegger no longer says that "transcendence" is grounded

in "finitude," but that unconcealment occurs in relation to the concealment of being as a whole.

The regression from truth as correspon-

dence to the "essence" of truth as freedom shows how the "question of
the essence of man" (BW 127) remains central to the problem of disclosure.

Nonetheless, the regression locates the ground of disclosure,

not in the finitude of Dasein, but in the concealment of being as a

18
whole.

Furthermore, the essence of freedom lies in "letting beings

be," and this letting-be is possible only on the basis of an attunement
to being as a whole.

Heidegger writes here of Verhalten or comport-

ment, the relation of man to beings in their disclosure.
is openness to beings.

Comportment

But comportment is already "attuned and in this

attunement is drawn up into being as a whole" (131), a being as a whole
which remains, as a whole, concealed.

The relation between comportment

and atttunement replaces the interrelationship in Being and Time
between understanding and mood.

Atttunement takes place from out of

"being as a whole" itself, so that "finitude" is no longer a function
of man, not even as Dasein, but of being (das Seiende) itself.

The

primordial concealment of being as a whole is "untruth" (Unwesen), and
therefore untruth is the essence of truth.
Man can be open to beings, and thus be "insistent" in his bearing
(Verhaltnis) toward beings--i.e., fall into a concern with beings
alone--precisely because the concealment of being as a whole conceals
itself in that concealing.
"mystery."

As such self-concealing, it is the

"Mystery" names the whole of man's relatedness to being,

and is that relationship which gives rise to

~istory

as errance.

There

is a "turning to and fro" (Zu- und Wegwendung) which is proper to
Dasein, and which is a function of the "need" (Not) to which Dasein is
bound.

"History" is constituted by this turning to and fro, toward

what is "readily available" (135) and away from the mystery; indeed,
Dasein itself is nothing other than this "turning into need."

And the

Turn--in Heidegger's "technical" sense, and for this "metontological"
text--is nothing other than this turning into need, which "constitutes"
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Dasein (history, disclosure). The Turn is a turning into errancy as
such, Le., into that "finitude" which is no longer the finitude of
man.

Thus the Turn signifies a movement opposite to that which seems

to be indicated with the rubric "science of Being."

And to inquire

into "Being as such" is to inquire into "oblivion as such."
It is not the inquiry into oblivion as such that is undertaken in
on the Essence of Truth, however, but the inquiry into the concealment
of being as a whole.

The inquiry into oblivion, or withdrawal, as such

(Heidegger "III"), cannot be undertaken directly because the withdrawal
of Being is not an "objective" phenomenon which can be examined in
distinction from the event of withdrawal, i.e., the concealment of
being as a whole which occurs with every event of disclosure.

To make

aletheia, the interplay of concealment and unconcealment, into an
object of inquiry would be to turn it into a metaphysical origin of the
various epochs in the history of Being.

To question the origin is not

to leave the field of historical disclosure, i.e., being as a whole,
but it is rather to question that process which occurs in the event of
the unconcealment of being as such and as a whole.

It is by question-

ing this event, which is in every case "concrete" in its occurrence,
that the problem of origin is addressed. Thus the questioning of origin
never leaves the field of the totality of beings, never departs being
into a meta-physical realm.

What happens in that questioning is not

something that we can follow here, except to say that it becomes the
questioning of the "event" as such (Ereignis), that its aim is to
develop the language appropriate to the thinking of aletheia, and that
it is intertwined with the question of the transformed relationship of
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•an to language.

The phrase "truth of essence" is merely a heuristic

phrase in relation to this potential development of the questioning of
the essence of truth which, in the original material of On the Essence
of Truth, can merely accomplish the regression to the problematic of
the concealment of being as a whole.

It is in relation to the over-

turning of ontology into metontology that it can be understood how the
central issue of the middle period becomes the Seinsgeschichte.

For

the latter problem is simply that of the character of the "event" in
its concreteness as the series of the disclosures of being as such as a
whole.

This primary concreteness is now the starting-point for the

inquiry into the possibility of such disclosure.
In spite of this reversal, it is clear that Heidegger continues
to inquire into the "source of the possibility" of disclosure (of
thought; of metaphysics; of philosophy as such; of world).

It is in

the character of this inquiry as a "questioning of origin" that the
continuity and unity of Heidegger's thought consists, since this
questioning, pursued to its consequences in the most radical fashion,
motivates the changes in Heidegger's work.

NOTES

1. William J. Richardson, From Phenomenology to Thought.
Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), p. 207.

(The Hague:

2. Krell is the first to write in English of the Metontologie, in his
Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger's
Think!!!g_of 1l11ing, ch. 2, "Fundamental Ontology, Meta-Ontology, Frontal
ontology." Krell recognizes the connection between "meta-ontology" and
finitude, but seems to find in this theme only the evidence of Heidegger's recognition of the futility or simple failure of his early transcendental-horizonal project. But metontology is the fulfillment of
ontology (cf. Heidegger's interpretation of metabole in his lecture on
Aristotle's Physics B,l). Krell places finitude and ontology in a relationship of opposition, in spite of his own recognition that "Heidegger's choice of that word [Umschlag] now aims to exhibit something of
the unfolding or maturation of his own question." (p. 39) There is a
considerable difference between "unfolding" and "maturation," since one
means fulfillment in an overturning, and the other only a "better judgment" with reference to the problem.
3.

Krell, p. 95.

4.

Krell, p. 98.

5.

Krell, p. 98.

6.

Krell, p. 99.

7.

Krell, p. 100.

8.

Krell, p. 99.

9.

Krell, p. 105.

10.

Richardson, p. xviii.

11. Richardson characterizes the early, "phenomenological'' approach as
follows:

In the present case, the phenomenon with which we are
concerned is There-being itself. The task is to let-be-seen the
Being of There-being . . . . To permit the There-being, then, to
reveal of its own accord what it is and how it is (as ontological
comprehension, existence, finite transcendence), Heidegger will
submit it to a phenomenological analysis and thus lay the Being
of There-being out (Auslegung) in full view. (Richardson, p. 47)
It is in "There-being" that Being is disclosed, so that the "thinking
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of Being" can take place, at this stage of Heidegger's thought, only
through the analysis of Dasein.
12.

Richardson, p. 20.

13.

Richardson, p. 21.

14.

Richardson, p. 624.

15. I have consistently modified all translations, where Sein has been
translated "being," to read "Being." There are several reasons for
insisting upon translating Sein with the capital "B." In the first
instance, Sein is a different word from das Seiende, and many passages
read more efficiently with the aid of the capitalization; witness a
passage like this from Michael Heim's translation of The Metaphysical
Foundations of Logic:
Human Dasein is a being with a kind of being to which it belongs
essentialy to understand something like being. (p. 16)
More importantly, the real question is why "Being" should not be
capitalized in the Heideggerian text, when it is the term of central
importance in his thought. Presumably Being has been de-capitalized
precisely because it is of such central importance; thus, many interpreters have wanted to resist the reification of the concept of Being,
or its elevation into a mystical goal of thought. Being is turned into
be-ing, since presumably Sein only means the "being-process," something
verbal and not an "object" at all. But does this (quite correct)
observation about the verbal character of Being resolve anything at
all? Precisely what is mysterious about Being is the fact that it is
no being, that it is "nothing." Even the attempt to think Being as an
"event" runs aground, again and again, on the representational pull of
the language inherited from our metaphysical tradition. The very
thinking of Ereignis is to a certain degree a response to the attempt
to say in what "be-ing," Being as event, consists. Thus the presumed
demystification of Being only has the effect of covering over the
profound and genuine difficulties inherent in the attempt to think
Being. Being is a mystery; its numinosity for thought is at least
suggested by the capitalization.
Furthermore, it is not even quite correct to emphasize, always,
the verbal aspect of Sein. The constant questioning of Being means
that Being is, for Heidegger's thought, an unknown which is always
addressed, which itself originates the questioning, whose multifold
meanings enter into play in the questioning, but which we do not yet
know how to name. Being is, in an odd way, a cipher which arrives from
the tradition but which is not properly addressed therein. Heidegger's
thought undertakes a transformation of this very concept, mediating the
metamorphosis of Being into Ereignis. The decapitalization of Being
suggests that we know what Being is; that we do not is, however,
precisely the starting-point and ground of Heidegger's inquiry.
Finally, Heim translates das Seiende im Ganzen as "beings as a
whole," but it is often useful to translate i t as "being as a whole,"
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since the emphasis here is precisely upon the totality of the ontic
realm as such, not upon the "collection" of beings which make i t up.
16 . 1 shall refer to Heidegger's texts by pagination, within quotation
aarks, and always with the understanding that the page numbers refer to
the last text explicitly designated within quotation marks. Because I
usually quote the text in English, I shall give the English page
reference first; an "m" following the reference means that I have
aodified the translation, however slightly (except that I shall not
note the modification in changing "being" (Sein) to "Being," or, in the
case of Hofstadter's translation of the Grundprobleme, "the Dasein" to
"Dasein"); the German textual reference follows a slash, but is
included only if I have modified the translation or have referred to
the German text within the quotation.
17. For heuristic purposes, I accept Poggeler's three-stage account of
Heidegger's work, as reported by Krell (Krell, p 104):
Poggeler's first stage comprises Heidegger's Marburg years
and the first several years of the second Freiburg period,
roughly 1923 to 1930 . . . . The second stage comprises the 1930s
and 1940s, when the question of the meaning of Being develops in
the direction of the truth of Being. .
The
third tier of Heidegger's career rises in the years 1950 to 1964,
when Heidegger "modifies" the question of the truth of Being by
asking about the site or locale of Being, the topos of the topic.
We need not accept precisely this characterization of the three stages,
but I shall work within the framework of this periodization. I am
attempting, in this essay, to show how Heidegger enters the second
period, and at the same time to show how to characterize the work of
that period. My claim is that the turn should be understood through
the occurrence announced in the quoted text from MFL, the overturning
of ontology into metontology. In that case, however, we might suspect
that the third period would be marked by something like a re-turn--to a
transformed ontology, i.e., to the problem of language. But this
question of the entry into Heidegger's later period is not an issue
which I shall address here. Rather, I wish to show through a
"practical" criticism how the problem of the turn is first of all a
textual issue, since the first question to be asked is what changes do
exhibit themselves in the development of Heidegger's work. The essay
"On the Essence of Truth" constitutes a demonstration of the
direction Heidegger's questioning takes once the principal issue
becomes the metontological one of the origin of "truth" in the midst of
being as a whole.

Chapter I
Heidegger's Early Concept of Metaphysics
In the texts of the Marburg period, Heidegger writes of founding
metaphysics and searches for the "ground of its possibility"; later,
his interest in the foundational problem seems to disappear, since in
the texts of the middle period he is clearly concerned with something
like an "overcoming" of metaphysics.

What accounts for this apparent

change is that, while in the early texts "metaphysics" is used in a
positive sense, in the texts of the later period metaphysics has come
to mean the thinking that belongs to the epoch of the oblivion of
Being.

For the Heidegger of the early period, "metaphysics" names the

essence of philosophy.

Metaphysics is the goal of the Destruktion,

with its regression to the "source-ground" of philosophy, and is the
source of the possibility of philosophical thinking as such.
In fact, the problem of metaphysics holds the key to an interpretation of Heidegger's early philosophical project--and with this key
the door opens to an understanding of the continuity of his work, as it
proceeds by way of the turn to the later concern with the "overcoming
of metaphysics."

It is by focusing upon the development of the concept

of "metaphysics" in the early work that we gain an entryway to the path
that leads from the early to the middle period, and thus that we are
able to achieve a characterization of the concrete significance of the
"turn" itself.
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Presumably we could determine the meaning of Heidegger's early
concept of metaphysics, simply enough, through a reading of What is
Meta.Q~~ics£_

But Heidegger raises the question of "what" metaphysics

is in the context of his own already developed concept of metaphysics,
which receives its clearest formulation in the text of the lectures of
the summer session of 1929, published as The Metaphysical Foundations
of Logic.

In this work, Heidegger attempts to place the fundamental-

ontological project of Being and Time within a certain context and he
does so through the development of a radical

conc~f

metaphysics.

Heidegger's succinct definition of the subject-matter of metaphysics is to be found at the end of the Introduction:

"The subject-

matter of metaphysics is what lies 'beyond' beings . . . It deals with
a) Being as such, b) beings as a whole" (MFL 25).

But this straight-

forward statement follows Heidegger's discussion of Aristotle's understanding of philosophy, and in fact represents a synopsis of the
results of that discussion.

Is this, then, Heidegger's definition or

Aristotle's according to Heidegger?

The question as thus formulated

cannot suggest the complex relationship of Heidegger's thought to the
tradition.

Heidegger neither simply takes over the conceptions of the

tradition nor does he merely replace them with his own.

His inquiry in

its relation to the tradition is guided by the notion of Wiederholung,
which I shall translate, in this essay, as "repetition. "1
The "method" at work in this text is meant to culminate in a
repetition of the traditional concept of metaphysics.

Heidegger

prefaces his undertaking with methodological remarks which reflect the
"circular" structure appropriate to the hermeneutic understanding of
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oasein:
Philosophy can be characterized only from and in historical
recollection [g_eschichtliche Erinnerung]. But this recollection
is only what it is, is only living, in the moment of self-understanding [im augenblicklichen Sichselbstverstehen], and that
means in one's own free, productive grasp of the task harbored in
philosophy. The ways of historical recollection and reflection
on the present [augenblickliche Besinnung] are not two ways, but
are both essential elements of every way toward the idea of
philosophy. (8/9-10)
The elements of geschichtliche Erinnerung and augenblickliche
Besinnung together signify the structure of historicity as presented in
Being and Time (!74).

Recollection based in historicity (Geschicht-

lichkeit) is not a mere reproduction of opinions or doctrines held in
the past.

For at its heart lies the Augenblick, the "moment of vis-

ion," whereby the past is explicitly taken over on the basis of an
envisioning of a possibility latent in it but perhaps hitherto undisclosed.

In augenblickliche Besinnung the future (Zukunft) is opened up

on the basis of a possibility belonging to what has-been (das Gewesen).
Thus the recollection, Erinnerung, of the "past" is the explicit
"handing down to itself" which Dasein can undertake on the basis of its
moment of vision.

Handing down explicitly, however, is repetition:

"Die Wiederholung ist die ausdrtickliche tiberlieferung" (SZ 386).

Thus,

in the lecture course The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, we find a
repetition, in Heidegger's sense, of what the tradition intends by
metaphysics.

It is our task to trace the path of the Heideggerian

transformation of the concept of metaphysics under the aegis of the
WiederholuQg.
In order to undertake the repetiton of the tradition--of the
understanding of metaphysics elicited from Aristotle's Metaphysics--a
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further methodological strategy is required, in order to effect a
clearing of the way for the necessary repetition.

What is required is

a "disavowal (Widerruf) of that which in the 'today' is working itself
out as the 'past'" (BT 438/386).

Repetition can take place only if a

refusal or disavowal first occurs; in relation to the idea of philosophy this means that a destruction is called for.

This is the "way to

the idea of philosophy" to be followed in The Metaphysical Foundations
of Logic.

From the standpoint of MFL, the destruction belongs to

geschichtliche Erinnerung, and constitutes the task of the First Major
Part of the text of the lecture series.
specifically, the work of Leibniz.

The Destruktion will address,

But the stage is set for this

destruction by Heidegger's reference, already a "retrieval," to Aristotle's concept of metaphysics; in this way the relevance of the
destruction to the tradition as a whole is indicated.

For Aristotle's

concept of metaphysics "oversees" the tradition as a whole, and it is
in reference to this concept that the Wiederholung is to be undertaken
and achieved.
Concerning the destruction, Heidegger says in Basic Problems that
it consists in a "critical dismantling (Abbau] of the traditional concepts, which at first must necessarily be employed, down to the sources
from which they were drawn"

(BP 22-23m/31).

It is, he adds, carried

out ''im historischen Rtickgang auf die Tradition," in a historical
regression to the tradition (23m/31).

In the destruction, a regression

to the sources or origin of the tradition is undertaken.

But at the

same time, what is sought in such regression is the possibility of a
repetition.

Heidegger's "method," then, can be characterized in
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general as a "regression to the origin," and equivalently as a "regression leading to a repetition."

The destruction or repetition is

never undertaken for its own sake, to end in an original disclosure
covered over by the tradition; the movement toward the origin can only
be completed in a repetition.

Why this should be so has to do with the

character of the "origin" (primordial time), and is a question we shall
discuss briefly below, and then examine more closely in Chapter IV.

In

any case, Heidegger's formulation in MFL makes it clear that the "mo•ent of vision" (Augenblick) lies at the heart of the task of retrieval
("historical recollection") in relation to the tradition, and the
Augenblick guides the Wiederholung, as we know from Being and Time (cf.
BT !74).
I have suggested that what we shall see in

Metaph~sical

Founda-

tions of Logic is, in view of Heidegger's methodological clues, a
"regression to the origin" (here, of course, of "logic"), a regression
that has the character of a Destruktion, and an origin whose character
we have yet to examine.

What is the character of that "origin" which

supports and even requires a "repetition"?
Of course, Heidegger has already shown us the character of the
origin in Basic Problems of Phenomenology.

There the regression to

the origin takes place through the threefold methodology implicit in
phenomenology, namely, reduction, construction, and destruction.

De-

struction undertakes a historical regression to, or "upon" (auf)

the

tradition, and thus to the sources from which it arises.

Reduction

means the leading back (Rtickftihrung) of phenomenological vision "from
the apprehension of a being . . . to the understanding of the Being of
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this being" (BP 21/29).

Phenomenological construction is the pro-

jection of the "antecedently given being upon its Being and the
structures of its being" (22), a projection which occurs precisely
through the "reductive recursion from beings" (22).

The projection,

in other words, is not added to the reductive recursion or regression
but is disclosed in it.

In the end, construction finds in time the

"origin of possibility itself" (BP 325); origin of possibility means,
as we shall see, the origin of "metaphysics."

Construction is an

epagoge2, a leading-towards the origin of Seinsverstandnis, and is,
as such, the culmination of the process of regression.

But if the

phenomenological methodology culminates in the disclosure of Temporal i tat as the origin of Seinsverstandnis, how can we justify the
claim that the Heideggerian regression necessarily ends in a
repetition?
Because of the emphasis upon the "scientific" character of
ontological inquiry in BP, it may be difficult to see at first how the
core of method is in fact repetition.

That it is so is clear in MFL;

it becomes even more explicitly so in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.

But in BP it appears, on the surface, that the phenomeno-

logical method fulfills its function in the demonstration that Temporalitat is the horizon of all interpretation of Being, and, therefore,
in this explicit carrying out of the ontological difference.

And of

course this is correct, so long as we restrict our inquiry to the
announced goal of Basic Problems.

Nonetheless Heidegger clearly

suggests there that his inquiries are meant not only to "grasp" the
meaning of Being but to open up the possibility of a repetition:
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in our own interpretation of Being we are attempting
nothing other than the repetition of the problems of ancient
philosophy in order to radicalize them in this repetition by
their own selves. (BP 316)
The reductive recursion or regression implicit in phenomenalogical method leads to primordial time.

What does it mean, however,

that time is the "origin of possibility," that time has, in some sense,
a "possibility-character"?

"Possibility" bears an intrinsic reference

to the future, within the structure of primordial time; but repetition
itself means the apprehension of a possibility that comes toward one
from the future, on the basis of what "has-been" and in the "moment of
vision."

Primordial time, as the origin of possibility, means the

"occurrence" of a repetition; primordial time occurs as repetition.
The origin itself exhibits the character of repetition.

Thus the path

to the science of Being--to Temporal science, ends, in fact, in repetitian, even though this is not made explicit within the limitations of
the project undertaken in Basic Problems of Phenomenology.
If time means repetition, then the recovery of "possibility" signified by this characterization of time already means something like an
overturning

(Umschl~)

of the scientific result of the inquiry, that is

to say, the result signified by the very concept of ontology.

Ontology

grasps primordial time as the source of all Seinsverstandnis.

But time

itself--and the argument concerning this claim must be reserved for the
appropriate place in our discussion (cf. ch. IV)--signifies, because it
exhibits the character of repetition, the possibility of a movement
beyond itself, the possibility of the origination of something new.
The science of Being, even if it is the end of the ontological inquiry,
is for Heidegger the beginning of the possibility of a renewal of
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philosophy·
What "originates" in the origin is always unique. Temporalization
never occurs in abstracto, but only as the temporalization "of" concretely existing Dasein; neutral Dasein is never what "exists" (cf. MFL
110.4; p. 137).

The issue here is nothing other than that of the

overturning or Umschlag of ontology into metontology, an issue to be
examined in detail in chapter IV.

The overturning is an immediate

consequence of the ontological inquiry itself, since, because it
elicits the origin of possibility lying at the heart of philosophy,
ontology has no other significance than to make (concrete) philosophy
possible.

And this means that Heidegger's foundational "science"

requires no application and has no "result"--since its sole function is
to make philosophy possible!
It might be objected that even if Heidegger is, in the early
period, concerned with something like a "new beginning" in philosophy,
that nonetheless this new beginning lies in the foundational character
of his own thought, i.e., in the science of Being considered as the
content of a new "first philosophy."

Thus an image of Heideggerian

ontology arises whereby "end"3 means a stopping-place, or a line to be
crossed4, beyond which philosophy would take its clues from that true
insight into its nature proffered in the Heideggerian ontology.
It is difficult to criticize this image tellingly.

But its oddly

unHeideggerian figuring of the character of time overlooks the features
of repetition and possibility which belong to primordial time and which
th!tJ!!.elves constitute its "foundational" character.

Time is the

"origin of possibility," the "condition of the possibility of all
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projecting" (BP 307).

It is thus the dimension of the preservation of

"possibility as possibility" which constitutes the goal, in Being and
Time, of the inquiry into the meaning of death and the attempt to grasp
nasein "as a whole."

In other words, the inquiry into the "end" of

oasein eventuates in the irruption of possibility, in an insight into
that origin or essence which is the source of the possibility of disclosure as such.

Similarly the end of philosophy is something other

than the cessation of the tradition; it is the moment of a glimpse into
its source and thus into the possibility of its renewal and even
transformation.
The dimension of possibility is not the same as that of sequential, chronological time.

The task of the "science of Being" is to

elicit this primal dimension of time, from which arises all projection
of the meaning of Being.

Ontology intends to enable philosophy, to

make it possible, and to let it remain "possible," solely on the basis
of the disclosure of the source of such possibility.

In short, what

lies beyond ontology is not a "Heideggerian" philosophy based upon the
true science of Being, but concrete philosophy--"enabled" by the
apprehension of what lets it arise and "come to presence."

If future

philosophy is transformed because of the accomplishment of the ontological gathering of philosophy into its end--time as the origin, in
repetition, of possibility--it is not because future philosophy builds
upon a supposed fundamentum inconcussum, but because philosophy can now
look to the disclosure in ontology of· the possibility of philosophy as
such.

Ontology is the eidos of philosophy itself.
What precisely is the "way to the [eidos or] idea of philosophy"
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undertaken in MFL?

And, further:

What happens to "philosophy" in this

text as Heidegger works out the repetition of the twofold structure of
metaphysics?

The destruction undertakes a regression, specifically on

the basis of the "traditional concept of logic" ( U).

Henceforth,

Heidegger will again and again return to traditional logic as a
starting-point, and undertake a movement back therefrom into the
ground of the received concepts belonging to the discipline.

Here he

surveys, in a way that becomes characteristic, the traditional field of
the discipline.

Logic itself "asks about the properties in general of

logos, of statement, of that determining where the essence of thinking
as such resides" (MFL 2).
formal logic.

Logic consists of two branches, material and

Material logic is investigation of the thinking approp-

riate to different domains of objects; its concern, in effect, is
regional

onto~.

Formal logic is knowledge of formal thinking, i.e.,

thinking without respect to specific type of content, "neutral with
respect to content" (4).

Heidegger characterizes this "general logic"

as the logic which treats "that which makes thinking, as such, intrinsically possible" (4), thus already suggesting the fulfillment of the
idea of logic in something like a fundamental ontology.
Logic is supposed to be a propaedeutic to philosophy, but academic logic provides no such genuine introduction; the question is "how
should a philosophical logic be set in motion?
an idea of such a logic?"

Where can we get even

The answer lies in the appropriate

regressus:
We shall try to loosen up the traditional logic in such a way
that problems in it become clear, and from the content of these
very problems we shall allow ourselves to be led back into the
presuppositions of this logic. In this way we shall gain
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immediate access to philosophy itself (6).
What is at stake, then, in releasing tradiitonal logic from "petrifaction" (Versteinerung) (6/7) is not so much acquiring a new logic as
gaining "an 'intro-duction' which leads into philosophy itself" (7).
The regression intended to ''loosen up" traditional logic exhibits
the following pattern:

A series of terms, representing certain funda-

mental themes, is elicited from the domain of tradiitonal logic.

Hence

logic as a discipline is reduced to fundamental problems such as
"truth, ground, lawfulness, freedom, concept, Being" (21).

None of

these terms is reducible to the other--" . . . none of these basic
phenomena is more primordial than the other.
(56).

They are equiprimordial"

The problem becomes, then, the "inner constitution of this

equiprimordiality" (56); that is to say, the problem is to open up
these themes, as philosophical issues, in such a way that their interrelatedness and mutual irreducibility becomes clear.

Finally, the

"ground" is sought which makes this equiprimordiality possible (56).
Heidegger adds that "these grounds and foundations are attained by
metaphysics; thus our title:
(56).

'The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic'"

We shall see this pattern confirmed in Heidegger's Destruktion

of Leibniz's logic (cf. ch. II).
The regressus leads to metaphysics--metaphysics is philosophy
dismantled.

If destruction returns philosophy to its sources, then

these sources lie in metaphysics.

And it is in metaphysics that the

"grounds and foundations" of logic--and thus of the sciences--are
attained.

Thus the foundational issue is the central issue of meta-

physics.

Metaphysics is the heir, in MFL, to the fundamental ontology
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of Being and Time and to the ontology of Basic Problems of Phenomen~;

metaphysics takes up the mantle of ontology.

In fact, through

the development of his concept of metaphysics Heidegger incorporates
his earlier work into a more incisive formulation of his own project in
relation to philosophy and the philosophical tradition (cf. the Appendix to MFL, "The Idea and Function of a Fundamental Ontology").

It

is for this reason that Metaphysical Foundations of Logic can provide
the basis for an interpretation of the full significance of the early
project.
With regard to the foundational issue, we soon find that the
inquiry into the foundations of logic serves a quite different function
from that of supplying the grounds for the advancement of "logic" as an
academic discipline.

In fact, the disclosure of the foundations will

bring into question the relationship of logic and the sciences to the
"foundation."

Heidegger will "undermine the foundations," but there is

no guarantee that the foundational enterprise will be able, by beginning "again from the first foundations," to establish something "firm
and lasting in the sciences" (Descartes, Meditation I)5.

If the foun-

dations of logic are "hidden" (verborgen) (21/27), there is what we
might call a caesura or gap between logic and its foundations.

In

exhibiting what the hidden foundations already are, as he does in
ontology, Heidegger suggests implicitly that the sciences are in some
sense delusively founded (just as is "everyday'' existence).

For the

sciences, traditional philosophy and everyday existence are "founded"
upon the forgottenness of Being, i.e. upon the implicit interpretation
of Being as presence--upon, as it were, the concealment and distortion
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of the foundations.
8

The very disclosure of the foundations of logic in

regression to them may disallow any route

ditionally constitutive of logic.

~~ck

to the concepts tra-

This potential "shaking of the

foundations" is implicit even in the fundamental ontology of Being
~nd

Time, as soon as we recognize what it means to exhibit the fact of

the founding of traditional forms of inquiry in the forgottenness of
Being.

There is no guarantee that recovery of the "meaning of Being"

would leave us with the traditional fields of inquiry intact.
Examination of Heidegger's texts shows that in fact he is
peculiarly indifferent to any concrete question of the conceptual
reorganization of any particular science; he seems interested neither
in an attack upon the conceptual structure of any given science nor in
a reformation of the fundamental concepts of any "regional ontology."
He is, however, concerned with the relationship of existing Dasein to
scientific inquiry (cf. MFL 21).

From the standpoint of the founda-

tional problem as such, what is at stake in laying the foundations is
not a "science" which would provide the basic store of concepts for all
other sciences; the issue rather is the

~ossibility

action in general, i.e. of Krounding as such.

of foundational

Metaphysics is the in-

quiry into "that which makes thinking, as such, intrinsically possible"
(4)--it is the inquiry into the intrinsic possibility (source or origin) of thought as the original "grounding" activity, without respect
to the character of any particular region of inquiry.

Because the

science of logic seems to be the arbiter in the realm of thought, it is
logic that is dismantled in order to discern a more fundamental significance to "thinking" than that provided by the traditional discipline.
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The dismantling of logic yields the clue to the character of thinking
as the fundamental grounding activity.
To suppose that fundamental regional concepts could be spun out
of an inquiry into "thinking" as such represents a basic confusion of
"types"--the caesura or chorismos here is that between thinking in
general and its "object" in any particular case, between noesis and

---

noema.

We must, therefore, reject the assumption that Heidegger's

investigations will reflect the traditional conception of the relation
of the foundational inquiry to those disciplines to be "founded."

This

is clearest precisely where Heidegger's language concerning the relationship of the foundational investigation to the positive sciences
echoes Kant's:
Whether we learn to think, in the real sense, by way of
logic depends on whether we arrive at an understanding of thinking in its intrinsic possibility, that is, with regard to lawfulness, truth, ground, concept, Being, and freedom. When we
acquire this understanding for ourselves, even if only in a few
outlines, then we will have warrant to clarify the particular
positive science we are working in from out of its intrinsic
limits, and only then do we take possession of a science, as a
free possession. And science, thus appropriated [zugeeignete],
and only such a science, is in each case the genuine school for
thinking. ( 21/27)
Here we find the same interrelationship between the limits and the
possibilit~

of a science that is exhibited in Kant's treatment of the

understanding.

But Heidegger says nothing about "establishing" the

science of logic.

There is rather a contrast implicit in this para-

graph between the thinking that subjects itself to the canons of a
scientific discipline, and that which is aware of the nature of the
foundatinal activity which underlies the possibility of the construction of the sciences in general.

Only such awareness lets science
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become a "free possession," and allows the discipline to become a
"genuine school for thinking."

What is this foundational activity?

It is nothing other than the projection of the ontological difference.
The following discussion from The Essence of Reasons clarifies the
contrast in question:
The basic concepts of modern science do not include "authentic"
ontological concepts of the Being of the being it treats, nor can
the latter be obtained simply through a "suitable" extension of
the former. Original ontological concepts must instead be
obtained prior to any scientific definition of "basic concepts,"
so that only by proceeding from them WILL WE BE IN A POSITION TO
EVALUATE the manner in which the basic concepts of the sciences
apply to Being as graspable in purely ontological concepts. The
manner in which ontological concepts apply to Being will always
be limited to and circumscribed by a definite point of view. The
"fact" of the sciences, i.e., the factical constituent of the
understanding of Being that is necessarily included in them as in
every way of behaving toward being, is neither a tribunal for
founding the a priori nor the source of our knowledge of the ~
priori but merely a possible clue to the primordial constitution
of the Being of, for example, history or nature. It is a clue
which must itself be constantly subjected to the sort of criticism that has already gotten its bearings in the fundamental
problematic of all inquiry about the Being of being. (ER 25-emphasis mine)
The limitation (as well as the possibility) of scientific thinking lies
in the limited point of view from which the specific science projects
its understanding of the Being of beings, e.g., one derived from the
pre-ontological experience of history or nature.

That science depends

upon such projection can only become clear to ontology.

Science is

"founded" in ontology solely in the sense that the grounding activity
already operative in every science is made explicit for the first time
in ontology's "explicitly carrying out the ontological difference,"
i.e., in its clarifying the nature of the grounding activity as such.
It is through ontology's making this "structure" explicit that science

becomes a "free possession"; here one can speak of something like a
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liberation from what Husserl called the "naivete of the scientific
attitude."
The true concern of the ontological inquiry, as indicated by the
phrase I have emphasized in the passage from ER, is to

~

the under-

standing of the Being of beings from contamination by concepts derived
from the projection at work in the positive sciences.

Heidegger is not

concerned to "proceed" from ontology to science, but to prevent philosophy's proceeding from science to ontology--except by way of a dismantling of the science.
The route to learning to think is undertaken through the dismantling of logic, and leads to a determination of the activity constitutive of thinking--"grounding"--that makes this activity possible.

What

is at issue is thus not the methodology, fundamental concepts and
articulated content of logic as a particular science, but the recovery
of the intrinsic possibility of thinking as such.

Through a return to

the basic problems brought to light through the dismantling of logic,
what is achieved is "a concrete entrance into philosophy itself"--not a
new logic or a reaffirmation of the essentials of traditional logic.
Fundamental ontology demonstrates the intrinsic possibility of
thinking as such.

But what is "thinking," or, equivalently, what is

philosophy in its essence?

If the "sources" (Quellen) of philosophy

lie in metaphysics, what is the nature of metaphysics, such that
philosophy can arise from it?
The determination of the idea of philosophy "from historicity,"
the repetition of metaphysics, requires the destruction for its ful
fillment, but at the same time guides the destruction by providing a
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preconception of the nature of that idea, namely that the "essence" of
philosophy lies in metaphysics.

Through the dismantling of traditional

concepts, philosophy returns to its own source, metaphysics.

As dis-

•antled philosophy, the latter is the "primordial" form of philosophy
covered over in the development of the philosophical tradition.

But if

ancient philosophy is the "gigantic beginning [that] contains within
itself a wealth of truly undeveloped and in part completely hidden
possibilities" (9), this does not mean that the idea of philosophy is
adequately developed by the ancients; it means, on the contrary, that
the possibilities of philosophy that emerge with the beginning remain
latent.

The return to the sources of philosophy in historical recol-

lection cannot directly yield the sought-for idea of philosophy, so
that even in this early text, Heidegger aims for something other than a
simple recovery of Greek thought in its original form.

Nonetheless, it

is only ancient philosophy which corresponds to the "Qresent necessi!}!

[augenblickliche Notwendigkeit] of bringing problems back to

simplicity" (9).
Aristotle in particular is chosen because "he represents the peak
of the development of genuine ancient philosophy" (10).

But even

Aristotle does not bring the conception of philosophy to full clarity;
Heidegger's appeal to Aristotle is already informed by the "present
vision" which guides his inquiry, and it is on its basis that he is
able to elicit the twofold structure of metaphysics.
Aristotle characterizes philosophy as the investigation of the

J; 1<
ov .lov --beings with regard to Being, i.e. solely with regard to what

":»

makes a being the being it is: Being" (10).

Knowledge of Being is
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knowledge of the "first," of the arche.
'.

Philosophy, c,tiv\oGo¢t«. is the

•

f

striving ( ¢1,{05 ) for understanding ( ao<j.t.d....) "of what

precede~

everything else, what is earlier, prior to everything else, that is,
prior to individual beings" (13); what philosophy strives to understand
is thus Being, for Being "is what is first understood before anything
like a being can arise anywhere and in any way" (13).
'°!

7•

i ,,

As striving for knowledge, /\O(fOS, of the ov .l ov , philosophy is
I

ontology ( 13) .
But there is another aspect to the Aristotelean characterization
of philosophy.

Philosophy, for Aristotle, is ~~0Ao¥1K1·

Here, too,

philosophy is science "of the highest, of the first" (11).

In this

case, however, the first is the realm of being as a whole.

"Eh:oAna-€:1'v

is a contemplation of the 1<rfttµ.05" ( 11), 1. e. of
the heavens [die Himmel]: the encompassing and overpowering, that
under and upon which we are thrown, that which dazzles and takes
us by surprise, the overwhelming [das Ubermachtige]. (11)
Philosophy is thus not only ontology, it is also theology.
Here in the Introduction, Heidegger does not explain further
the relation between philosophy as ontology and philosophy as theology.
Nonetheless his succinct statement of the subject-matter of metaphysics
does indicate the direction to be taken by Heidegger's investigation;
he himself suggests the structural relationship between his own task
and the twofold characterization of philosophy elicited from Aristotle's Metaphysics.

Ontology, as knowledge of Being, is referred to

the problem of the understanding of Being; theology, as "knowledge of
the overwhelming," concerns itself with that which holds man "in
thrall" (12).

Therefore "this twofold character corresponds to the
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twofold in Being and Time of existence and thrownness" (11).

Heidegger

thus intimates the possibility of interpreting Being and Time from the
standpoint of the concept of "metaphysics," for "the concept 'metaphysics' encompasses the unity of 'ontology' and 'theology' in the
sense already characterized" (25).

In fact, to offer such an inter-

pretation concerning the significance of the project of Being and Time
is one of the purposes of MFL (cf. !10 and Appendix).
Metaphysics, then, has two parts, ontology and theology; ontology
"deals with . . . Being as such," and theology with "being as a
whole."

This distinction within the structure of metaphysics defines

the structural articulation of Heidegger's own work.

Heidegger

establishes and interprets his own "problematic" in terms of the
relationship between these two parts of metaphysics; indeed, he now
understands his own project as the recovery and repetition of the
metaphysical project which lies concealed at the heart of the
philosophical tradition.

Regression to the source of the tradition,

metaphysics, is completed in a repetition of metaphysics.
Metaphysics takes up the mantle of fundamental ontology; it
"absorbs" the whole of Heidegger's early project, particularly as
articulated in Being and Time and Basic Problems of Phenomenology.
Much of MFL is devoted, as we shall see, to the assimilation of the
earlier work to metaphysics, and to the reformulation of its goals in
terms of the clearer apprehension of the metaphysical project.
Heidegger writes in the Appendix that
By a fundamental ontology we mean the basic grounding of
ontology in general. This includes: 1) a grounding that exhibits
the intrinsic possibility of the Being question as the basic
problem of metaphysics--the interpretation of Dasein as
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temporality; 2) an explication of the basic problems contained in
the question of Being--the temporal exposition of the problem of
Being; . . . (154)
But we have already learned that there is another part to
metaphysics, "theology," an inquiry which we find, according to the
Appendix, arising out of the full development of ontology itself:
3) the development of the self-understanding of this problematic,
its task and limits--the overturning [Umschlag]. (154/196)
Heidegger thus introduces a "dynamic" relationship (metabole) between
the two parts of metaphysics.

Ontology is "overturned" into theology,

and it is nothing other than "the radicalization of ontology [which]
brings about the above-mentioned overturning of ontology out of its
very self" (157).
Heidegger gives to his retrieval of the Aristotelean "theology"
the name metontology (Metontologie).

Its theme is the problem of man

thrown into the midst of the "overwhelming," i.e., of being as a whole,
a problem which arises out of the "intrinsic necessity" for fundamental
ontology to "turn back to its point of origin"

[zurtickschl~gt,

von wo

sie ausgegangen war] (156/199), i.e., to turn back to the "metaphysical
ontic in which it implicitly always remains" (158).

The full develop-

111ent of the concept of existence requires an inquiry into the conditions determining the factical situatedness of Dasein and thus the
possibilities open to his "projection." Ontology itself is possible
only with the factical existence of Dasein:
. Being is there [es gibt Sein] only when man understands
Being. In other words, the possibility that Being is there in
the understanding presupposes the factical existence of Dasein,
and this in turn presupposes the factical extantness of nature.
Right within the horizon of the problem of Being, when posed
radically, it appears that all this is visible and can become
understood as Being, only if a possible totality of beings is
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already there [schon da 1st].
As a result, we need a special problematic which has for
its proper theme being as a whole [das Seiende im Ganzen]. This
new investigation resides in the essence of ontology itself and
is the result of its overturning [Umschlag], its metabole. I
designate this set of questions metont~. (156-57/199)
Heidegger's formulation of the motivation and circumstances of the
overturning is precise, and requires closer examination than we can
give it in these remarks on the Introduction; this passage will be
taken up again in chapter IV.

For present purposes it is adequate to

observe the "concreteness" of the formulation.
11 etontological

The announced theme of

inquiry is that of a "possible totality of beings"

[mogliche Totali tat von Seiendem], of "being as a whole" [das Seiende
im Ganzen].
"arises."

It is in relation to such a whole of beings that ontology
Facticity is brought into relation to the concrete situ-

atedness of Dasein, the specific situation or configuration of being
from out of which Dasein emerges in its existence.

If ontology is

generated by thematizing Dasein's "death," metontology concerns the
site of its "birth."
Thrownness and existence are inseparable moments in the constitution of Dasein, and Heidegger has treated them as intertwined, in
Being and Time, in a manner we cannot take up here.

Nonetheless, Hei-

degger's investigation in Being and Time is oriented from the beginning
toward the question of the meaning of Being ("Being as such," the first
half of metaphysics) and thus toward the horizon of projection. "Theology," the relationship of man to das Seiende im Ganzen, is not explicitly elevated in BT to the status of a problem in its own right.
We have already seen that Heidegger identifies the twofold in
Being and Time with "the twofold . . . of existence and thrownness" (MFL
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1 1) .

Dasein is thrown projection; existence (transcendence) takes over

its thrownness as its Gewesenheit or "having-beenness" in the light of
its

zuk~nft,

that possibility which comes toward it in the taking over

of its authentic "past".

The problem here is to show how Dasein ori-

ginates in a specific "situation," i.e. finds itself in a given world,
already disclosed in a particular manner ("everydayness") in its own
transcendence.

In Being and Time, the analysis says nothing of the

situation into which Dasein is thrown as such; the Situation is considered only from the formal standpoint of the analysis of Dasein's
transcendence.

As thrown, Dasein is for the most part lost in the

world of its concern:
"Dasein gets dragged along in thrownness; that is to say, as
something which has been thrown into the world, it loses itself
in the 'world' in its factical submission to that with which it
is to concern itself" (BT 400).
But Dasein can come back to itself in anticipatory resoluteness:

"The

authentic coming-towards-oneself of anticipatory resoluteness is at the
same time a coming-back to one's ownmost Self, which has been thrown
into its individualization" (BT 388).

Thrownness is understood from

the standpoint of Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-Being.

Either it

forgets itself in the 'world' into which it is thrown, or, alternatively, it takes over its thrownness to become that which it already
authentically is.

But this means that it takes over its 'world' as

its own, for the sake of resolute disclosure of the situation in which
it finds itself.

Thus the "twofold" of SZ, thrownness and existence,

are considered together from the standpoint of the problem of transcendence, and thus from the standpoint of the development of a fundamental
ontology.

But it turns out that it is possible, and indeed necessary,
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to conceive of "transcendence'' from the standpoint of the "situation"
into which it is thrown, and, surpassing which, it discloses in
transcendence.
The situation, considered in itself, is nothing other than the
"whole of beings" (das Seiende im Ganzen) "into which" Dasein is
thrown.

The overturning of fundamental ontology is an overturning into

the problematic of the realm of "being as a whole" into relation to
which is thrown, and in relation to which Dasein's transcendence
happens (geschiehtl.

The metontology takes up the issue of the

happening of the transcendence of Dasein in relation to the prevailing
order into which Dasein is thrown: the "overwhelming," das tibermachtige.

Thus "thrownness" can be said to appear twice in the

developing problematic of metaphysics:

first as subordinated to

transcendence, and then in such a way that the problem of transcenis taken up on the basis of its relation to the whole into which Dasein
is thrown.

The overturning of ontology means that the event of tran-

scendence must be rethought from the standpoint of the original
relatedness of transcendence, as an event, to the

"whole" of beings.

The problem of the metontology is that of how Dasein "happens,"
how it effects an irruption, or rather is as an irruption, into an
already extant whole of beings, into an already prevailing 'world'.
We can now understand the change of perspective which has
occurred in a text like What is Metaphysics?.

This text--and the same

remains true for virtually all other texts of the "middle period" (the
new approach defines the "middle period")--begins with the factical
situatedness of Dasein, its finding itself thrown into the midst of
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being as a whole.

Thus in What is Metaphysics? "the question of the

nothing proves to be such that it embraces the whole of metaphysics"
(BW 110).

The nothing is encountered, however, in the fundamental mood

of anxiety, which "not only reveals beings as a whole in various
ways, . . . this revealing . . . is also the basic occurrence of our
oa-sein" (102).

What is at stake in the "nihilating" of the nothing,

in WM, is the occurrence of the transcendence of Dasein, in which
nothing less transpires than the irruption by one being called
"man" into the whole of beings, indeed in such a way that in and
through this irruption beings break open and show what they are
and how they are. (97)
Heidegger says furthermore in WM that:
occurrence of Dasein.

"Metaphysics is the basic

It is Dasein itself" (112).

Heidegger gathers

the fundamental ontological inquiry undertaken in his early work into
the question of metaphysics, i.e., that of the irruption of Dasein into
the midst of being as a whole.

"'Metaphysics' is the fundamental event

[Grundgeschehen] which comes to pass with the irruption into being of
the concrete existence of man" (KPM 251/218).

In the lectures and

texts following the publication of Being and Time, "metaphysics" means
the twofold metaphysics of Dasein:

the problem of the possibility of

something like an understanding of Being (fundamental ontology, the
investigation of transcendence, or the ground of the possibility of
metaphysics), and the problem of the relation of transcendence itself
to that "whole of beings" in relation to which transcendence "occurs."
If we conceive of Heidegger's work as beginning with an inquiry
into the "hermeneutics of facticity," then we can say that in the
metontology Heidegger returns to his starting-point, bringing the
hermeneutic enterprise full circle.

But this return within the scope
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of the hermeneutic circle does not end in a reiteration of the initial
formulation of the problematic of facticity, but to a re-initiation of
Heidegger's project on the basis of his retrieval of "metaphysics."
Thus the metontology does not simply recapitulate the relationship
between the existentiell and the existential, but represents a sharpening of the problem of the ontic "origin" of Dasein's transcendence.
rt is now necessary to account for the origin of transcendence on the
basis of Dasein's originary situatedness in the midst of being as a
whole.

The dispersal of Dasein implicit in this conception--since the

problem of "being as a whole" implies the problem of the concrete
individuation of the event of transcendence, with reference to a
particular "configuration" of being--opens up the problem of transcendence to that of

hi~tory.

Metontology leads, as we shall see, to

the problematic of the Seinsgeschichte.
Dasein projects an understanding of Being, not in the void of a
worldless transcendental subjectivity, but as itself a being already
thrown into the midst of a totality of beings.

The problematic of the

metontology is that of the ontic whole wherein Dasein finds itself
situated in the very act of disclosive projection.

The metontology

overturns the ontological standpoint because it shows that temporalization itself "occurs" in the midst of beings.

But this means that

temporalization cannot provide the most radical "answer" to the question of the meaning of Being; it means that Dasein cannot be the
ultimate source or origin, as fundamental ontology requires it to be,
of metaphysics as interpretation of Being.

Dasein, the site of the

meaning of Being, is itself situated in the midst of beings.

One of
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the motivations of the so-called "turn" lies in the fact that with
the metontology, a more radical questioning of the origin becomes
necessary.
The problem of the origin is that of the way the question of
Being arises with the existence of man; it is the problem of the
relation of the "basic question of philosophy and the question of man"
('IV).

The problem of that upsurgance of the question of Being which

can occur in human existence is sometimes formulated as the problem of
freedom, as in MFL and On the Essence of Truth.

But the investigation

of this problem must also take account of the "finitization" (Verendlichung) of human being, an issue emphasized in Kant and the Problem of
Metaphysics and the Introduction to Metaphysics.
The question of Being, Heidegger says,
is not arbitrary and not applied to man externally, but is more
or less stirring in man insofar as he exists at all as human, and
because human Dasein takes this question over, as it were, along
with human existence, this question has, as a burgeoning problem,
its own necessities. This is why the latter manifest themselves
already in the first steps of philosophy (MFL 15).
These "necessities" manifest themselves in the fact that, throughout
the tradition, from Parmenides for whom the "clarification of Being
takes place by way of a reflection on 'thinking, ' noein," (15) to
Hegel's defining of substance from the subject, "human Dasein moves to
the center" (15).

Here the "field becomes visible .

. upon which the

K!g_antomachia peri tou ontos takes place, the battle of the giants over
Being" (15).
Thus man is already the site of the polemos, the conflict which
"breaks out from human Dasein as such" (16), that polemos which is the
focus of Heidegger's interpretation, with reference to Heraclitus,
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parmenides, and Sophocles, of the relation of Being and thinking in the
!,ntroduction to Metaphysics.

In the later text Heidegger says that

According to Heraclitus what man is is first manifested.
in QQ_lemos, in the separation of gods and men, in the
irruption of Being itself. For philosophy what man is is not
written somewhere in heaven. We must rather say:
3. The question of what man is must always be taken in its
essential bond with the question of how it stands with Being.
The question of man is not an anthropological question but a
historically meta-physical question. (IM 140)
Heidegger writes also of "the conflict between the overwhelming
presence of being as a whole and man's violent being-there" (162).
Where is this conflict enkindled?

The "gigantomachia," the

battle of the giants, is a battle of Titans, of the gods of the earth.
The battle "breaks out from Dasein as such," and Dasein is a being
among beings, in the midst of the totality of beings.

What is

essential, from the standpoint of the problem, resolutely entertained
as a problem, is that there is "nothing" beyond beings.

The ques-

tioning of the relationship of man to the question of Being is
resolutely a-theistic.

There "is" nothing but being, das

Seie~~

Ganzen; the problems of freedom and finitude are possible as problems
only insofar as it is recognized that the inquiry into the origin of
metaphysics excludes consideration of an origin "beyond" being.

Man

himself is the field of the conflict; the problem of the "beginning" is
placed back here into its metaphysical antic, from which it arises and
"in which it implicitly always remains" (MFL 158).
The problem of finitude is that of how transcendence arises on
the basis of finitude (KPM, Section IV), and this problem can be
formulated with philosophical precision only i f every concept of an
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ttother" to the totality of beings is rigorously excluded.

In this

sense, Heidegger's questioning is already resolutely anti-"metaphysical."

The transcendence of man is founded in his holding himself

out into the Nothing; in his finitude, he transcends or "passes beyond"
beings to no being, to nothing ontic.

That World is "nothing," that in

the event of transcendence, the "nothing nothings," must be understood
rigorously, to mean that what occurs in transcendence is solely an
affair of the realm of beings.

The battle takes place on an earthly

battlefield.
One of the questions concerning the nature of the "turn" is
whether the latter signifies a relaxing of the rigorously a-theistic
character of the early questioning, so that "Being"--which is now
questioned "by itself"--has something of the character of a transcendent "source" for the happening of truth.

An investigation of this

question (and whether this question is even correctly posed) we shall
defer for the present.
The present section (IV) of the Introduction to MFL has the
character of a sketch; the problems which Heidegger surveys here are
taken up again and again with increasing rigor, so that here we have
only something like an "outline," through which the elements of the
problem are placed into relationship with one another.

Thus when

Heidegger says that "the basic question of philosophy, the question of
Being, is in itself, correctly understood, the question of man" (16),
and yet that "the important thing is to raise the question of man in
view of the problem of Being" (16), we catch only a glimpse of the
difficulty of the set of inquiries which the problem of the inter-
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relationship of man and Being initiates.

As late as 1956, in his

Addendum to "The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger says concerning
that text that the relation between man and Being is "unsuitably
conceived"-a distressing difficulty, which has been clear to me since Being
and Time and has since been expressed in a variety of versions.
(PLT 87)
Before leaving this section, let us take note of the interplay in
Heidegger's lecture here of the metaphysical themes of ontology and
metontology.

Heidegger reminds us that "human Dasein is a being with a

kind of Being to which it belongs essentially to understand something
like Being.

We call this the transcendence of Dasein, primal tran-

scendence" (MFL 16), and he refers here to the second part of the
lecture course--showing, incidentally, that the question of grounding
in Metaphysical Foundations of Logic belongs primarily to the "ontological" theme, not the metontological.
But the question of Being is also the question of man, so that
ontology is also at once intertwined with the metontological theme:
That the basic ontological question of philosophy has
somehow to do with beings as a whole, as well as thereby with
human existence and in such a way that the existence of the one
philosophizing is in each case decided, this i~ expressed in
Aristotle by the fact that "first philosophy" is, at the same
time, theologike. (17)
The two are intertwined in that philosophizing (in which the question
of Being is addressed) is only significant in relation to the decision
thereby made with regard to the existence of the one philosophizing.
"Philosophy, in its innermost ground, is the most radical, universal,
and rigorous conceptual knowledge" (17)--i.e., it is ontology.
Nonetheless, "the proofstone of philosophical truth consists solely in
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the loyalty the philosophizing individual has to himself" (17).
the "existential" and the ''existentiell" are inseparable.

Here

We shall see

that the unity of metaphysics, i.e., the unity of ontology and metontology, is thematized by Heidegger under the rubric of freedom (18).
The latter problem, however. comes into its own only with the "overturning" of ontology into metontology, because the problem of freedom
is precisely that of the ''happening" of truth in the midst of being as
a whole.
Indeed, we shall be able to observe in Metaphysical Foundations
of Logic

the initial steps of Heidegger's transition to the "middle

period," with its focus upon the problem of truth as opposed to that of
time.

Both the turn-over into the metontology and the reorganization,

to be observed in this text, of the problems of fundamental ontology
around the issue of "ground" are aspects of this change.

Of course,

MFL with its inquiry into logic as the "metaphysics of truth" can be
understood to supply the missing fourth chapter of Part Two of
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Problems of Phenomenology--just as the latter is supposed to belong to
the missing Third Division of Part One of Being and Time--namely, the
chapter on the truth-character of Being.

Thus MFL represents a con-

tinuation of the early ontological project, even while it undertakes
the work of reorganization and transition.
The concept of metontology prepares the way for the reformulation
of Heidegger's inquiry into the "question of the meaning of Being" on
the basis of truth, aletheia, as opposed to the ontological formulation
of the question in terms of the horizon of temporality.

Meanwhile the

principal task of the present text is the restatement of the problems
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of fundamental ontology on the basis of the issue of grounding.

What

is at stake in fundamental ontology is, in the end, the nature of the
"grounding event," the "happening" of the transcendence of Dasein.
Heidegger will show how "world" comes to pass with this event--what is
grounded is "world."

Focusing upon the problem of ground clarifies the

founding nature of the event; this clarification suggests that what is
actually at stake in fundamental ontology is not a search for a dogmatic version of the "true" meaning of Being, but an attempt to elucidate
the character of the world-instituting event, the origin of world.

Nor

is what is accomplished in fundamental ontology merely an exhibition of
the basis of the positive sciences; more fundamentally, it is a disclosure of the source or "possibility" of the coming-to-pass of a
world.
Thus Heidegger's regression upon logic engages the dimension of
"thinking," not in order to establish a reformation, however fundamental, of the science of logic, but in order to establish the possibility of the "act" of grounding that takes place in thinking.
"Thinking" here is understood as the event of transcendence and has,
in the end, nothing to do with subjective processes of ratiocination.
Thus in seeking the "grounds which make thinking possible," what is
sought are "the bases [Griinde] for understanding, existence, the
understanding of Being, Dasein, and primal transcendence" (19).

The

question is, "How are ground and Dasein related to one another?" (20).
That Heidegger is reorganizing the problems of fundamental
ontology around those of ground shows why he chooses Leibniz as an
"appropriate place" (geeignete Stelle) (22) for the "critical dis-
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mantling of logic down to its hidden foundations" (21).

If the prob-

lem of ground is that of primal transcendence (metaphysics), then the
dismantling of the philosophical tradition itself is accomplished in
the dismantling of logic; and the central principle of logic is that
of Leibniz's principle of ground.

In other words, the Destruktion of

Leibniz's "doctrine of judgment down to basic metaphysical problems"
(27) addresses the central issue in the dismantling of the tradition as
a whole:

what is the source of the possibility of "thinking" as such?

NOTES
1 . one may object to this translation, since it does not convey the
sense of "drawing up again" that is implicit in Wiederholung, and since
repetition often signifies mere reiteration in English. In fact, I
have sometimes used "retrieval" or even "recovery" as the translation
of Wiederholu~. Nonetheless, thee are reasons to use repetition as
the central, if not the only, rendering of this term. The strongest
argument in favor of "repetition" is that, even in English, it retains
the connection with the tradition which Wiederholung intends, in that
(for example) we are familiar with repetition in Plato (S~mposium); we
can speak of repetition in Kierkegaard, but not retrieval, and we think
of Augustine as having a doctrine of repetition (the soul's return to
God in self-knowledge). Thus we can say that in Heidegger's work the
concept of repetition comes to suggest the whole of the process of retrieval, appropriation and transformation which together constitute the
Heideggerian "methodology." But "retrieval" seems to imply bringing
back (Wiederbringen) that which once was present, the restoration of a
former state--and this is not at all what Heidegger intends by Wiederholung. Furthermore, we should like to be able, in certain contexts,
to speak of a repetition where it seems odd to speak of retrieval; for
example, with reference to the repetition of the First Major Part of
MFL in the Second Major Part.
2. As Rodolphe Gasche points out in his recently published work,
The Tain of the Mirror (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986),
p. 115. Gasche, too, finds in Heidegger's method something like a
"retrogression to the origin," although he develops this insight in
the context of a comparison with Husserl's methodlogy in Experience
and Judgment (pp. 109 ff.).
3. For an excellent discussion of the relationship of ontology to the
problem of the "end" of philosophy and thus to the overcoming of the
oblivion of Being, see John Sallis, "End(s)," in Delimitations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), pp. 128-38.
4. For a critique of the image of the line, cf. The Question of Bei~.
tr. Jean T. Wilde and William Kluback (New Haven: College and University Press, 1958), pp. 33-43.
5. Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on Flrst Philosophy, tr. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.,
1980), p. 57.
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Chapter II
Leibniz's Doctrine of Judgment and its Destruktion
The destructive analysis of Leibniz's doctrine of judgment is set
into the context of the question of the relation of thinking to beings,
of thinking to Being, and of thinking itself as a way of Being (MFL
27).

The path undertaken here, meant to be "a concrete path of re-

flection on what makes thinking possible as such" (27), first asks
whether Being or thinking is "most proximate" (27); for the modern
tradition, i t is thinking that is "nearest."

Yet the question remains

whether, for Leibniz, thinking (logic) is prior to or dependent upon
metaphysics (ontology).

The issue of whether logic or metaphysics

guides the construction of Leibniz's system was already a current one
in the Leibniz scholarship of Heidegger's day.

Couturat's La Logique

de Leibniz (1901) and Russell's A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy
of Leibniz (1900), especially, are mentioned; both of these works argued for the precedence of logic over metaphysics in Leibniz's thought.
In any case, it is the

am~iguity

of this relationship within the Leib-

nizian text that guides the direction of Heidegger's inquiry.

The

specific route taken by the Destruktion is the one required in order to
resolve this ambiguity.

tl.

Characterization of the the general structure of judgment
Thus the discussion is oriented by contemporary scholarly at-

tempts to determine whether logic or ontology dominates in the construction of Leibniz's thought.

Heidegger's analysis begins with the
57
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theory of judgment (logic, "thinking") and will remain alert to the
presence of ontological elements within this theory.
The theory of judgment is for Leibniz a theory of inclusion.

In

every true statement, "the subject must contain the predicate in itself, whether explicitly or implicitly" (32).

But what does "sub-

ject" mean here? Apparently substance itself is understood "from the
viewpoint of the logical subject," although "the converse is also quite
possible" (33).

Many passages in Leibniz assimilate the ontic subject

to the logical, i.e., "substance" to "subject."

But this assimilation

takes place in each case via the concept of truth.

The essence of

truth consists, according to Leibniz, in the relation of being-in.

But

Inclusion is as such an inclusion in logos, a logical inclusion;
and as intending the being itself, it is an ontic inclusion. The
peculiarity is that both of these in a certain way coincide.
(35)
Thus the situation with regard to the priority of being or logos cannot
be clarified until we have "forged ahead to the final metaphysical
foundations of this theory of judgment" (35).
The first task is the more precise characterization of inclusion
or the inesse.
!2.

Judgment and the idea of truth.

The basic forms of truth

Because "being true is the being true of propositions" (37), the
question is how the concept of judgment is to be connected with that of
the essence of truth in Leibniz.

Heidegger shows that, for Leibniz,

the essence of truth lies in identity.

Truth means the truth of judg-

ments, so that the problem of truth centers on the connection of the
predicate with the subject.

This connection, as we have seen, is of
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the nature of inclusion, or being-in,

t~.

For Leibniz, however,

the type of statement exemplary of the nature of being true is "the
simplest and most primordial true statements, . . . the primary
•truths'" (38), such as "A is A."

Statements like these have the

character of identities, "propositions in which something is explicitly asserted as itself in its sameness to itself and with regard to that
sameness" (38).

Furthermore, for Leibniz, all true statements are

reducible, through definition or analysis, to such primary identities;
therefore "all true statements are finally reducible to identities"
(39).

Thus the essence of truth "resides in identity" (39).
Heidegger now wishes to show that this definition and the prob-

lems connected with it land us immediately in "the ontological problematic, the question about Being as such" (39).

In the first instance,

identity, which for Leibniz constitutes the essence of truth, is traditionally one of the principal features of Being (a "transcendental").
Heidegger will show, furthermore, that Leibniz's division of truth into
original and derivative truths "has its metaphysical, ontological background" (41).

Thus he proceeds to resolve the ambiguity between logic

and ontology by exhibiting the metaphysical substructure that is concealed in Leibniz's theory of judgment.
In the division into two types of truths, original truths are
those primary propositions for which no proof is posssible, since "they
are in themselves immediately evident" (41).
explicit identities, identities as such.

These are the class of

Derived truths are further

classified into two types of truths, necessary and contingent.

Neces-

sary truths are "virtual" identities, i.e., they can be reduced to
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explicit identities; conversely, they can be deduced by us from identities.

contingent truths Hare also identities in essence, but their

analysis, their proof, never comes to an end--for finite understanding"
(41).

For God, however, contingent truths can be analyzed into identi-

ties, and therefore can be deduced from these.

Implicit in the whole

of this scheme is the a priori character of all knowledge.
Heidegger proceeds to show the metaphysical basis of this concept
of knowledge, for which even truths of fact are grounded in eternal
truths--not, to be sure, in logical identities, but in the "very concept of the subject" (monad) (43).
be truths of identity.

Thus contingent truths, too, would

What is the metaphysical basis of this tendency

to assimilate truths of fact to truths of identity?
In the first instance, Leibniz, as a "rationalist," conceives
Being, including the Being of facts, from the standpoint of the ratio
(43).

More importantly, the Scholastic tradition exerts a principal

influence here.

The Scholastic doctrine of God is "the key to Leib-

niz's logic" (43).
At this point an indication of a key element in Heidegger's
destructive strategy is in order.

Having begun with the problematic

situation (aporia), the ambiguity encountered in attempting to determine which of logic or ontology is more fundamental in Leibniz 1 s
thought, and focusing on the manifestly "logical" theory of the
doctrine of judgment, Heidegger shows, in effect, that the issue is
undecidable on the basis of the express formulations of the Leibnizian
text alone.

Heidegger then demonstrates the presence in Leibniz's

thought of metaphysical (Scholastic) doctrines guiding his theory of
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judgment.

The priority of logic or ontology with reference to Leib-

niz's theory cannot be determined as long as the inquiry remains at the
level of the overt, "logical" discourse that constitutes the "given" of
Leibniz's text.

Heidegger's Destruktion wishes to exhibit the sources

of the Leibnizian philosophical discourse.

This engagement with the

sources of the tradition will serve, in the end (as we have already
seen in Ch. I), the function of that repetition which seeks a renewal
of philosophical thinking from its source.

Thus Destruktion is not

"endless" in principle, but has a determinate goal--one which, to be
sure, cannot be achieved forthwith but requires, for Heidegger, the
constant "repetition" of precisely this task of retrieval of the
source.
Hence the Destruktion, as a "regression to the origin,"

makes

use of concrete and, indeed, scholarly procedures as Heidegger locates
the sources of Leibniz's theory of judgment in Scholastic metaphysics.
There is, in this analysis, something like a topology at work, to
borrow an expression from Heidegger's later phase.l

Heidegger dis-

cerns in Leibniz's text--to take one example--the topos of truth and
the relation of the latter to identity.

The themes belonging to this

topos are preserved even while they undergo a certain process of transformation in Heidegger's own work, so that the language of aletheia and
of the Same remains related to that of traditional metaphysics. I cannot trace the full process of transformation at which Heidegger's
"overcoming" of metaphysics aims here; but we can observe the beginnings, at least, of the process of transformation in Heidegger's act
of revealing the "place" of the Leibnizian text in relation to the
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tradition.
Heidegger traces the source of the Leibnizian ideal of cognition,
according to which all truths can be reduced to "original" truths,
f.e .• truths of identity, to the Scholastic notion of the scientia Dei,
the knowledge that belongs to God.

Thus he shows how Leibniz's concept

of truth originates in the metaphysical tradition.

Heidegger's ex-

plication of this concept is based for the most part upon Aquinas's
article De scientia Dei (Quaestio XIV in Part I of Summa Theologica).
There are two types of divine knowledge, scientia necessaria
~alis,

naturally necessary knowledge, and scientia libera, free

knowledge.

The division is based upon a relationship within divine

knowedge to "possibility."

God has a knowledge of pure possibilities

as such--the essences of things--regardless of whether these possibilities are actualized or not (44).

Scientia necessaria naturalis is

the knowledge that belongs to the nature of God; namely, "it belongs to
God's essence simply to think the totality of what is possible" (44).
This is, in effect, "thought thinking itself," noesis noeseos:
In the knowledge of his thinking, God knows what is thought in
this absolute thinking, i.e., the totality of reality, the
omnitudo realitas, pure possibilities. (44)
Apart from the concept of pure possibility, the notion of the
"possible" also means "that which in actuality is not yet but will be
. . all that which is not only in general possible, but also determined" (44).

God has perfect precognition of what will thus become

actual:
God has, moreover, a precognition of everything actual, a Y!J!!.Q.,
a scientia libet!!, because whatever does become actual remains
ultimately a matter of his willing it. (44)
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This visio "is a grasping in the manner of a

~raesens

intuitus . . . . a

look which must be taken to range over the whole, as present before God
who has everything existing presently before him" (45).

The fact that

God knows everything, past, present and future, "equally present in his
presentness [Gegenwartigkeit]" (46), bears upon the nature of truth as
identity.

In finite knowing, knowledge proceeds by composition and

division, in the proposition; but "what for us is a separate and
successive attribution of predicates is for God an original unity, a
sameness, identity" (47).

(Thus the logical concept of identity is

grounded in a metaphysical concept of the co-presence of all beings
before the divine intuitus.)
For God, then, in the visio of scientia libera, contingent truths
already have the character of identities.

This assimilation of truths

of fact to truths of reason is, for Leibniz, the ideal for human cognition.

"He defines the idea and essence of human knowledge, i.e., of

truth and of the statement, from the idea of the scientia Dei" (47-8).
Following this explication of the metaphysical background to
Leibniz's concept of truth, Heidegger now shows how the idea of truth
as identity is further related to the principles of knowledge (sufficient reason, non-contradiction).

,3.

The idea of truth and the principles of knowledge
In this section, Heidegger notes once again an ambiguity in

Leibniz's thought, in this case one that obtains among the principles
of knowledge in their relationship to one another.

According to the

conventional understanding of Leibniz, the two basic principles of
knowledge are correlated with the two types of truth: truths of
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reasoning with the law of non-contradiction, and truths of fact with
the principle of sufficient reason (52).

Nonetheless, this

straightforward correlation does not represent the true complexity of
the situation.
~tates

evident:

originariae require no grounding, since they are self-

"they are themselves grounds" (53).

But both necessary

truths, i.e., truths of reason in general, and contingent truths do
require grounding.
They fall under the principium rationis, or better, under the
principium reddendae rationis, the principle of demonstrating
grounds, i.e., the resolutio (the principle of the need for
proof ) . ( 53)
This seems to be the crux of the matter.

Although Leibniz does not

fully clarify the issue, even necessary truths, subject to the
priniciple of non-contradiction, are also subject to the principium
reddendae rationis.

The reason for this is that necessary proposi-

tions, subject to the principle of non-contradiction can be reduced to
identities.

But reducibility is a kind of demonstrability, so in some

sense the principle of grounds "is more primordial than the principle
of non-contradiction" (53).

Furthermore, Heidegger

understands

Leibniz to say that the principle of sufficient reason follows from the
definition of truth as identity, meaning that without the principle of
sufficient reason there could be no proof, i.e .. reduction to identities, and thus there could be no truth (55).

It already begins to

appear that the principle of sufficient reason is the basic principle
of knowledge.
But Heidegger wishes first of all to show the irreducible
interconnectedness obtaining among the principles and terms of
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This summary of the principles of knowledge shows their
connection with identity as the essence of truth. Identity is,
however, the basic feature of the Being of all beings . . . . A
connection emerges between reason, or ground, and truth and
Being, with reference to identity. (55)
The question is how these terms fit together.

What it is important to

notice is that no decision is possible with regard to the equiprimordiality of a single term:
primordial than the other.

"(N]one of these basic phenomena is more
They are equiprimordial" (56).

Thus

Heidegger turns the ambiguity to be found in Leibniz's work regarding
the primacy of one term or principle over another, into an equiprimoraiality obtaining among the basic terms.
This result, however, is not meant as a solution but provides a
way of further sharpening the central problem, which now becomes:

"l)

the inner constitution of this equiprimordiality, and 2) the ground
which makes it possible" (56).

Just as one step is taken toward

resolving the ambiguity of the relationship between logic and metaphysics in Leibniz's thought by showing the dependence of Leibniz's
logical inquiries upon the Scholastic metaphysical tradition--a method
of going ''outside" the ambiguous structure to show its hidden basis in
the tradition--so here another kind of step is taken toward overcoming
a fundamental ambiguity in Leibniz's logical theory.

The equiprimor-

diality of the basic logical terms is grounded in something other than
logic, namely metaphysics:
The fundamental meaning of the principle of reason first becomes
clear . . . when one realizes that the main principles of
Leibnizian metaphysics are based on it and that Leibniz even
deduces his metaphysical principles from it. (55-6)
The principle of sufficient reason is not primarily logical, but
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etaphysical, since it concerns the grounding of "reason" itself.

This

transition to a metaphysical ground belongs, as we shall see, to the
grounding of thought in general in the transcendence of Dasein; thus
Heidegger says here that "the question concerns the nature of the
integrity (non-decomposability) of this equiprimordial dimension of the
transcendental" ( 56) .
As I have already indicated above, Heidegger's geschichtliche

-

Erinnerung exhibits a pattern that suggests something like a
"topology," since Heidegger is seeking to locate logic within its

proper dimension.

(Cf. note 1, above.)

Thus Heidegger insists upon

the non-decomposability of the equiprimordial dimension of these
elements, i.e., the logical terms, since the dimension of their equiprimordiality, transcendence, is not another element with an independent subsistence, a "one" beyond the "many"; it is nothing other than
the "dimension" constitutive of their equiprimordiality.2
Heidegger's discussion here concerns, then, "how the main phenomena of what is discussed in logic refer back to metaphysics" (56-7).
But his demonstration of this relationship aims toward something other
than a foundation for the rebuilding of logic; for "the dismantling of
logic is itself part of the grounding of metaphysics" (57).

This

requires nothing less than an Auseinandersetzung "with the whole of the
previous tradition" (57), and the site of this "confrontation" is, for
the present inquiry, Leibniz's doctrine of judgment.

14.

The idea of knowledge as such
In the present section Heidegger demonstrates in greater detail

the dependency of the Leibnizian ideal of knowledge upon the ideal of
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the

~~i~qti~_Dei.

~~Q!C!_si~~esentialtter

eraesens, which has the character of
~ciE!_ns,

"bringing everything before itself in its presentness"

(58), is deduced, in effect, from the
~implicitas

int~itt.!§

The mode of knowledge of the latter,

sim~licitas

of God.

The

Dei is itself the "guiding ideal of what, in the genuine

sense, is" (69), and therefore exhibits the grounding of Leibniz's idea
of knowledge in an ontology, i.e., in an interpretation of Being.
Heidegger presents an elegant and clear analysis of Leibniz's
treatise on the essential characteristics of knowledge,
cognitione, Veritate et Ldeis (1684).

~~~itati~

de

Here I shall review only the

principal elements of that analysis in order to bring out the relevant
topoi.
Leibniz writes (Gerhardt IV, 422):
Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear knowledge is either
confused or distinct; distinct knowledge is either inadequate or
adequate, and also either symbolic or intuitive. The most
perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive.
(59)

Heidegger summarizes these relations in a diagram:
knowledge

obscur.---~
confused

.. clear

~

inadequate---- distinct

~

(symbolic)
blind - - -

:::c::
(most perfect)

Obscure notions are those which do not allow for the clear
differentiation of things different in themselves, i.e .• which do not
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allow for the recognition of a thing as of one kind rather than another; clear notions are those which do allow of such demarcation.
Even if one has a clear notio, however, one may not be able to "enumerate one by one the marks which are sufficient to distinguish this
clearly known thing from others"; in this case, even though one's
knowledge is clara it is nonetheless confusa.

What is at stake here is

the capacity to define a thing through its distinguishing characteristics, as opposed to the capacity to distinguish things at the level
of sensory experience.

A clear knowledge is distincta when we do

indeed have "sufficient marks and characteristics to distinguish the
thing from other similar things" (60-1).
"nominal" definition of the thing.

Here it is possible to have a

A nominal definition "does not mean

a simple verbal definition," but "a knowledge with content, though not
the really primary knowledge" (61)--a knowledge sufficient to enumerate
the "marks" of the thing named.

Thus a

cognitio distincta is one in which the object named as such is
not only clearly distinguished from another, but in which also
the marks of its difference are expressly enumerable. (61)
Even though such marks are enumerable, the marks taken by themselves may be confused; in this case knowledge is inadequate,
inadaeguata.

~Q&.nitio

Knowledge is adequate when analysis is carried out to the

end and "confusion is no longer possible" (62).
What is important here is that adequate knowledge represents an
ideal of knowledge, since it may be impossible for a human being to
carry out such an analysis to the end.

Furthermore, "the mathematical

ideal of knowledge appears again in connection with this idea of
knowledge" (62).
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Cognitio adaequata is possible for us only in an indirect way:
"Instead of maintaining ourselves in the total intuition of things, we
use signs" (62).

This "blind" knowledge is the way that human beings

appropriate adequate, i.e., fully analyzed knowledge.

It is contrasted

with "seeing," intuitive knowledge, which is "not a still higher degree
of analysis, but a mode of appropriating the highest state of analysis,
i.e., of its result, of cogntio adaequata" (64).

It means to look into

"the distinct totality simultaneously; to bring to complete presence"
(64).

This manner of possessing knowledge
implies the orientation to the ideal described earlier as God's
way of knowing, the knowledge of the simplest being, ens simplicissimum. Intuitus is therefore: 1) direct grasp, 2) grasp of
what is not further analyzable in its wholeness. (64)

Adequate knowledge is thus distinguished from distinct knowledge, not
merely by greater clarity, but by what is in effect a different type of
knowledge.

For here "all marks are present in clarity, and among them

'natures' as well, essential determinations, i.e., what makes the thing
itself possible" (64).

Heidegger adds that "with Leibniz the distinc-

tion between essentia and existentia is again fluid" (64).

With the

concept of adequate knowledge, the ideal of knowledge moves into the
realm of essentia, i.e., that of possibilitas, "the inherent possibility of the thing."
Heidegger is engaged, even in this seemingly straightforward
analysis, in something like a repetition of the relation of essentia
and existentia, which, relying upon the Leibnizian precedent, will
result in a clarification of the relationships to be established
between ontology and metontology.

If ontology is fundamentally con-

cerned, as we have already seen in our introductory remarks, with
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essence or

~ossibility,

then we can expect the metontology to consti

tute the Heideggerian transmutation of existentia or "actuality."
Possibility for Leibniz signifies compatibility among its marks:
Adequate knowledge as knowledge of essence is a priori knowledge
of what makes the known itself possible, for it is the clear
grasp of thorough compatibility, compatibilitas. (65)
Real definition, definitiones reales, is associated with adequate
knowledge, since it is in real definitions that "the thing is established as possible" (65).
Heidegger notes here by way of parenthesis that the Kantian transcendental inquiry constitues a radicalization of Leibniz's doctrine
of possibilitas, to which belongs realitas.

Thus the problem of the

"objective reality of the categories" is that of their realitas, not
empirical determinations of appearances but the way that categories
determine objects from their "transcendental reality, a finite,
horizonal-ecstatic reality" (65).
in the transcendental imagination.

Kant "grounds ontological knowledge
Intuitus gains a constitutive

character" ( 67).
The problem now is to connect the earlier interpretation of truth
as identity to its definition in relation to the idea of knowledge,
i.e., as adequate intuitive perceptum esse, "being adequately perceived
intuitively" (68).

A close examination of what is meant by adequate

knowledge enables us to see its connection with identity:
In adequate knowledge that which is known is the totum of
the reguisita, i.e., that which, as a whole, constitutes the
reality of a thing. This thing known is the true, the verum; the
totality of the requisita is the possibilitas, that which makes
possible the thingness of the thing. This content of the res is
compatible with itself, for only by being compatible can i t make
possible. Incompatibility as conflict breaks apart, as it were,
the essence of a thing; it falls apart and "can" not "be." What
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is known in adequate knowledge is the coherent connection of the
thing's mutually compatible determinations. In fact, the thing,
if adequately known, is known precisely with regard to the compatibility of its realities. Adequate knowledge is the total
grasp of the harmony of multiplicity" (68).
However, "identity," in relation to the judgment, means that what is
grasped in the connectio realis characterizing true judgment not only
does not come into conflict with itself, "but all is in itself unified
and, as determination, relates to one and the same, to what the thing
is, to the identical in its identity" (68).
Thus Heidegger not only shows the relationship of adequate
knowledge to identity but arrives at an enriched concept of identity:
Identity is not the negative concept of the absence of all
differentiation. It is, conversely, the idea of the uni-sonous
unity of what is different" (68).
If truth as "the same" (69) and truth as adequate knowledge are

thus linked, then it also becomes clear how the characteristics of
truth are derived from the "sirnplicitas Dei as guiding ideal of what,
in the genuine sense, is" (69), and thus how logic is dependent upon
ontology or metaphysics.

The next step is clarify further Leibniz's

interpretation of Being, and at the same time to "find a connection
between the interpretation of Being and the theory of judgment" (69),
i.e., to show how Leibniz's logic rests upon the interpretation of
Being implicit in Leibniz's work.
We have already seen that Heidegger's Erinnerung exhibits
something of the character of a "topology," not only in its attempt to
locate the metaphysical site of the Leibnizian doctrine of judgment,
but also in its manner of delineating the various topoi constitutive of
Leibniz's metaphysics.

These topoi--which are constitutive not only of
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Leibniz's metaphysics, but of metaphysics in general--include identity,
presence, possibility, the contrast of essence and existence, and
infinite vs. finite knowledge.

What is Heidegger's aim in delineating

these fundamental themes?
on the one hand, Heidegger is engaged, as we have seen, in a
"regression" to the foundations of logic in metaphysics.

The regres-

sion demonstrates how interrelationships among fundamental terms can
onlY be resolved by placing them in a metaphysical context; thus
Heidegger will show that for Leibniz the "site," the concept of the
Being of beings at work in his monadology, is named in the concept of
drive (cf. !5).
At the same time, the exposition of the metaphysical site of
Leibniz's fundamental logical concepts--the geschichtliche Erinnerung,
in Leibniz's case--makes it possible to undertake the repetition
envisioned in the augenblickliche Besinnung.

Heidegger exhibits, in

his analysis of Leibniz's doctrine of judgment and its metaphysical
basis, the resources which he appropriates and, in the context of the
present text, transforms in order to constitute his own concept of
"metaphysics."

Thus "drive" becomes "transcendence."

(Heidegger

remarks incidentally how Kant's notion of the transcendental imagination belongs to a radicalization of the Leibnizian problematic, and
thereby suggests that it mediates Leibniz's concept of drive and his
own concept of transcendence.)

We see, then, that the Destruktion of

Leibniz's logic unfolds into a repetition.

And it is not only the

fundamental notion, drive as the interpretation of Being, which is
repeated; but also all the topoi of the metaphysical "dimension"--we
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see this exemplified in the way that Heidegger already calls identity
"the same" here (p. 69).

Heidegger's revaluation of metaphysics, even

while attempting to effect the most fundamental transformation of metaphysics, remains in the "same" topos as metaphysics.

Thus Leibniz's

unifying, monadological drive becomes the event of transcendence; possibility becomes the central theme of Heidegger's theory of transcendence and temporalization; and the "uni-sonous unity of what is different" (68) suggests the harmony that characterizes world.
Destruktion as a method is meant from the first to open up the
possibility of a positive appropriation and transformation of metaphysics.

Something like this "method" remains operative throughout all

periods of Heidegger's work, even when Heidegger no longer wishes to
retain the name "metaphysics" for the source of the tradition.

The

strategy of regression to the origin, exposition of the nature of the
origin or "site" of metaphysics, and, with this "insight into that
which is," the envisioning of a possible transformation of thought,
remains characteristic of Heidegger's work from beginning to end.

This

fact suggests that the unity of his work should be conceived in terms
of this "strategic" continuity, rather than (say) on the basis of a
determinate philosophical position maintained from beginning to end.
Of course, it may also turn out that his "position" can only be
conceived on the basis of this "strategy," i.e., that the content and
movement of Heidegger's thought are intimately intertwined.
We should note here, too, that because "Being" enters into this
Process of transformation in Heidegger's work, it is not adequate to
focus upon the theme of the "question of the meaning of Being" as the
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sole key to his project.
~hicle

That question, it is true, serves as the

of his work, as it carries his project through to that trans-

formation which his thought seeks to work upon the tradition.

But for

this very reason it is necessary to see that what motivates the question of Being is just this goal of repetition (overcoming) and transformation.

Heidegger's questioning of the meaning of Being "destroys"

"Being" itself.
!5.

The essential determination of the Being of genuine beings
This long section, the crux of Heidegger's analysis, is divided

into three subsections.

In subsection a), "The monad as drive,"

Heidegger at last elicits the truly fundamental metaphysical features
of Leibniz's monadology; in b), "Intermediate reflections to find the
guiding clue for the interpretation of Being," he compares Leibniz's
determination of the nature of substance, on the basis of the ego's
awareness of itself, with his own concept of Dasein's transcendence and
its constitution through the understanding of Being; and in subsection
c), "The structure of drive," he shows how the individuation of the
monad, its uniqueness, follows from its metaphysical character as
drive.
By means of this long analysis of the Leibnizian monadology,
Heidegger in effect outlines his own metaphysical program: subsection
a) concerns the elements of ontology and subsection c) constitutes a
treatise on Leibnizian "metontology."

Thus Heidegger presents a

Preparatory exposition of his own "metaphysics of Dasein."

The Second

Major Part of MFL is a repetition of the First, so that Heidegger's
inquiry into grounding and the metaphysics of truth is offered as a
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repetition of the Leibnizian monadology, just as in KPM his "laying of
the foundations of metaphysics" in fundamental ontology is presented as
a repetition of Kant's own laying of the foundations in the Critique of
pure Reason.

We see then the concreteness of the process whereby the

metaphysical essence is distilled, as it were, from the work of a
thinker, and how Heidegger's own analyses are indeed engaged in the
alchemy of transformation with respect to each text.

What Heidegger

seeks is the metaphysical essence of the metaphysical tradition, an
essence

(!~)

which his own work is meant to "liberate" from the

obfuscations of the tradition.

The "possibility" addressed in the

Destruktion is that of the letting-arise of world (truth). be thought
again as the letting-arise of thought and world.
Heidegger has been engaged in showing the metaphysical roots of
Leibniz's doctrine of judgment, and thus that his logic is grounded in
an ontology.

In t4 he has demonstrated that a metaphysical content

(the ideal of the simplicitas Dei) underlies the concept of truth as
identity, and that this concept can be reconciled with the interpretation of truth as intuitus.

Heidegger now turns to the interpretation

of Leibniz's ontology proper, the monadology, and asks
Is there a connection, and what sort of connection, between the
interpretation of Being as identity and the interpretation of
Being as monad? Does discovery of this connection give us
insight into what we seek: the metaphysical foundations of
Leibniz's logic--and with it a paradigmatic insight into the
deep roots logic has in metaphysics? (72)
The choice of "monad" as the name for substance lies, indeed, in its
signifying "the simple, unity, the one" (72).

But Heidegger immedi-

ately offers an alternative definition--"it means also: the individual,
the solitary" (72); and this alternative definition already suggests
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the themes that differentiate metontology from ontology.
In his polemic with Descartes, Leibniz shows how the principle of
unity cannot lie in extensio with its passive or purely negative geo11etrical

points, but "the principle of unity is thus to be sought in

what is itself positively unifying and thereby active" (75).

But the

unifying elements sought are not "pieces" of "matter," "but they are
the primordial indivisible principle of formation, the forma, the
eidos" (77).

Monads, in short, are not antic but are of an ontological

character.
Heidegger's analysis in subsection a) concerns the interrelationship between the "principle of formation," i.e., drive rn.rang), and the
problem of unity.

"The nature of

1

force 1 must be understood by way of

the problem of unity as it is inherent in substantiality" (77).

Force

interpreted as "drive" is the concept of an activity which is, in its
essence, an activity of unification.
Before introducing the concept of drive, however, Heidegger
enlarges upon the Scholastic background to Leibniz's principle of vis
primitiva.

What is important for our purposes in the exposition is the

way Heidegger emphasizes the role of possibility in the development of
Leibniz's concept of force, "possibility in the sense of that which
constitutes the essence of a thing, enabling the thing in its essential
constitution aside from whether or not this possibility is ever
actualized" (80).

The Scholastic roots of the concept of possibility

(or "power") are seen in the division of eotentia physica into activa
and passiva.

-

This division corresponds to a twofold division of actus

into actio and forma, second act or "power to accomplish" and first act

--
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or "inclination towards, aptitude."

Potentia passiva corresponds to

"first act," actus as forma, whereas potentia activa corresponds to
"second act," actus as actio.

There is a metaphysical hierarchy in

evidence here, for second act, the power to accomplish or actio, is
possible only if something is already actual.
Power, on the contrary, as power to become something, to allow
something to happen with itself, is distinct from actuality, for
in this case something which becomes actual is particularly
dependent on the disposition of that which allows something to
happen to itself. The aptitude is distinct from that which is
and can come to be on the basis of the aptitude. The aptitude
itself requires no actualization. (81)
Heidegger adds that "these are important distinctions for general
ontology, and they have long been inadequately interpreted and
assimilated" (81).
Leibniz's concept of vis activa (which Heidegger translates as
Orang, drive) is not potentia activa, the capacity to act, but is
"midway between the faculty of acting and the act itself" (Gerhardt IV,
469), "a capability, but not a capability at rest" (82).

Drive is a

capacity for action which is continuously productive (83).

In the

concept of drive, Leibniz transforms the Scholastic notions of

~ctio

and for'!! by reversing their relationship (subordinating the former to
the latter), and combining them into the structure of the metaphysical
entity, the monad.

The character of drive defines the Being of the

monad, and thus constitutes an interpretation of the Being of beings,
an ontology.
But Heidegger adds that "we must now anticipate.

For, as

universal, this interpretation of genuine being must also explain the
possibility of beings as a whole" (83).

What is "anticipated" here is
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the problem of the dual structure of metaphysics, how what is "one" in
the monad's metaphysical character as drive gives rise to the problem
of its radical individuation, i.e. its unique relation to being as a
whole.

The question for Leibniz is,
On the basis of this self-unifying monad [on the basis of the
ontological character of the monad], how does the entirety of the
universe constitute itself in its interconnectedness [the
problem, in its Leibnizian version, of "being as a whole"]? (85)

Heidegger interprets drive as the conferral of unity.

The nature of

this unifying activity is examined in subsection c), "The structure of
drive."
One half of this subsection is given over to the further
clarification of the structure of drive in its ontological character.
The other half concerns what lies beyond ontology for Leibniz's
metaphysics:

his "meta-ontology."

Specifically, the subsection can be

divided into four parts with the following themes:

1) drive as the

original organizing function, and the relation of perceptio and

~

titio; 2) transition (the question of individuation); 3) apperception
as the key to the problem of individuation; and 4) review and transition to the (undelivered)

~6.

In what we are calling part 1 of !5(c), Heidegger develops the
ontological significance of the monad, in effect demonstrating that the
monad is characterized by a kind of representing transcendence, namely,
by an appetitio or "tendency toward transition" which expresses itself
in eerceptio.
The "central problem" is that of how "the drive of substance confer[s] unity, how must the drive itself be defined?" (89).
Now, although the monad itself is simple, if it is to be
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conceived as conferring unity, then "there must already be something
l!!!nifold which it unifies," so that "what unifies and that whose essence it is to unify must essentially have a relation to the manifold"
(89).
If what unifies is drive, then the manifold itself has the character of drive, and indeed it is drive itself that constantly is
pressed on [Ge-drangte], since it possesses the character of movement
as such.

"There is thus in drive itself a self-surpassing; there is

change, alteration, movement" (90).
The problem here is the relation of unity, of the one, to the
manifold.

"Unity should not be the subsequent assembling of a

collection, but the original organizing unification" (90).
This means that the constitutive principle of unification must
then be prior to that which is subject to possible unification.
What unifies must anticipate by reaching beforehand toward
something from which every manifold has already received its
unity. The simply unifying must be originally a reaching out
and, as reaching out, must be gripping in advance in such a way
that the entire manifold is already made manifold in the
encircling reach. (90)
Leibniz calls this reaching out and gripping in advance

~erceptio,

"apprehension," which Heidegger characterizes as vor-stellend, representational.3

Heidegger goes so far as to speak of the ek-static char-

acter of representating drive (91); that is to say, representation is
not a mental faculty but the way in which the manifold is pre-unified
"in the simple" (91).
The "striving" that belongs to the structure of drive Leibniz
clarifies further with the concept of appetitio.
fies the self-surpassing that belongs to drive.

This concept signi"This means that

multiplicity arises in the driving thing itself" (92); the multiplicity
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is a multiplicity of manifold succession, i.e., time.

This drive to

overcome any momentary stage or "trend toward transition is what Leibniz means by appetitus" (92).
The self-surpassing (a precursor of "transcendence") that characterizes drive is a way of anticipating every "possible multiplicity,"
and at the same time of being able to "deal with every multiplicity in
its possibility" (91).
That is, drive must have already surpassed and overcome multipli
city. Drive must therefore bear multiplicity in itself and allow
it to be born in the driving. That is its "world" character. It
is important to see the essential source of multiplicity in drive
as such. (91)
Heidegger will later take up the theme sketched out here, transcendental dissemination, in tlO of MFL.

Heidegger treats this ancient

philosophical problem of the one and the many, furthermore, under the
aegis of "world," as we see in this passage.

In the Leibnizian con-

text, the "one" is addressed in the function of drive, at once unifying
and self-surpassing.
of an event.

In other words, the "one" here has the character

Multiplicity itself can only arise and come to be as a

manifold with the unifying event which anticipates a possible multiplicity and provides it with its "possibility."

The one, however, is

not something over and above the multiplicity--it is the originally
unifying event itself (always a "concrete" event), the event that
allows "multiplicity to be born" and that bears multiplicity "in
itself."

(Because it is neither an ontic nor even a "meta-physical"

One, world, as exhibiting the character of event, is "nothing" (cf. MFL
210). )

It is clear that there is not "a" drive apart from this or that
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drive that organizes and unifies a possible multiplicity.

The onto-

logical significance of drive lies in its possibility-character. But
drive, which lets a multiplicity arise in its possibility, always
refers to the "individuality" of this particular multiplicity.

This

•eans, hwoever, that it must lie in the nature of drive, in the ontology of drive, to individuate itself in this fashion.

Heidegger

writes, in the transitional "part 2" of t5(c):
As what unifies, drive is the nature of a being. At the
same time, every monad has its propre constitution originale .
. . What then makes each monad ultimately just this particular
monad? How is this individuation itself constituted? . . .
Obviously individuation must also take place, as it were,
in that which basically constitutes the essence of the monad, in
the drive. Where can and must the ground of the peculiar
uniqueness of the monad reside? What essential character in the
structure of drive makes a particular individuation possible? To
what extent is the primordially unifying self-individuating in
its unifying? (94)
These questions lead to the "overturning" (Umschlag), in the Leibnizian
context, of ontology into the problematic of radical individuation
(meta-ontology).

In our examination of the Umschlag of Heidegger's

ontology into the metontology, we shall see how the metontology is the
immediate result of the full development of the ontology; the turn-over
into the metontology is not mediated by anything else, nor does it
signify a mere "failure" of the ontology, but arises, just as Heidegger
says, with "the development of the self-understanding of this problematic" (154).

And for Leibniz the radical individuation of the monad

arises immediately from its ontological character:

"Inasmuch as it

unifies--and that is its essence--the monad individuates itself" (96).
Our part 3 of subsection c), then, constitutes the Leibnizian
"metontology."

The central issue here is the way the finitude of the
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(created) monad is expressed in the monadology.

In the Leibnizian

context, "finitude means restrictedness [Eingeschranktheit]" (94).
Restrictedness is founded in the basic ontological feature of the
monad, its unifying drive, because in "representational unifying there
is a l!Q.Ssession of unity in advance to which drive looks, as representing and tending toward transition" (94-5).

This "point" to which

drive looks, the "view-point," is already "constitutive for drive" and
indeed "regulates in advance the entire drive itself" (95).

Thus "per-

ceptio and appetitus are therefore determined in their drive primarily
from the viewpoint" (95).
The problem of the individuation of the monad is that of its
finitude or restrictedness, and the latter must be interpreted as
restrictedness to a "viewpoint."

The second feature Heidegger educes

in his analysis of the monad's finitude is the so far inexplicit
possibility of the monad's also "grasping itself" (95), in its
"reaching out and grasping."

By virtue of "this dimensional self-

openness," the monad "can perceive itself concomitantly; it can
apperceive" (95).

Thus Leibniz's "apperception" is interpreted here as

a function of the finitude or restrictedness of the monad.

According

to Heidegger i t is apperception--the "reflexive" character implicit in
drive--that establishes the uniqueness of the viewpoint of the
individual monad, for it is only in apperception that the viewpoint
becomes possible as a viewpoint; in other words, viewpoint itself means
an apperception of the monad's "situation," thereby constituting the
monad's unifying relation to its own possible multiplicity.
is inherently "reflexive" in this sense.

Viewpoint
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Thus the third feature of the restrictedness characterizing the
aonad in its essence as drive is the way that in drive it "unifies the
universe represented in advance, only according to the possibility of
the perspective" (96).
Each monad is thus in itself a mundus concentratus (Letter to de
Volder, June 20, 1703, G. II, 252). Every drive concentrates in
itself, in its driving, the world in each case after its own
fashion. ( 96)
Each monad is the "world," but through a "perspectival refraction," so
that each monad is reflected in each; all monads together "are oriented
in advance toward a pre-disposed harmony, the harmonia praestabilita of
the totality of beings [des Alls des Seienden]" (96/119).

The totality

of beings, the whole of the world, is apprehended, by virtue of its
viewpoint, by each monad; but at the same time the monad in its finitude cannot comprehend the world '!§. such a totality.

Instead, the

aonad's apprehension of the world has the character of a finite event:
"Each monad is, according to its particular level of awareness, a
world-history making the world present" (97).

Thus there is a multi-

plicity, a fundamental dissemination inherent in the concept of the
monad as drive (of course, for Leibniz, the divine monad has a privileged perspective, not being finite; it is noteworthy that Heidegger
is not concerned with this "absolute" monad, and is concerned solely to
explore the consequences of the individuation of the finite monad).
Thus a fourth feature of the monad in relation to its finitude
emerges: "the monad is a living mirror of the universe" (97). Heidegger quotes the Letter to de Volder of June 20, 1703:
It is necessary that entelechies <monads> differ from one another
or not be completely similar to each other; in fact, they are the
principles of diversity, for each differently expresses the
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universe from its own way of seeing (representing, Vor-stellung).
And precisely this is their peculiar task, that they should be so
many living mirrors or so many concentrated worlds. (G. II,
251/52) (97)
Heidegger finds here each of the features already discovered in the
analysis of the monad's finitude.

Of the last, mirroring, he says that

it "is not a fixed copying, but drives as such to ever new predelineated possibilities of itself" (98).

Thus re-presentation itself sig-

nifies, not a fixed copying, but precisely the perspectival mirroring
from the restriction of viewpoint that follows from the self-surpassing
character of drive.

Representation is "creative" in the sense that it

articulates a possible viewpoint upon the whole, while it is only from
such a viewpoint that the whole (world) is apprehended.
There is a final aspect of finite drive to be mentioned, namely
the negative consequence of particularity that
In every finite drive occurring in a particular perspective,
there is always and necessarily something resistant which opposes
the drive . . . . Insofar as the monad is always the whole from a
viewpoint, it is finite insofar as it is ordered to the universe.
That is, the monad relates to resistance, something which it is
not but could well be. This passivity, in the sense of what the
drive does not drive, belongs to the finitude of drive. (98)
This fundamental passivity is what Leibniz means by "prime matter."
In a conclusion to this subsection and to Section 5, Heidegger
reminds us that "it was necessary to interpret the monadology in order
to expose the genuinely metaphysical foundation of Leibniz's logic"
(99).
At the same time our result needs a still deeper basis: the
problem of ens qua essentia and as existentia, of being as
something possible which is as such a possible actuality [das
Problem des ens als essentia und existentia, als ein Mogliches,
das als solches ein mogliches Wirkliches ist]. (100/123)
The discussion of this problem is omitted in the lecture course;
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Heidegger refers back to the lectures on the subject from the summer
semester of the previous year (Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie).
For our purposes, what is important in this remark is its clue concerning the relation of the twofold structure of metaphysics to the
traditional problem of Being as essence and as existence:

Ontology

concerns possibility, and metontology "possible actuality," and these
concerns are the locus of Heidegger's repetition of the traditional
metaphysical problems of essence and existence.

In this text, the

repetition is undertaken in the light of the Leibnizian metaphysics,
for it is with Leibniz that "the distinction between essentia and
existentia is again fluid" (64).4
Heidegger has now finished his commentary on Leibniz, since the
final section (17) of this Part constitutes a review and overview of
the problem of the relation of logic to ontology.

Before proceeding,

then, to our study of the Second Major Part, let us summarize what
our reading of the First Part has brought to light regarding the
Destruktion and Heidegger's involvement with Leibniz's metaphysics.
The First Part of MFL is motivated by the geschichtliche
Erinnerung (and, of course, is alredy guided by the envisioned project
to be worked out in the augenblickliche Besinnung of Part Two), and
takes the form of a Destruktion, "a critical dismantling [Abbau] of the
traditional concepts . . . to the sources [Quellen] out of which they
were drawn" (BP 23m/31).

The regression (Rilckgang, BP 31) to the

sources has the very concrete sense of a tracing of Leibniz's logical
concepts to their origin in Scholastic metaphysics.

The regression is

motivated here by an ambiguity or undecidability in the Leibnizian text
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with regard to whether logic or metaphysics takes precedence in the
construe tion of Leibniz's thought.

The ambiguity is resolved by going

outside Leibniz's work proper to the historical sources of Leibniz's
logic.

Here Heidegger merely hints at sources beyond these sources--at

the ubiquity of the metaphysical theme of presence, for example in the
cognitive ideal of the scientia Del (MFL 45).

Thus the regression does

not really end with these particular sources; it could be carried
through to the source of the fundamental metaphysical topoi.
Heidegger actually aims at such a complete regression to the
transcendence of Dasein, but he does not continue toward it by means of
the "historical" regression to earlier metaphysical sources.

Rather,

he focuses upon another ambiguity in Leibniz's logical enterprise,
namely the question of the primacy of one principle of knowledge over
another.

This ambiguity cannot be resolved in logical terms.

In a

sense, it cannot be resolved at all, since the basic principles are
"equiprimordial" (56).

It is in order to comprehend the ground of this

equiprimordiality that Heidegger turns to the metaphysical dimension,
which for Leibniz is conceptualized as monadic "drive."

Thus, once

again, the ambiguity (aporia) is resolved by stepping "outside" the
problematic field of logic to find its ground or basis in metaphysical
sources.

In this second case, the metaphysical basis is discovered in

Leibniz's own work.

Nonetheless, Heidegger is implicitly undertaking a

regression to a source that lies "beyond" Leibniz's own formulations of
the nature of drive:

The regression aims at the transcendence of

Dasein as the ground of "thought," and this regression can be completed

Q!!.!x in a repetition.

Thus the "regression to the origin" is actually
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completed only with the repetition that Heidegger undertakes in the
analysis of transcendence in the Second Major Part of MFL.

The paradox

here is that the "origin" of Leibniz's work only becomes "manifest"
throught the repetition of Leibniz's work.5
Besides the central, metaphysical concept of drive, the major
"topoi" of metaphysics are at least intimated in Heidegger's discussion of Leibniz.

Heidegger's repetition of fundamental metaphysical

concepts is not intended to transpose thought to a place "outside"
metaphysics, but is rather meant to be effective solely as a repetition
and transformation of what is essential in metaphysics.

The "overcom-

ing" of metaphysics rests upon a transformation "of" metaphysics itself, from its soruces, and is in this sense continuous with "metaphysics."
We learn from Heidegger's examination of Leibniz that

~ossibility

is the central concept of ontology; indeed, the twofold structure of
metaphysics is constituted by the relationship between "possibility"
and "possible actuality."

Heidegger shows how Leibniz transforms the

Scholastic concept of possibility or power into that of vis activa or
"drive."

In turn, Heidegger elicits from the monadological concept of

drive the interpretation of essence or possibility as event, the "happening" of transcendence.
This event is itself "thinking," the grounding event whereby
world comes to pass.

Heidegger's transposition of the problems of

fundamental ontology onto the problematics of ground and the metaphysics of truth is modelled upon the results of his Destruktion of the
Leibnizian theory of thinking, i.e., of judgment.

The Second Major
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part of MFL constitutes a "retrieval" of transcendence on the basis
the new focus upon the problem of ground.

of

Heidegger presents this new

perspective on transcendence as a clarification of the sense of his
original project: to think the event of "world," to think transcendence
as the grounding event, the site of the upsurgance of world.

Thus the

Destruktion of Leibniz yields, as I have already suggested, the central
issue concealed in the tradition, that of the "principle of ground"
(which must always be understood in relation to the problem of the
"instituting" of world).
The "metaphysics of truth" signifies the complete revision of
fundamental ontology via the problematic of ground.

In fact, The

Meta2hysical Foundations of Logic is a transitional text, the
transitional text, between the early ("transcendence") and the middle
("truth") periods, for it is here that the motivations underlying this
change are most clearly expressed and formulated.

The "overturning"

(Umschlag) of ontology into the metontology regulates the change from
the early to the middle period, and it is by tracing the development of
the metontology that we achieve the most concrete characterization
possible of the so-called "turn" in Heidegger's thought.
With the transition from drive to the problem of individuation,
the Leibnizian "metontology" proceeds through a certain sequence of
issues.

Heidegger's presentation here shows how his own metontology

can exhibit such a wide range of significations as we shall find in ,10
and the Appendix:

The metontology encompasses the problems of individ-

uation, finitude, "reflexivity," multiplicity and dissemination, and
the upsurgance of world in the midst of das Seiende im Ganzen.
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At the same time, the metontology will provide the key to the
blossoming of the "metaphysics of truth" in the middle period.

How

this is so we shall see on examination of On the Essence of Truth.
Meanwhile Heidegger himself completes the First Major Part with a
reflection on logic as the metaphysics of truth.
17.

Theory of judgment and the conception of Being.

Logic and

ontology
In this section, Heidegger surveys once again the field of
inquiry and organizes it around the issues that are to be of central
concern in the Second Major Part of MFL.

Starting with the current

situation, that epistemology has become logic, he reviews very suecinctly the intentional theory of judgment, according to which "the
intentional relation of making statements is itself a relating relationship" (101).

The determining judgment is articulated relationally,

and the whole of the judgment, in the sense of the act of judging, is
itself an intentional relationship of Dasein to the present thing which
is bifurcated (into "subject" and "predicate") through the judgment.
Since the structures of intentionality and bifurcation are "structures
of judging Dasein," the true question concerning judgment and truth is
What is Dasein and how is it that it can make statements and must
make them in the manner of a bifurcated intentionality? Wherein
is the intrinsic possibility of judgment grounded as the characterized mode of Dasein's activity? We need then to illuminate
the Being-constitution of Dasein, first in this one definite aspect, then ultimately with regard to an ontology, a metaphysics
of Dasein. (lOlm/125)
Thus the metaphysics of Dasein concerns the possibility of thought as
such, the locus of the determination of beings effected in the bifureating judgment.

This characteristic "mode of Dasein's activity" is
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the ground of the possibility of such determination of beings. Ontology, as the metaphysics of Dasein, is about "thinking" as that fundamental activity or event whereby beings are determined in their Being.
The relation of judgment to truth can be examined only thorugh
the clarification of "the way truth is related to judging Dasein and to
Dasein as such" (102).

What is really at stake in "logic" is the

question of "the intrinsic possibility of truth . . . . If, however,
clarifying the essence of truth can only be carried out as a metaphysics, as an ontology, then logic must be conceived as the meta~h~sics

of truth" (102).

But to turn ontology into the metaphysics of

truth is the task of the whole of MFL.
Heidegger now reviews the First Major Part.

The central theme in

relation to the problem of "being true" is that of identity.

But

identity governs not only logical truths but "existential" truths as
well, i.e., the multiplicity constituting the content of a given
existing being can be brought together into "a possible coherent whole"
only i f "the being itself is constituted by an original unity" (102).
That unity is monadological.
Thus the monadic structure of beings is the metaphysical foundation for the theory of judgment and for the identity theory of
truth. Our dismantling of Leibniz's doctrine of jdugment down to
basic metaphysical problems is hereby accomplished. (102-3)
Heidegger adds that
Our orientation to Leibniz's logic and its connection with metaphysics has the task of making a horizon of possible problems in
this field visible in the first place, so as to remove some of
the strangeness from the purely systematic discussions that are
to follow. (103)
Heidegger proceeds to a long digression wherein he takes up the
argument with "those who believe the primacy of logic over metaphysics
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can be conclusively proved" (103).

Actually, Heidegger "demonstrates,"

through the entanglement in the concepts of logic that results through
this argument, that there is no exit from logic through argument--he
makes, in effect, a sort of "leap":
So the primacy of the rules of thought is thus, for all
that, not to be dismissed, however one might twist and turn. In
fact, this argument cannot be evaded. But it is especially
impossible to evade the question whether the conditions necessary
for the operations of thinking are foreordained prior to the
essence of thinking and of that wherein thinking as an activity
of Dasein is grounded, or whether, conversely, the essence of
Dasein and thinking first makes possible the operational conditions of thinking and the way in which they must necessarily be
employed. Thinking and rule usage may be inevitable for the
operation of all thinking, and thus also for establishing metaphysics as well, but it does not follow from this that the
foundation consists in the use of rules. On the contrary, it
merely follows that rule usage is itself in need of justification. And it further follows that this apparently plausible
argument is not in any position to establish a foundation at all.
The argument from the inevitability of using rules can make its
appeal solely on this fact, the fact of its inevitability, but it
is not even in a position to make this fact, in its intrinsic
possibility, into a problem, much less solve it. (105)
The point is that
Insofar as the intrinsic possibility of something that provides a
foundation must be prior in order to the actual operation and the
conditions of thinking, the explication of the intrinsic possibility of thinking, as such, is the presupposition of "logic" as
a science of the rules of thinking. (105)
What is necessary is to show to logic that it "lives and feeds on
something" which it cannot itself produce "but which it even believes
it must deny" (106).

This "demonstration" takes place in a reflexive

moment in which one grasps the character of the activity engaged in
(the act of grounding) while arguing concerning the primacy of logic or
metaphysics; thus the necessity of something like a "leap" through the
very inevitability of the entanglement with logic in an argument with
it.
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Finally, Heidegger insists that "laying the foundation does not
mean shoving another fundament under a finished discipline" (106).
Here Heidegger explicitly denies that the foundational inquiry will
have the effect of grounding the scientific disciplines in their given
or traditional form.
lish?

What, then, does the foundational inquiry accomp-

Its true object is philosophy, and furthermore its aim is the

trans-formation of philosophy itself:
Laying the foundation implies always a new draft of the blueprints. Every foundation for philosophy must transform philosophy itself, but transformation is only possible in seizing
and maintaining what is essential. (106)
Thus in the First Major Part of MFL Heidegger focuses upon
Leibniz's doctrine of judgment, and then upon the metaphysics underlying it, as an appropriate place (geeignete Stelle), or site, for the
geschichtliche Erinnerung (22).

Through this historical recollec-tion,

he accomplishes a regression from logic to its foundations in metaphysics, undertaken both on a historical and ontological basis.

Heidegger

shows how Leibniz gathers up into his philosophy and transforms, in his
own way, the traditional metaphysical concepts of
tia.

~ssentia

and existen-

In particular, essence as "possibility" takes on the ontological

character of the drive that "anticipates primordially," while existence, as "possible actuality," is understood from the individuation of
drive (cf. note 4, above).
In this way, the twofold structure of metaphysics becomes that of
a relation between the organizing, unifying event in its essence--the
latter conceived in terms of a kind of "potency"--and the individuation
of the event, the latter conceived as taking place in relation to a
possible multiplicity or "totality of beings" (95-96).

Heidegger's own
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concept of metaphysics is presented, then, as a "repetition" of this
concept of the twofold structure of metaphysics, elicited from the
"recollection" of Leibniz's ontology and the meta-ontology consequent
upon ontology.

Heidegger shortly presents, in !10, the retrieval of

the project of Being and Time in terms of Dasein's ontological neutrality and the meta-ontological concreteness belonging to existing
oasein.

Hence in Chapter 3 we shall proceed to an examination of the

metaphysical twofold on the basis of the interrelationship of these
concepts.

NOTES
1. Topology is an anti-"metaphysical" concept, in that it suggests a
model of an interrelationship among elements sustained, not by a single
dominating element, but by the character of the "space'' inhabited by
the individual elements. The determining region or dimension of philosophy is transcendence. In The Essence of Reasons, after recapitulating something of his earlier "discussion" (Erorterul_!g) of Leibniz and
of the principle of sufficient reason, he says that

To analyze the problem means to gain access to and mark out the
re~lm [Bezirk] within which we should treat the question ~oncern
ing the essence of reasons. This realm is shown to be the realm
of trans~endence. (ER 8/9, 10/11)
Although "topology" properly belongs to a later period, we nonetheless find the beginnings of topological method in Heidegger's treatment of Leibniz. His discussion there is topological not only because
it takes Leibniz as an appropriate "place" (Stelle) for the dismantling
of philosophy, but because its method is a search for the "dimension"
constitutive of the realm of inquiry, and thus moves away from the
traditional, meta-physical opposition of the "one" determining the
"many." One might add that his discussion also suggests an analysis of
metaphysics on the basis of topoi rather than system and structure. A
"topology'' attempts to locate the site of metaphysics for the sake of a
transformation of the site; and, along with this, of all of the topoi
of metaphysics.
2. Heidegger is a1m1ng at a notion of transcendence as that "event"
which gathers a manifold into a unity, but a unity which is not itself
"present" in the gathered manifold or "multiplicity." The problematic
is that of the relation of the antic order to the ontological, of the
phenomenal to the phenomenon, of representational thinking to its
ground. Heidegger seeks a way of thinking the event which will not
reduce it to a member of the field of elements, whether antic, phenomenal, or logical, but which at the same time will avoid turning it into
a meta-physical ''super" or transcending element. The ground is not
ang_!_her being, or any "type" of being whatsoever. Thus transcendence
is "nothing"; it is the event of the coming into being of a "uni-sonous
unity," and is, as such an event, itself the unification which comes
into being. It escapes every representation of unity. Thus the difficult~ of characterizing the "event" as such is one of the motivating
factors leading to the language and thinking of ~reignis, the event
that cannot be represented, not even as an "event."
3. Heim translates vor-stellend as "pre-hensive," in order to suggest
the relationship of ~erceptio in Leibniz to the prehensive activity of
the actual occasion in Whitehead's cosmology (and also, presumably, to
suggest a common relationship in the notion of "event" between Heidegger's and Whitehead's philosophies). The term "prehension" in Whitehead does not by itself, however, include the notion of subjective aim
and the "unifying unity'' that grasps in advance. Prehension signifies
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only the moment of relatedness to the multiplicity, not the whole of
the complex process of concrescence. But it is this feature of the
anticipatory unifying of a possible multiplicity that Heidegger wishes
to emphasize. Vorstellen is the mode of apprehension of a possible
multiplicity, and the apprehension which makes the multiplicity as such
"possible." Furthermore, the emphasis which the word ~or::.ili!)end
intends to place upon the "representational" character of drive should
be recognized and preserved in the translation. I have not retained
the hyphen, however, only because the hyphen is meant to emphasize the
character of grasping in advance ("vor") that takes place with representation, and this factor is lost in translation.
4. Heidegger expresses the close intertwining of "ontology" and
"metontology" very succinctly in discussing the Leibnizian concept of
being as identity (ER 31/30):
What makes an Elns an El~ is "identity." Identity is, properly
understood, the simply unity which unites primordially and, in
uniting, at the same time individuates. The sort of unification
that anticipates primordially ["possibility"] and individuates
simply ["possible actuality"], constitues the essence of being
[Seiende] as such.
It would be difficult to understand the structure of this passage and
its import if we did not have MFL at hand.
5. Thus it is impossible to conceive of the or1g1n as simply independent of this work of the repetition of the tradition. It cannot be
taken to be simply "present," "present to itself." This is particularly true since repetition lies at the heart of transcendence itself.

CHAPTER III
Neutrality and Concretenesss of Dasein in ,10: "The
problem of transcendence and the problem of Being and Time"
Section 10 divides rather naturally into three subsections:

The

first (pp. 136-141) comprises an introductory paragraph, a paragraph
"a)" containing "a general description" of the problem of Being and
~and

a paragraph "b)" containing "the guiding principles" thereof,

and subdivided into twelve numbered paragraphs.

The entirety of the

first subsection is concerned with the meaning of the "preparatory
analysis" of Dasein.
The second subsection (pp. 141-148) asks why the preparatory
analysis of Dasein, "with regard to revealing the possibility of the
understanding-of-Being [is] an exposition of the temporaliu of Dasein"
(141).

It

attempts to justify "connecting the problem of Being with

time" (148).
The third subsection (pp. 148-154) explains what is involved in
working out the problem of Being as the central problem of philosophy,
and what is meant by the required radicalization and universalization
of the problem of Being.
Heidegger's introductory paragraph explains why the "problem of
Being and Time" can be inserted, here, into this text on transcendence
and the relation of transcendence to the problem of ground.
~

Being and

must be interpreted from the standpoint of the problem of tran-

scendence because "Seinsverstandnis forms the basic problem of
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metaphysics as such" (136).

Metaphysics, as the metaphysics of Dasein,

bas as its central problem the event of the coming into being of Seinsverstandnis.

"What does Being mean?

mental question of philosophy?" (136)

This is quite simply the fundaBut the basic problem of "meta-

physics as such," the "metaphysics of metaphysics," is that of the
possibility of the philosophical event, i.e., the coming to pass of the
understanding of Being.

The problem of the happening of Seinsverstand-

nis encompasses that of "Being":

To raise the Being-question in its

most radical form means to question the possibility of the event of
transcendence, "wherein" Being is understood.

Because philosophy

arises only within the dimension of transcendence, fundamental ontology
asks after the possibility of the question of Beingl, rather than
undertaking to establish a decisive answer to the "question of Being."
For the question of Being is always "answered," with the existence of
every Dasein, but the task of fundamental ontology is to answer to the
problem of the possibility, in general, of such "answers."

The prob-

lematic relationship of the inquiry into the possibility of Seinsverstandnis to the concretization of that possibility in any given understanding of Being is addressed in the present section.

In the first

subsection in particular, the theme is that of the interrelation
between "possible" Dasein and the "possible actuality" of concretely
existing Dasein.

The problem of the relation between the first and the

second parts of metaphysics is taken up under the headings of the
neutrality and concreteness of Dasein.
Thus the purpose of fundamental ontology, according to paragraph
a), is this:

"The understanding-of-Being is to be brought to light by
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way of Dasein's mode of Being, which is primarily existence" (136).
What is to be demonstrated, through the analysis of the constitution of
oasein's being, is "the intrinsic possibility of the understanding-ofBeing" (136, emphasis mine).

Heidegger notes that in Being and Time

"the metaphysics of Dasein itself is not yet the central focus" (136),
so that the metaphysical significance of fundamental ontology is not
evident in Being and Time, and perhaps could not become clear from a
reading of Being and Time alone.

In short, Heidegger is "retrieving"

Being and Time itself for his metaphysical project, interpreting it in
the light of his analysis of the twofold structure of the metaphysics
of Dasein.

In this way, Heidegger completes the self-interpretation of

his early project, and therefore completes his early project, since it
is "complete" ("teleion") only when gathered up into such a complete
view.

The present inquiry into the significance of Heidegger's early

project is based upon that perspective upon its completion provided by
the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.
Although we shall be concerned in the present chapter only with
the first "subsection" of UO, i t should be noted here that UO
represents, not only the revisionary retrieval of the first Division of
Being and Time which is the subject-matter of the first subsection, but
also a recapitulation of the theme of the temporal analysis of Dasein
(second subsection), and therefore of the second Division of

~eil,!g_and

Time, and a synopsis of the treatment of the "radicalization" and
"universalization" of the problem of Being that constitutes the final
aim of Basic Problems of Phenomenology.

In short, Heidegger "inserts"

the whole of his previous work into the Second Major Part of The
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~taphysical

Foundations of Logic, so that it is now to be understood

as embedded in the inquiry undertaken there into the problem of ground
as the "basic problem of metaphysics."
Paragraph b), with its twelve subparagraphs, presents "the
guiding principles" for the treatment of the problem of the understanding of Being in Being and Time.

Actually it is a somewhat

revisionary treatment of the twofold of existence and thrownness, on
the model of the problematic of the two parts of metaphysics.
The numbered paragraphs end with these remarks:
These guiding principles should indicate briefly the sort
of intent behind the analysis of Dasein and the requirements for
carrying out the analysis. The basic intent of the analysis is
to show the intrinsic possibility of the understanding-of-Being,
which means at the same time the possibility of transcendence.
(141)

This "retrieval" of Being and Time in terms of the question of the
intrinsic possibility of transcendence is in accord with the interpretation of the project of Being and Time given in other texts of the
period, including, in particular, Kant and the Problem of

Metaphy~ics,

which is concerned with the "intrinsic possibility of the grounding of
metaphysics."

Heidegger's interpretation of fundamental ontology is

not a violent wrenching away of the problematic of ontology from its
original intent--presumably, to "answer the question of Being"--but
constitutes a genuine clarification of the aims already implicit, but
not fully and explicitly formulated, in the project of Being and Time.
Being and Time is above all concerned with the

~ossibility

of the

question of Being that occurs with the existence of Dasein.
Before examining the numbered paragraphs in detail, let us take
an overview of Heidegger's highly concentrated presentation, in these
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passages, of the "metaphysics of Dasein."

The first five paragraphs

address the ontological themes of possibility, essence, and origin.2
ontology requires the "metaphysical isolation" of Dasein.
speaks in this context of the "neutrality" of Dasein.

Heidegger

Neutrality

signifies Dasein's existence considered solely from the standpoint of
its "essence"; thus neutrality usurps the concepts of generality and
universality which, in the tradition, would serve as the locus of a
philosophical inquiry into essence.

Insofar as the analysis of Dasein

in BT presents an "eidos" of Dasein, it is presented not as a universal
which would define the form of man, without reference to the existence
of any particular human being, but rather as offering to existing
Dasein an image of the "potency of the origin" which, in any given
case, can be the potency only of an existing Dasein.

The analysis of

neutral Dasein is that of lli! existing Dasein, so that it can open up
the potency of the origin to every possible existing "instance" of
Dasein.

Thus the presentation of the eidos, which is not a universal,

but represents, Heidegger says, an "extreme construction" (189m/243)-is meant to "enable" existing Dasein toward the fulfillment of its
authentic possibility of being.
The next five paragraphs take up the motif of the radical
individuation of the metaphysical being, i.e. the metontological theme
as we have already seen it introduced in reference to the Leibnizian
problem of monadological individuation.

We have already discussed

these passages from the First Major Part;
What then makes each monad ultimately just this particular monad?
How is this individuation itself constituted? (94) . . . In this
viewpoint the whole universe is in each case held in view, as it
were, in a definite perspective of beings and of the possible . .
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[the view] is refracted in each case according to the monad's
possibility for unifying itself in its multiplicity. (95) . . .
Inasmuch as it unifies--and that is its essence--the monad
individuates itself.
In every monad the whole universe is
potentially present. (96)
The themes treated here in 110 are, in particular, those of the
multiplicity and dissemination proper to the concretely existing (individuated) Dasein.

It is noteworthy that, for Heidegger, dissemination

cannot be understood apart from the unifying, organizational event that
transcendence signifies; indeed, Heidegger finds it necessary to speak
of "transcendental dissemination" with reference to the total structure
of concretely existing Dasein.
The tenth numbered paragraph concerns furthermore the grounding
of dissemination in freedom.

But the problem of freedom is bound up

with that of truth (cf. pp. 191 ff.).

Thus the problematic of the

metontology culminates. once again, in the metaphysics of truth.
The last two numbered paragraphs interpret the ontological
project--Heidegger's own fundamental ontology--as itself an "extreme
example" of metontological concretization; that is to say, they show
(if we can put it this way) that ontology itself is already submitted
to the reflection on finitude articulated in the metontology.

It is

the finitude of the ontological project itself that demands the the
"overturning" of ontology, and so motivates the "turn" in Heidegger's
work.
Heidegger's retrieval, in these paragraphs, of the "problem" of
Being and Time offers a new perspective upon the thrust of his existential analysis and inquiry into the transcendence of Dasein,

For he

makes it clear that the "aim" of the existential analysis, however
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motivated by a concept of the universality of the existentialia it may
be, is something like the "concretization" of possible Dasein.

But i f

the relationship between fundamental ontology and the "actuality" of
the factically existing Dasein is not the traditional metaphysical
relationship of eidos and fact illustrative of the form, if it cannot
be articulated in terms of the traditional distinction between essence
and existence, how can this relationship be expressed?
In his revision of metaphysical concepts, Heidegger brings the
concept of essence, as we have already indicated, into the vicinity of
the ideas of potency or possibility and of origin.

These ideas belong

to the analysis of the metaphysics of Dasein as concerned with the
"event" of transcendence, the coming-to-pass of Seinsverstandnis.
Essence, Wesen, comes to be understood verbally; it is the "activity"
of the origin (transcendence) in surpassing itself toward a possible
understanding of Being.

Thus it is necessary to analyze transcendence

as such and thereby to lay out those fundamental structures of existence which make an understanding of Being "possible."

The analysis of

such fundamental structures does not yield information about the character of the specific project of any factically existing human being,
but rather discloses the ground and possibility of such a project.

The

analysis is "neutral" with respect to factically existing Dase in; i t
concerns only the phenomenon of Care or self-concern in general:
1. The term "man" was not used for that being which is the
theme of the analysis. Instead, the neutral term Dasein was
chosen. By this we designate the being for which its own proper
mode of being in a definite sense is not indifferent. (136D)

The self-concern of Dasein, the concern of finitude for itself (cf.
remarks on para. 5, below), is the point of origin of the analysis and
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the point from which de-pends the whole of the discussion of the neutrality of Dasein.

Derrida says in "Geschlecht," concerning this

passage, that
It is a matter of reducing or subtracting every anthropological,
ethical or metaphysical predetermination by means of that
neutralization, so as to keep nothing but a relation to itself,
bare relation, to the Being of its being . . . . Neutrality .
is first of all the neutralization of everything not bearing the
naked trait of this relation to itself, of this interest for its
own Being. (G, 69)
But Heidegger will say that neutralization is not the "voidness of an
abstraction," nor the "indifference" of an empty void, an ontic
nothing, or the nobody and everybody (para. 2)--in other words, not the
result of a reduction or subtraction at all.

Indeed, we soon will see

(paras. 6-10) that i t is a matter of getting "everything" in.

The

"relation to itself" is not the barren one of an auto-affection or
presence to itself, but of that which, as self-concern, has always
already prepared the way for and indeed articulated itself in the
upsurgance of a "world."3

There is no "bare self" for the self to be

related to:

"As constituting the selfhood of Dasein, the for-the-sake-

of has . .

universal scope" (MFL 191); "the totality of the

commitment [Bindung] residing in the for-the-sake-of is the world"
( 192/247).
Because neutrality means possibility,
2.

The peculiar neutrality of the term "Dase in" is

essential, because the interpretation of this being must be
carried out prior to every factical (faktische) concretion. (136)
What is at stake, in fact, is the way in which Dasein "occurs,"
as transcendence, in the midst of beings.

The analysis of neutral

Dasein exhibits the possibility of such occurrence.

In this sense,
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neutral Dasein is not itself a "being"--"neutral Dasein is never what
exists [das Existierende]" (137/172).
this, not that"; it is no-thing.

Dasein in its essence is "not

The neutrality of Dasein is its

"power" to occur, its dunamis:
3. Neutrality is not the voidness of an abstraction, but
precisely the potency of the origin, which bears in itself the
intrinsic possibility of every concrete factual humanity.
Dasein is "nothing," but its nothingness is not that of the voidness of
an abstraction, i.e., of the generality of a concept, but that of a
potency which can be realized through its own nihilating power, the
"nichtet" of das Nichts.

Thus the concept of neutrality looks forward

to the analysis of the "nothing" in What is Metaphysics?; it also looks
back to the treatment of the nothingness of Dasein, revealed in Angst,
in UO of Being and Time.

Neutrality is Dasein's "not" being any

being, and at the same time its power of opening up a space within
which being as a whole can be understood as "in" being.

This nihil-

ating, irruptive power is what is meant by the "potency of the origin."
Dasein is "not yet" (137) any thing; this open futurity, however, is
what lets Dasein arise in its concrete, factical humanity, letting it
be as

~being,

so that it can belong to a specific sexuality and

determinate generation.
This neutrality also indicates that Dasein is neither of the two
sexes. But here sexlessness is not the indifference of an empty
void, the weak negativity of an indifferent antic nothing. In
its neutrality Dasein is not the indifferent nobody and everybody, but the primordial positivity and potency of the essence.
(136-37)
But it is neutrality which allows Dasein to harbor "the intrinsic
possibility for being factically dispersed into bodiliness and thus
into sexuality" (137).

Sexlessness is not "the indifference of an
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empty void"--as is the "universality" of genus--nor is it "the weak
negativity of an indifferent ontic nothing," the limit of an abstraction from "what is," and thus less than any thing.
its neutrality the indifferent das Man.

Nor is Dasein in

As the potency [Machtigkeit]

of the essence, neutrality is not the opposite of concreteness; being
"neither" of the two sexes is not non-sexual being, but signifies
rather that which makes it possible for Dasein to have (in its selfdispersal) a determinate sexuality.

Thus

4. Neutral Dasein is never what exists; Dasein exists in
each case only in its factical concretion. But neutral Dasein is
indeed the primal source of intrinsic possibility that springs up
in every existence and makes it intrinsically possible. The
analysis always speaks only in Dasein about the Dasein of those
existing [Existierenden], but it does not speak to the Dasein of
the Existent [Existenzen]; this would be nonsense, since one can
only speak to those who exist [Existierenden]. (137m/172)
Although neutral Dasein is "neither of the two sexes," this does not
mean that Dasein is, in its factical concretion, without sexuality; on
the contrary, the "sexlessness" of neutral Dasein is the condition of
the possibility of sexual determination.
What would it mean for neutral Dasein to be in its essence
"sexual"?

The issue is that of the "potency of the origin."

"Origin"

here means, as always, origin of Seinsverstandnis, and, equivalently,
of "thought" and of "world."
founded?

In what is the power of origination

If neutral Dasein were sexual, and therefore of a determinate

sexuality, then "thought" would necessarily differentiate itself along
sexual lines.

But it is, as possibility, neutral with respect to

Geschlecht--to sexuality, nation, race, and generation.

This is not

the only metaphysical implication of the neutrality of Dasein:

That

the locus of origin is Dasein means that theories which ground the
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origin of human "culture" (more properly, world) in psychoanalytic
concepts fail to reach to the essential dimension of the foundation of
human "creativity."

The

~ossibility

of origination cannot, on Heideg-

ger's analysis, lie in any of the conditions of human embodiment; its
potency means that it arises "before" such determination.
What is at stake in an ontological reflection upon the nature of
the origin is the preservation of the ontological, i.e., "neutral,"
character of the origin, as opposed to a determination of the character
of origin on the basis of an ontic model. For Heidegger, psychoanalytical and other ontic explanations of the origin of history and "culture"
restrict the possibilities of historical disclosure to those which can
be formulated in the language of the psychology of desire (for example).

This type of explanation constitutes an inversion, since psycho-

analysis is only one of the historical possibilities of the understanding of human being (and thus, one would have to add, of Being).

No

historical event could surpass the explicatory conditions established
for it by psychoanalysis, if psychoanalytic explanations were substitituted for the neutrality of an ontological grounding.
To preserve the radically ontological character of the origin
means that the origin cannot be understood through terms appropriate
solely to any "regional ontology," that is to say, through terms
derived from any specific region of human comportment in relation to
beings.

The problem of origin cannot be formulated, then, in terms of

the evolution of the species, nor in terms of physical causality, nor
in terms of the "bicameral mind," nor, in particular can ontology
submit to the natural tendency--since Dasein is always "human being"--
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to identify the locus of origin with respect to "thought" (creativity,
"culture," world) with its "natural" basis in sexuality or the body.
Ontology must preserve, and indeed present a vision of, possibil
ity "as such," in relation to the possibilities of historical disclosure; it is concerned solely with the "potency of the origin."

Thus

ontology must affirm the neutrality of Dasein with respect to any
identification that would limit the possibilities of Seinsverstandnis.
Therefore "the interpretation of this being must be carried out prior
to every factical concretion" (136).
sexes" (136); it is sexless.

Dasein is "neither of the two

Not only is it "not" sexual and "not" a

body, its analysis is "prior to all prophesying and heralding worldviews" (137) because world-views are subsequent to historical disclosure, and are wholly dependent upon such prior disclosure.

The

interpretation of Dasein is not even "wisdom, something available only
in the structure of metaphysics" (137), i.e., in a concrete historical
disclosure of the meaning of Being.

Only within such a metaphysical

order can human beings achieve "wisdom," knowledge of the truth of
beings, since the latter requires a prior disclosure of Being.
All of this is to emphasize that, to preserve the "potency of the
origin," ontological analysis can only be concerned with Dasein in its
neutrality.

To treat Dasein as "neutral" has the specific function of

thinking the "origin as such" and of illuminating it as the ground of
Qossibilit2.

In order to think the origin in genuinely radical fashion

(to think possibility as such), ontology must achieve the separation of
neutral Dasein from all beings.
is in each case mine:

Dasein is not even "I," even i f Dasein
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5. Nor is this neutral Dasein the egocentric individual,
the antic isolated individual. The egoity of the individual does
not become the center of the entire problematic. Yet Dasein's
essential content, in its Existence [Existenz] to belong to
itself, must be taken up along with the approach. The approach
that begins with neutrality does imply a peculiar isolation of
the human being, but not in the factical existentiell sense, as
if the one philosophizing were the center of the world. Rather,
it is the metaphysical isolation of the human being.
The origin of the origin, one might say, lies in Care, and indeed in
self-concern, as Derrida has pointed out in commenting on this passage
and Heidegger's earlier remark that neutral Dasein designates "the
being for which its own proper mode of being in a definite sense is not
indifferent" (136)4.

In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger

speaks of the self-concern of finitude, the concern of finitude with
itself:
the finitude of human reason is finitization [Verendlichung],
i.e., "concern" [Sorge] about the ability to be finite . . . . the
laying of the foundation of metaphysics is rooted in the question
of the finitude of man in such a way that this finitude itself
can first become a problem. (KPM 224-25)
The origin of interpretation of Being as such lies in this "reflexive,"
self-questioning character of finitude.
Let us turn briefly to Heidegger's elaboration (in MFL !11) of
these remarks in paragraph 5 concerning the metaphysical isolation of
Dasein.

In section 11, entitled "Freedom and World," Heidegger calls

Dasein's self-concern its egoicity (Egoitat):
If we say "Dase in is in each case essentially mine," and i f
our task is to define this characteristic of Dasein ontologically, this does not mean we should investigate the essence of my
self, as this factical individual, or of some other given individual. The object of inquiry is not the individual essence of
my self, but it is the essence of mineness and selfhood as such.
Likewise, if "I" is the object of the ontological interpretation,
then this is not the individual I-ness, of my self, but I-ness in
its metaphysical neutrality; we call this neutral 1-ness "egoicity." But here too there is a danger of a misunderstanding. One
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could say, Must not thou-ness, too, become likewise a topic and
must not thou-ness be taken together with I-ness as equiprimordial? This is certainly a possible problem. But I-ness, as the
phenomenon correlative to thou-ness, is still not metaphysical
egoicity. Here it becomes clear that the term "I" always pushes
in the direction of the isolation of my self in the sense of a
corresponding severance from the thou. Contrariwise, I-ness does
not mean the factical ego distinguished from the thou; egoicity
means, rather, the I-ness also at the basis of the thou, which
prevents an understanding of the thou factically as an alter ego.
But why is thou not simply a second ego? Because being an ego,
in contradistinction to being a thou, does not at all pertain to
the essence of Dasein, i.e., because a thou is what it is, only
qua its self. and likewise for the "I." Therefore I usually use
the expression "selfhood" [Selbstheit] for metaphysical I-ness,
for egoicity. For the "self" can be said equally of the I and
the thou: "I-myself," "you-yourself," but not "thou-I."
Pure selfhood, understood as the metaphysical neutrality of
Dasein, expresses, at the same time, the metaphysical isolation
of Dasein in ontology. (188)
We will not pause, here, to examine Heidegger's important contrast of
the "I" of the factical ego and the "thou":

The "thou" is always a

self in the most fundamental, metaphysical sense (I-ness), but the "I,"
at least as mere ego, is not.

What is important in this passage for

the present discussion is the placing of the self "prior" to the
distinction of I and thou--just as it is prior to, and thus "neither"
of, the sexes in their division.

What is at stake is that "not-yet"

sexuality which, indeed, gives rise to the possibility of sexuality.
And in this sense, it is, as Derrida says, in some sense "sexual"5-just as it is, because it gives rise to "I" and "thou," to the division
and relation between the two, in some sense "egoic."
We have seen that the task of ontology is to accomplish the
separation of Dasein from every ontical model that might compromise its
neutrality.

It must guarantee that Dasein is "neutral" with respect to

any interpretive model derived from a specific Geschlecht; possibility
as such cannot carry any "Schlag," any imprint, in advance.

To ground
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Dasein ontically would mean to confine "possibility" to the conceptions
available in the already articulated domain of a specific region of
beings, or to those available to a historical "generation," or even to
those dependent upon Dasein's concrete sexuality.

The purpose of

ontology is to present Dasein with an "extreme construction" (189m/243)
of its being, one which will, in its neutrality, ensure that
possibility remains possibility.
But through this purification, achieved by means of the analysis
of neutral Dasein, the concept arises of an ontological ground, an
essence, which is wholly distinct from the existing "particulars" for
which it serves as the model.

Thus Heidegger seems, at least at this

stage of his work, to recapitulate, in his conception of the twofold
structure of metaphysics, the traditional role of the chorismos
separating essence from existence, even if now in the revised language
of the distinction between neutral and concrete Dasein.

The first five

paragraphs of ,10 confirm the metaphysical isolation of Dasein, and
thus establish the radical separation of neutral from concrete Dasein-a separation which is established precisely in order, in the end, to be
undone.
Indeed, the five paragraphs 6-10 bring this separability of neutral and concrete Dasein into question.

These paragraphs show that the

"potency of the origin" proper to neutral Dasein is always the potency
of a concrete event of origination, i.e., always bears a relationship,
as a "potency," to a determinate multiplicity.

Just as for Leibniz

drive is always the self-surpassing unification of a specific manifold,
in the drive of the individuated monad, so in Heidegger's !10 of MFL
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origination always occurs with the temporalization of a concretely
existing Dasein.

There "is" no neutral Dasein anywhere.

Possibility,

potency. is always the possibility of a specific determination of
Being.
Thus we can say that something like an Umschlag occurs between
paragraphs 5 and 6--at least on the limited model of the "overturning"
that Heidegger finds at work in Leibniz's ontology.

In Chapter II we

found that the metaphysics of drive leads immediately to the metaphysics of the individuated monad.

The corresponding relation here in flO

can be formulated in this way:

The radical separation of the origin is

first articulated on the basis of the demand placed upon ontology that
the "origin" be thought independently of every ontic means of interpretation--that is to say, it must be thought in its neutrality.
chorismos is established.

Thus the

But the closer exam- !nation of the neutral

"origin" shows that, as potency of the origin, its very essence is to
give rise to determinate originations.

This recognition does not ren-

der ontology unnecessary, since it is not possible without it; indeed,
the function of ontology is to articulate the thinkability of (concrete) origination in general.

It is not possible to analyze the ap-

perceptive character of the individual monad, for example, unless one
first grasps the significance of the "monad" and its relation to drive.
This intertwining of neutrality and concreteness will become
clearer upon examination of the details of the ontological analysis of
Dasein.

At present let us note only that temporalization--the crux of

the ontological analysis--is always the "historizing" of factical
Dasein.

The neutrality of the ontological analysis means that Seins-
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verstandnis always has a temporal horizon, and thus that the temporale
analysis is true for Dasein in general.

But at the heart of the

analysis of temporality lies the disclosure of the finitude of time.
Temporalization means the repetition of a definite "past" in view of a
possible "future" and in relation to a receptive "present."

Since the

potency of the origin lies in temporalization itself, there is no
temporalization except in relation to a determinate "there" of Being.
Thus in paragraph 6 we find that, because of the intimacy of the
relationship between the neutrality of Dasein and its individuation,
in its metaphysically neutral concept, Dasein's essence already
contains a primordial bestrewal [Streuung], which is in a quite
definite respect a dissemination [Zerstreuung] (138/173) . . . .
multiplicity belongs to Being itself. (138)
We have already seen, in the context of the Leibnizian
"metontology," the connection between the radical individuation of
Dasein and the concept of "multiplicity."

Heidegger introduces

multiplicity here in relation to the more precise metaphysical concept
of Streuung--which signifies the dispersal intrinsic to Dasein's
~utral

(ontological) being.

To think possibility means to ask how a

possible actuality is indeed possible, i.e., how a multiplicity can
become determinate in relation to a certain "apperception" of being as
a whole.
Thus, to return to the beginning of paragraph 6:
the metaphysical neutrality of the human being, inmost isolated
as Dasein, is not an empty abstraction from the ontic, a neithernor; it is rather the authentic concreteness of the origin, the
not-yet of factical dispersion [Zerstreutheit]. (137/173)
Temporalization ("not-yet,
factical dispersal.

11

futurity) occurs only in relation to a

The potency of the origin, therefore, is that of
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the potential of that dispersal and the multiplicity that belongs to it
for being gathered into something like a unity.

"Potency" makes no

sense apart from a relation to such a potential multiplicity.
It is impossible here not to think of other metaphysical (and
mythical) models of the origination and organization of the world.
Heidegger himself mentions the mythical theme--elaborated, in one
version, by Plato's Aristophanes in the Simposium--of the "large primal
being becoming ontically split into many individuals" (138).

This is

the image of an on tic origination of mulitiplicity (or "multiplication") from a prior unity, and thus of the subsequent reference of
all beings back to that prior unity.

Unity, in other words, lies, for

the myth, in the unity of an ontically primordial source.

Freud's

concept of Eros in Beyond the Pleasure Principle contains echoes of
such an appeal to a primordial unity and the concept of a "return" to
it; indeed, this return constitutes for Freud the fundamental meaning
of the compulsion to repeat, "beyond the pleasure principle."

It is

the theme of this metapsychological repetition that introduces into
human life a movement toward higher types of unity, and which opposes
the dissolution of organic life into its inorganic origin.

Thus

Freud's metapsychology remains grounded in an antic concept of repetition.
A comparison with the cosmology of Whitehead would be particularly instructive here, perhaps, since an analogy certainly obtains
between the cosmological conception of the prehensive gathering of the
many given data into the concrescence (concretization) of a novel
actual occasion, and the Heideggerian metontological concept of the
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multiplicity achieving unity through the individuation of concretely
existing Dasein.

However, it is necessary to recognize in Whitehead's

concept of prehension the working of a decidedly ontic model, in that
the actual occasion, although selective with respect to the subjective
forms under which data will be prehended, and in that sense "creative,"
is creative only in relationship to an already established, determinate
multiplicity of past actual occasions.

This model differs from the

ontologically grounded concept of the individuated event, in that the
event of transcendence is primordially constitutive of the
"multiplication" it contains.

Thus

here we are dealing with something else [than a negative concept,
in the concepts of Zerstreutheit and Zwiespaltig], with a
description of the multiplication [Mannigfaltigung] (not
"multiplicity" (Mannigfaltigkeit]) which is present in every
factically individuated Dasein as such. [What is at issue is]
the clarification of the intrinsic possibility of multiplication
(137-38/173)
This is why Heidegger speaks of "transcendental dissemination" (para.
7):

The manifold can be conceived as such only on the basis of its

potential "unity," i.e. the interrelatedness or "harmony" of elements
belonging to the same manifold.

The elements being unified are not

simply "given" prior to the act of unification, but arise as a
"multiplication," a field of interrelated elements, only with the
originating (potential) act of unification.

In the case of the

monadology, Heidegger says that "drive develops the manifold
[Mannigfaltig] in itself" (94/116).
Inasmuch as drive primordially unifies, it must already
anticipate every possible multiplicity, must be able to deal with
every multiplicity in its possibility. That is, drive must have
already surpassed and overcome multiplicity. Drive must therefore bear multiplicity in itself and allow it to be born in the
driving. This is its ''world" character. It is important to see
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the essential source of multiplicity in drive as such.

(91/114)

It is important to see the essential source of dispersal in transcendence as such.6
Thus we see that, while it is metaphysically necessary to emphasize the ontological gap that separates neutral from concrete Dasein-and thus the "metaphysical isolation of the human being" (137)--this
work of separation, precisely because it converges upon the "potency of
the origin," concerns that which "bears in itself the intrinsic possi
bility of every concrete factical humanity" (137--para. 3).

In other

words, it is in virtue of its metaphysical isolation that
6. As such, Dasein harbors the intrinsic possibility for
being factically dispersed into bodiliness and thus into
sexuality. (137)
"Concretely" speaking, then, origination is possible only in relation
to the "dispersion" (Zerstreutheit) of Dasein into embodiment and its
splitting into the "disunity" (Zwiespiiltig) of the sexes.

There can be

no "multiplication"--this, of course, must be understood to mean world
--apart from that "embodiment [which] presents an organizing factor"
( 138).
Since Heidegger is presenting here, in effect, a rewriting of the
first Division of Being and Time, these passages can only be understood
in the light of certain structural correspondences with, as well as
differences from, the fundamental-ontological approach of Being and
~·

The first five paragraphs thematize the fundamental-ontological

problem, that of Dasein's "existence"; the second five thematize the
issue of "thrownness."

The progression to the "authentic" existence of

Dasein takes place now within the context of a more fundamental empha-
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sis upon thrownness as the "original" situation of Dasein.

That is to

say, we have in the remaining numbered paragraphs a "metontological"
context for the development of fundamental ontology.

To the

ontological themes of neutrality, isolation, transcendence, and
temporalization correspond the "metontological" themes of concreteness, multiplication, bestrewal, and spatiality.
In ,10, sexuality and embodiment occupy the place belonging in
Being and Time to the analysis of the ready-to-hand (Zuhandene).

In

his "preliminary sketch of Being-in-the-world" (BT U2), Heidegger says
that
Dasein 1 s facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has
always dispersed [zerstreut] itself or even split itself up
[zersplittert] into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity
[Mannigfaltigkeit] of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something,
[etc.]. (BT 83/56)
Thus we find in MFL !10 an alternative presentation of the fundamental
mode of Dasein's Being-in:

not the multiplicity of concern with the

ready-to-hand, but the modes of dispersion belonging to embodiment and
sexuality.

This particular "retrieval" of the problem of Being and

Time shows that there is nothing sacrosanct about the route to ontology
undertaken through the analysis of Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit.
Heidegger's treatment of these themes in !10 represents an exploration
of another potential route to the explication of Being-in-the-world
(embodiment as "organizing factor") and transcendence.

Heidegger's

treatment of dissemination or Dasein's dispersal into embodiment and
sexuality represents an alternative formulation of the "groundcondition" of human Dasein.

Thus in this alternative treatment Being-
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in-the-world is inherently and radically a function of "embodiment" and
"sexuality."
But then doesn't this mean that the origin itself, contrary to
the sense of the doctrine of neutrality, participates in some way in
the "flesh"?

But it is from this ground-condition that human Dasein

gathers itself if it is to "function" as origin, i f its being as the
"potency of the origin" is to be fulfilled.
the condition of potency, but remains

The dispersed condition is

mere!~

"potential" i f Dasein

remains immersed in the initial "entanglement" and "captivation" (para.
8) in its environment.

Dasein's "being-a-self is in every case only in

its process of realization" (139, para. 11).
It is difficult to avoid a seemingly Gnostic language implying a
fall into the flesh and subsequent restoration of the self to itself-as if to a condition of perfect presence to self, to the self's pristine condition of self-presence--when speaking of Dasein's dispersal in
contrast to its "process of realization."
subtle than this, however.

Heidegger's text is more

"Realization" is not restoration to self-

presence, but the "return" to just that state of freedom which first
lets Dasein become entangled in its environment, identifying itself
with its own embodiment and its "desire."

Thus, in Being and Time,

anticipatory resoluteness brings Dasein back into the authenticity of
its Situation, the flight from which constitutes inauthenticity.

In

110 "dissemination . . . ultimately has its ground in the freedom of

Dasein as such" (139, para. 10).

Thus when Dasein is restored to

itself, it does not take flight into the "heavens," nor return to a
Pristine condition of self-presence:

It recognizes itself in its
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freedom as the site of the potential disclosure of the manifold as a
whole.

Dasein is thus "responsible" for the possible disclosure of

this whole of being.

Thus

7. The transcendental dissemination
metaphysical essence of neutral Dasein, as
possibility of each factical existentielle
division, is based on a primordial feature
thrownness. (138/174)

proper to the
the binding [bindende]
dispersion and
of Dasein, that of

And thrownness, therefore, is nothing other than the necessary condition for Dasein's disclosure of a particular "world" (multiplication).
Neutral Dasein, as potency of the origin, signifies the potential locus
of disclosure of a concrete manifold, determined uniquely for each
"factical existential dispersion and division."
"Binding possibility" refers back to the theme of being-guilty in
Being and Time and that "being-a-basis" which constitutes Dasein's
selfhood:
The Self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can
never get that basis into its power; and yet, as existing, it
must take over Being-a-basis . . . . In being a basis--that is, in
existing as thrown--Dasein constantly lags behind its possibilities. It is never existent before its basis, but only from it
and as this basis. Thus "Being-a-basis" means ~ to have
power over one's ownmost Being from the ground up. This "not"
belongs to the existential meaning of "thrownness" . . . . what
one has in view here is . . . a "not" which is constitutive for
the Being of Dasein--its thrownness. The character of this "not"
as a "not" may be defined existentially: in its being its Self,
Dasein is, as a Self, the entity that has been thrown. It has
been released from its basis, not through itself but to itself,
so as to be as this basis. (BT 330/284-85; ~58)
The "nullity'' of Dasein's being-a-basis defines the existential meaning
of thrownness.

In taking over its being-a-basis, in the "nullity" of

that thrownness which it can never master, and the impossibility of
mastering which determines its being-a-basis, Dasein understands itself
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in terms of its possibilities (BT 331).

Indeed Dase in "always stands

in one possibility or another; it constantly is not other possibilities" (331).

Dasein "as projection . . . is itself essentially null"

(331), since it does not "give itself" its own possibilities originally
(nor is the Self ever transparently present to itself, since, as null,
it grasps neither a "reason" for its thrownness in relation to this
particular whole of being, nor does it determine the possibilities open
to it as a Self; the latter it can only choose or fail to choose).

In

the nullity of its being, which includes the "nullity" of a possible
projection, Dasein is free
for its existentiell possibilities. Freedom, however, is in the
choice of ONE possibility--that is, in tolerating one's not
having chosen the others and one's not being able to choose them.
(331)
The "binding possibility," then, is that possibility which represents
Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being, the projection that is "thrown"
along with the being of Dasein.

The nullity of Dasein's being as

thrown projection (binding possibility) is definitive of Care (331) and
means that "Dase in as such is guilty"

( 331).

The themes of freedom and guilt or "responsibility" are taken up
again in MFL 111:
In the projection of the for-the-sake-of as such, Dasein gives
itself the primordial commitment [Bindung]. Freedom makes Dasein
the ground of its essence, responsible [verbindlich] to itself,
or more exactly, gives itself the possibility of commitment. The
totality of the commitment residing in the for-the-sake-of is the
world. (MFL 192/247)
Freedom binds Dasein, not to the type of "Self" which would exist
beyond or outside its potential world, but to the whole of beings
"into" which Dasein is (initially) dispersed and divided:
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In choosing itself Dasein really chooses precisely its being-with
others and precisely its being among beings of a different
character.
In the express self-choice, there is essentially the
complete self-commitment, not to where it might not yet be, but
to where and how it already always is, qua Dasein, insofar as it
already exists. (190)
nasein's return to itself in choosing itself is nothing other than a
return and commitment to that multiplicity into which, in its factical
existence, Dasein is "dispersed."

But does Dasein then remain

dispersed even in its authentic state, i.e., when i t "realizes" its
freedom?

What is the difference between dispersal and unity?

Dissemination is transcendental because it "ultimately has its
ground in the freedom of Dasein as such" (139).

That is to say,

transcendental dissemination--Streuung, bestrewal--is "for-the-sake-of"
the potential disclosure of that multiplicity "into" which Dasein is
dispersed.

Such disclosure occurs on the basis of a projection, and it

is in projection that the multiplicity becomes determinate, a manifold
or "world."

Dissemination is not the rending of a "large primal being"

into ontical multiplicity, but the way in which an ontological being
(neutral Dasein) finds itself in its being as thrown.

Dasein's

bestrewal is the condition for its potential disclosure of the manifold
as such.
Thus it is only on the basis of dissemination that Dasein can
find itself "in" other beings:
8. This thrown dissemination is to be understood
metaphysically. It is the presupposition, for example, for
Dasein to let itself in each case be factically governed by
beings which it is not; Dasein, however, identifies with those
beings on account of its dissemination. (138)
The entanglement and captivation of Dasein in "nature," and thus the
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origin of mythology, is based upon the dissemination of Dasein.
Theories of the rise of "culture" sometimes are formulated in
terms of a development of human thought in relation to more original,
mythical forms of expression.

For Levi-Strauss, for example, rational

thought is an attenuated, and therefore derivative, form of thought
exhibiting the structures but none of the vitality of myth.

Alterna-

tively, a still popular view holds thought to have developed out of the
mythical expression of early man through the development of philosophical and scientific rationality, these having conquered their origins
as a result of the natural progression of mankind toward rationality.
Heidegger's paragraph 8 is implicitly critical of all such models
of origin which represent an ontic continuity between myth and
"thought," whether of a structural or historical order.

Myth is for

Heidegger a function of the dissemination that is inherent in Dasein's
neutral or ontological character.

Myth arises as the result of

Dasein's dispersal into nature, its entanglement and captivation in
this other to itself, and thus its finding "itself" in that other.

In

this way, Dasein reads itself "out" of nature on the basis of its dispersal into nature.

Thus "thought," Dasein, is prior to myth in the

ontological order, even if not in the order of historical succession.
The "not-yet of factical dispersion" can be "the authentic
concreteness of the origin" (137) because, in dissemination, Dasein is
bound to the possibility of a free projection and hence disclosure of
the "multiplication" corresponding to Dasein's existence.
Dissemination is of ontological, never of merely ontical, significance.
Heidegger therefore would deny the possibility of interpreting
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"psychological" phenomena--the Oedipal conflict for example--in merely
psychological terms.

Such conflicts of identity concern the conflict

of freedom with itself; dissemination expressing itself in
identification with beings is in conflict with dissemination as a
function of freedom, i.e., as the (ontological) basis for the potential
disclosure of an ontic manifold.

The "psyche" is the locus of the

conflict of freedom with itself.
Indeed, Dasein emerges from its immersion in its own sexuality-that is to say, from its involvement, characterized (say) psychologically in terms of libidinal conflict, in the identification of itself
with its own sexual and bodily being--to discover its own

hymanit~:

9. The essentially thrown dissemination of Dasein, still
understood as completely neutral, appears, among other ways, in
Dasein 1 s being-with with Dasein. This being-with with X does not
emerge on account of factically existing together: it is not
explained solely on the basis of the supposedly more primordial
species-being of sexually differentiated bodily creatures.
Instead the species-like unification metaphysically presupposes
the dissemination of Dasein as such, that is, being-with as such.
(139)
There is no sexually (or genetically) grounded explanation of
humanity (being-with).

The latter is, rather, the ground of the

recognition of the "other" as belonging to the same species.

It is,

furthermore, presumably the ground of the relatedness to the other that
is constitutive, for human beings, of the significance of sexuality.
Thus sexuality and embodiment are "explanatory" only where Dasein's
humanity is occluded or not yet factically developed:
Rather, factical bodiliness and sexuality are in each case
explanatory only--and even then within the bounds of the
essential arbitrariness of all explanation--to the extent that a
factical Dasein's being-with is pushed precisely into this
particular factical direction, where other possibilities are
faded out or remain closed. (139)
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The emergence of Dasein's humanity is to be contrasted with its
immersion in nature, along with the mythological forms of expression
accompanying this immersion, and its immersion in the conditions of
embodiment and sexual being, with those forms of explanation of "human
nature" that arise from confusing this "ground-condition" with human
being Rer se.

Paragraphs 6-10 can be read as the "story" of Dasein's

return to itself in the recovery of its original freedom, the freedom
which itself is the ground of dissemination (and which, therefore, is
the "same" as dissemination.

Dasein's return to itself consists in a

withdrawal, an askesis with respect to beings, but for the sake of the
development of its freedom, i.e., its letting-be of beings.)

The

story is the same as that of Being and Time, with some variations,
however, in the plot:

sexuality and embodiment play the role, here,

played earlier by extant and present being; and the story (which
corresponds approximately to Division One of Being and Time) ends in a
clearer articulation of the role of freedom than does Being and Time,
with the latter's central focus upon the concept of Entschlossenheit7.
Paragraphs 6-10 may be read as mimetic of the return of Dasein's dissemination to the freedom which is the ground of dissemination.

Thus

it can be understood as a recounting of the (possible) temporal, "experiential" progression of Dasein from sexual/mythical modes of experience and explanation, to the discovery of Dasein's own humanity, and
then to the recovery of its own freedom as such.

But the story "ends"

not in the flight of Dasein from the world "into" which it has been
dispersed, but in the discovery of freedom as the ground of its original dissemination:

Freedom means the disclosure of the manifold as
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such.
is."

Dasein remains "committed" "to where and how it already always
Dasein's thrownness, manifesting itself in the transcendental

dissemination of Dasein, is its being bound to the world potentially to
be disclosed through Dasein's free projection of that world.
Dasein's initial dispersal into embodiment and sexuality is not
incidental, but is ontologically grounded and is the condition for the
disclosure of the manifold as such.
tizing the finitude of Dasein.

"Embodiment" is one way of thema-

But Dasein can become entangled in the

situation into which it is thrown, and thus interpret its own Being in
terms of that situation, i.e., in terms derived from the conditions of
embodiment and sexuality.

Thus there can be a kind of Seinsverstandnis

which is grounded in the bodily and sexual being of Dasein, just as
there can be a kind of Seinsverstandnis which reflects Dasein's immersion in the field of its concern with beings present at hand.

The

concept of the "neutrality" of Dasein accounts both for the inadequacy
of any such interpretation, from an ontological standpoint, of the
Being of Dasein, while also accounting for the "not-yet of factical
dispersion" which allows Dasein to interpret itself in these terms.
Dasein is "nearer" to itself in its being-with with Dasein--its
humanity--although being-with still belongs to the mode of dissemination.

We know from Being and Time that Dasein's being-with can deter-

iorate into such identification with the other that Dasein interprets
itself on the basis of das Man; on the other hand, being-with is
possible as a mode of comportment of authentic existence.

However

10. Being-with as a comportment of authentic existence is
only possible in such a way that every existing-with can be and
is authentically itself. (139)
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But what does it mean for existing-with to be "itself" authentically?
Does Dasein "exist" somewhere other than in being-with with others?
This freedom of with-one-another, however, presupposes the possibility of the self-determination of a being with the characteristics of Dasein as such, and it is a problem how Dasein can exist
as essentially free in the freedom of the factical ties of beingwi th-one-another. (139)
It

is a problem because of the possible "identification" with the other

being and its possibilities; nonetheless, it is not in a "higher" stage
but only here, in the "factical ties of being-with-one-another," that
Dasein can recover its freedom.

It is here that the turn-around

occurs, and Dasein discovers that
Insofar as being-with is a basic metaphysical feature of
dissemination, we can see that the latter ultimately has its
ground in the freedom of Dasein as such. The basic metaphysical
essence of metaphysically isolated Dasein is centered in freedom.
(139)
In freedom, i.e., in Dasein's authentic being-with, the Other first
"becomes" himself for Dasein.
We have seen that the first five numbered paragraphs of 110
introduce, under the heading of the neutrality of Dasein, the ontological theme of the "potency of the origin."

Neutral Dasein is possible

Dasein; ontology thinks Dasein in its possibility, addresses the origin
of possibility as such.

Corresponding to dynamis, possibility, there

must be an energeia, actuality.

More precisely in this context, "pos-

sibility'' makes sense only insofar as it can be correlated with a
"possible actuality."

Thus paragraphs 6-10 undertake a "metontologi-

cal" account of the "actualization" of Dasein in relation to a given
manifold.

The dissemination of Dasein is the precondition for the

actual disclosure of a determinate "world."

126
Dasein's freedom is disclosive of the Being of beings.

Dasein is

constituted a s·elf only in that resolute openness which brings Dase in
back to the Situation as such (cf. note 7, above), letting beings and
the other Dasein "be so-and-so as" they already areB.

Thus, although

Dasein does not take flight from beings in being its Self, worldly
beings are not disclosed except in relation to an understanding of the
Being of beings, i.e., in world-projection.
projection" (192).

"As free, Dasein is world-

The "for-the-sake-of" constitutive of the selfhood

of Dasein is that "towards which Dasein as transcending transcends"
(191), i.e., the world.
Thus one would expect Heidegger to follow through in the numbered
paragraphs with a discussion of the specific project of Dasein, the
projection of world, or the projection of the constituion of Being,
whereby Dasein "completes" its actualization.

Indeed he says

11. This metaphysics of Dasein, first as an analysis, can
be attained only in the free projection of the Being-constitution
[Seinsverfassung] itself. Dasein always exists as itself, and
being-a-self is in every case only in its process of realization
[Vollzug (=energeia)], as is also existence [das Existieren].
(139/175-76)
The actualization of Dasein is completed in the free projection of the
constitution of Being.

But isn't this ontology?

What has ontology to

do with the metontological concern with the actualization of concretely
existing Dasein?
As we have already seen, ontology presents an "extreme model" of
the constitution of Dasein; it is in this way that it contributes to
the "actualization" of concrete Dasein:
For this reason, projection of the basic ontological constitution
of Dasein must arise by constructing one of the most extreme
possibilities of Dasein's authentic and total capability of
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being. The projection is directed towards Dasein, as a whole,
and towards the basic determinations of its wholeness, even
though Dasein in each case is only as existent [das Existierendes]. To put it another way, attaining the metaphysical
neutrality and isolation of Dasein as such is only possible on
the basis of the extreme existentiell involvement [Einsatz] of
the one who himself projects. (139-40/176)
The project began with the announcement of the neutrality of "Dasein,"
"essential, because the interpretation of this being must be carried
out prior to every factical concretion" (136m/171-72; para. 2).

Here

the hermeneutic circle returns to its beginning, however, with the
announcement that the ontological project itself has a metontological
Q_rigination.

As realizing an "extreme possibility," it is itself only

one possibility; concerning the existential as such, it is itself
possible only on the basis of an existentiell involvement.

Neutral

Dasein, never "existent" by itself, represents the projection of an
extreme possibility by (concretely) existing Dasein:
metontological (finite) basis.

Ontology has a

Heidegger's metaphysics of metaphysics

is bound to the conditions common to all metaphysics (i.e., thrown
projection).

It

is thus not really a "meta-" metaphysics, but an "ex-

treme possibility" belonging to metaphysics itself.
ical reflection upon metaphysics.

It is a metaphys-

As such, it is itself subject to the

same finitude inherent in all metaphysical projects.

But although

subject to finitude, it is nonetheless the project disclosive of
finitude as such:
This involvement is necessary and essential for the metaphysical project, for metaphysics as such. But it is, therefore,
as an individual existentiell component, not authoritative and
obligatory within the many concrete possibilities of each factical existence. For the metaphysical project itself reveals the
essential finitude of Dasein's existence, which can only be
understood existentielly in the inessentiality of the self that
only becomes concrete--as can be proven metaphysically-through
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and in the service of each possible totality, a whole which
becomes manifest in a rather special way in metaphysical inquiry.
Nevertheless, it is a problem in its own right: to what extent
there is an existentiell guidance, an indirect guidance, in the
metaphysical project and in the existentiell involvement of the
person who philosophizes. (140)
Heidegger thus places his own project within the context of
metontology, that is to say within the context of the finite "individuation" of a project which itself is in the service of a "possible
total! ty."

Each of the multiplicity of possible metaphysical projects

is "in the service" of a "possible totality"--in the service of some
"whole of being" (das Seiende im Ganzen).

The relationship of a

possible project to the totality to which it is responsive raises the
question of "existentiell guidance" (the call of conscience) in each
case.

Through the ontological project, these "metontological" prob-

lems--the finitude of thrown projection, the possibility of existentiell guidance, the "possible totality" which Dasein serves as the
"there" of its disclosure--first become manifest.

Fundamental ontology

is the project "of" projects, i.e., it is the inquiry into the possibility of projection as such.
Most importantly, that Dasein as such exists only in relation to
(in the service of) a "possible totality" becomes manifest only through
the ontological inquiry.

Thus ontology is that unique project which

grounds the metontological diversity of possible projects; it is that
inquiry into neutral Dasein which lets Dasein become manifest as "the
authentic concreteness of the origin."

The "origin" is always con-

crete, for existing Dasein is always the origin of the disclosure of a
determinate whole of beings.
12.

Furthermore

The ontological interpretation of Dasein's structures

r
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must be concrete with regard to the metaphysical isolation and
neutrality of Dasein . . . . Real metaphysical generalization does
not exclude concreteness, but is in one respect the most concrete
. . . . ( 140)
Wherein lies the concreteness of ontology?

It lies in the

concreteness in the analysis of the Dasein phenomena, which give
direction and content to Dasein's metaphysical projection. (140)
That is to say, the concreteness of fundamental ontology itself lies in
showing how direction and content are given (in the call of conscience)
to (other) possible projections on the part of (concretely existing)
Dasein.

Ontology is concrete in showing how the "possible actuality"

of existing Dasein becomes, for Dasein, possible.

The (metontological)

ontological project grounds metontology.
Thus it is a misunderstanding to think that Dasein is concretely
committed, in general, to
taking the concrete phenomena of [neutral] Dasein by themselves
and [secondly, to] taking them as existentiell absolutes in their
extreme, fundamental-ontological conceptualization. (140)
More bluntly put, no concretely existing Dasein need find its "actuali
ty" in the "philosophizing" undertaken in Being and Time; only that
which grounds its "possibility" is to be found there.
Indeed, Heidegger finally says that
One may not . . . lose sight of the fact that with such a
fundamental-ontological clarification nothing has yet been
decided, and what furthermore ought to be shown is that nothing
is decidable in this manner. Yet there is also always the
factical necessity of a "presupposition" of a factical situation.
(140-41)
Heidegger's fundamental ontology is "foundational" with respect
to the multiplicity of possible concretizations of existing Dasein.
Ontology is foundational of metontological diversity.
says that

When Heidegger
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the basic intent of the analysis is to show the intrinsic possibility of Seinsverstandnis, which means at the same time the
possibility of transcendence (141/177),
we by now realize that showing this intrinsic possibility, in ontology,
determines nothing with respect to the concrete possibilities available
to existing Dasein.

Showing the intrinsic possibility of transcendence

lets possibility first become possibility for existing Dasein.
As we shall see in the chapter to follow, answering the question
of the meaning of Being, and thus fulfilling the project of fundamental
ontology, means, not designating "Being" as x--giving a "true" definition of Being--and thereby placing future philsophy upon a "secure"
basis, but showing how all Seinsverstandnis originates in temporalization, and thereby in

makin~

Seinsverstandnis in general possible.

"By

a fundamental ontology we mean the basic grounding of ontology in
general" (154).

The role of fundamental ontology is to show how some-

thing like a multiplicity of "ontologies," i.e., of "interpretations of
Being," are possible.

The difficulty, however, lies not so much in

the concept of a "multiplicity," but in the concept of

~eing,

i f we

think that Heidegger means to grasp in his own ontological inquiry the
"true" meaning of Being which the tradition has simply missed.

To

answer the question of Being means to attain to the source of possibil
ity as such, and this means to explicate, in "Temporal science," the
"origin of possibility" through the analysis of time.

The "answer" to

the question of Being is that time is the source of all possible "answers" to the question of Being, i.e., time is the source of metaphysics as such.

The (mis)interpretation of Being as presence founds the

tradition; it is an interpretation which is represented by no single
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philosophy, but underlies all traditional philosophical understandings of the meaning of Being.

There is a multiplicity of such inter-

pretations; there is, in short, a metontological dispersal of ontological projects already evident in the tradition.

Although we need

not postulate the full concept of the Seinsgeschichte at this period of
Heidegger's work, it is evident by now that the metontology establishes
the context for the developing problematic of the Seinsgeschichte.
It is clear, then, that Heidegger is in no sense attempting to
jettison traditional metaphysics.

Rather he takes over and transforms

the bipartite division of metaphysics on the basis of his differentiation of neutral from concrete Dasein.

This differentiation is, howev-

er, immediately questioned and undercut precisely through the reversal
which is effected by the transition from neutral to concrete Dasein.
The finitude of the ontological project--or, better, the finitude of
time itself, disclosed in the fulfillment of the project--means that
the neutrality of Dasein is unstable, i.e., that it cannot provide an
autonomous grounding for the sequence of metaphysical disclosures.

We

shall see in Chapter IV how the completion of the ontological project
in the "science of Being" demands the overturning of the first part of
metaphysics and its displacement by the second ("metontology") as the
basis for inquiry into the origin of disclosure as such.

The transi-

tion between the two parts of "metaphysics" is no longer of a merely
formal nature, but constitutes a genuine overturning of the ontological
methodology in favor of a new approach to the "question of origin."

NOTES
1. This is Heidegger's explicit formulation of the issue--for
instance, in The Essence of Reasons (1929):
We might point out here that the portion of the investigations concerning "Being and time" published so far has as its
task nothing more than a concrete, revealing sketch (Entwurf] of
transcendence (cf. !112-83, esp. ,69). The sketch is-there in
order to make the single prominent goal of these investigations
possible, a goal that is clearly indicated in the heading of the
whole first part: namely, attaining the "transcendental horizon
of the question about Being.
All concrete interpretations,
above all the interpretation of time, should be evaluated
strictly as they aim at making the question of Being possible.
11

The emphases are Heidegger's.
2. These themes taken together constitute the locus of Heidegger's
reinterpretation of the traditional concept of "essence," and are part
of his attempt to transform the metaphysical twofold (essence and existence) as such. This process becomes explicit with the reading of
Leibniz in the First Major Part of MFL; Being and Time is assimilated
to this interpretation in '10; and the Appendix to tlO announces this
reinterpretation of metaphysics as the basis of his future work.
3. The concept of neutrality is introduced in The Essence of Reasons
in the context of a discussion of the concept of world (Chapter II in
ER). Here the "self" and "world" are defined in terms of each other:
As a totality, world "is" no particular being but rather
that by means of and in terms of which Dasein gives itself to
understand [bedeuten] what beings it can behave toward and how it
£!.n behave toward them. That Dasein gives "itself" to understand
in terms of "its" world means, then, that in approaching being
through the world, Dasein makes a self of itself, i.e., a being
which is free to be. The Being of Dasein lies in its "potenti
ality for being" [Seinkonnen]. Better: its Being is such that
its potentiality fQ.r Being is an issue. Dasein exists "for the
sake of its . . . .
If the world is that, in surpassing to
which, selfhood first arises, it is also that for the sake of
which Dasein exists. The world has the basic character of the
"for the sake of . . . in the primordial sense that it ensures
the inner possibility of every factical "for your sake," "for his
sake," "for its sake" [deswegen], etc. But that for the sake of
which Dasein exists is itself. World belongs to selfhood; it is
essentially related to Dasein. (85/84)
11

11

This "itself" for the sake of which Dasein exists is its surpassing
beings toward world; at the same time, world is that which is dislosed
in Dasein's freedom, its "being able" to comport itself toward beings
and toward itself.
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Thus the ontological concept of neutrality (cf. also p. 87)
refers to that selfhood which is related to world "prior" to any relation to particular beings. Far from signifying a "bare relation to
self," the concept of neutrality means that there is no "self" apart
from that relation to world which consitutes it a self. Hence the
ontological analysis necessarily precedes any possible philosophical
q!.!£.!!.ssion of the egoity or sexuality of Dasein, since the latter
cannot be understood as possible modes of Dasein's comportment except
on the basis of ontology. The neutral analysis first makes the
interpretation of Dasein's concrete being possible.
4.

Derrida says in "Geschlecht":
At first the concept of neutrality seems quite general. It
is a matter of reducing or subtracting every anthropolocial, ethical or metaphysical predetermination by means of that neutralization, so as to keep nothing but a relation to itself, bare relation, to the Being of its being; that is, a minimal relation to
itself as relation to Being, that the being which we are, as
questioning, holds with itself and its own proper essence.
("Geschlecht: sexual difference, ontological difference," in
Research in Phenomenology, vol. XIII. Atlantic Highlands:
Humanities Press, 1983, p. 69)

Our question (cf. note 3 above) is whether Neutralitat is "neutralization," a reduction or mini11alization of Dasein to a bare relation to
its "own proper essence."
Derrida's reading coincides in several places with our own; but
if I do not take up here or respond directly to his treatment of these
paragraphs, it is because his own strategy of re-marking the text on
the basis of what it excludes, and of questioning the presence in the
text of the metaphysical concepts of propriety and essence, fails, it
seems to 11e, to recognize the "processual" and transformative character
of Heidegger's own inquiry. It is not that Derrida is "incorrect" in
what he discerns still to be at work in Heidegger's text--it is only
that his method of reading disrupts and thereby renders ineffective the
movement of Heidegger's text, the "process" at work which needs to be
respected and recognized on its own terms, if Heidegger's task is to be
understood. Derrida's method produces a blindness to the task manifest
in the texts. Thus it remains necessary to find a way fo reading Heidegger which is independent of Derrida's.
5.

Derrida, p. 72.

6. The concept of "transcendental dissemination" is correlated with
that of the synthesis of apprehension in Kant's t1_ritique of Pure
Re<!:.!.Q!!--it signifies transcendental synthesis insofar as it is oriented toward the apprehension of the manifold as such and in advance.
Concerning the synopsis of the manifold in pure intuition, Heidegger
says, for example, in KPM:
Time as pure intuition is neither only what is intuited in the
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pure act of intuition nor this act deprived of its "object."
Time as pure intuition is in one the formative act of intuiting
and what is intuited therein. Such is the complete concept of
time. ( KPM 180)
This is temporalization as "transcendental dissemination."
7. In Being and Time, "resoluteness brings the Being of the 'there'
into the existence of its Situation" (BT 347/300). "The Situation is
the 'there' which is disclosed in resoluteness--the 'there' as which
the existent entity is there" (346/300). Furthermore, when the call of
conscience summons us to our potentiality-for-Being, it does not hold
before us some empty ideal of existence, but calls us forth into the
Situation" (347/300). Prior to the temporal interpretation of the
structure of Care, the analysis of Dasein culminates in the concept of
anticipatory resoluteness, which is "the way in which Dasein's potentiality-for-being-a-whole has existentiell authenticity" (352/305). In
other words, in resoluteness Dasein's co••it•ent to the whole of its
existentiell being-there--to the "whole of being" which is constitutive
of its Situation--comes into its own. Thereby it comports itself
"authentically." The authentic disclosure of the Situation is grounded
in what Heidegger calls "freedom" in MFL 'UO.
8. Freedom is never simply the freedom of a subject, but is essentially the letting-be of entities which Dasein encounters: "Ontically,
'letting something be involved' signifies that within our factical concern we let something ready-to-hand be so-and-so '!!. it is already and
in order that it be such . . . . Letting an entity be involved, if we
understand this ontologically, consists in previously freeing it for
['!uf] its readiness-to-hand within the environment" (BT 117/84-85).

Chapter IV
The Science of Being and the Turn

In the following pages I wish to show how Heidegger completes his
ontological project and how the metontological overturning of ontology
is implicit in the very fulfilling of this project.

To this end our

discussion will first take up the issues of the science of Being, the
the objectification of Being, and what is meant by the explicit carrying out of the ontological difference.

We shall then examine closely

Heidegger's horizonal analysis of the projection of the ecstasis of the
present upon praesens, and show how his discussion of Temporality contributes to the completion of the ontological project.

It

will then

be possible to show how the result of ontological inquiry is such as to
lead immediately to the problematic of finitude ("concreteness") in the
formal sense already indicated in our previous discussions, as well as
to require the more radical Umschlag that signifies the "turn" in
Heidegger's thought.
The first paragraph of the Appendix to MFL presents the total
structure

of the fundamental- ontological project in a three-stage

formulation:
By a fundamental ontology we mean the basic grounding of
ontology in general. This includes: 1) a grounding that exhibits
the intrinsic possibility of the question of Being as the basic
problem of metaphysics--the interpretation of Dasein as temporality [Zeitlichkeit); 2) the explication of the basic problems
contained in the question of Being--the temporal [temporale)
exposition of the problem of Being; 3) the development of the
self-understanding of this problematic, its task and limits--the
overturning [der Umschlag]. (154/196)
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The definition of fundamental ontology is followed by a listing
of the various "stages" of its development.

Each stage contains a

statement of the task at that level followed by a formula indicating
how the task is fulfilled.

Thus, the first task is to exhibit the

ground of the question of Being, and this task is accomplished through
the interpretation of Dasein as temporality.
Heidegger's statement (1) seems to be ambiguous--does it mean
that the grounding exhibits how the question of Being

~be

the basic

problem of metaphysics, i.e. how it is that metaphysics is constituted
through Dasein 1 s asking the question of Being; or does it mean that the
basic problem of metaphysics is to exhibit the ground of the intrinsic
possibility of the question of Being?

But the two readings come to the

same thing, for the fundamental problem of metaphysics (as fundamental
ontology) is to show how the Being-question can be the fundamental
problem of metaphysics (ontology in general).1

Within the self-ref-

erential structure of fundamental ontology, what is questioned is the
possibility of the question of Being itself (cf. MFL, pp. 214-15).
Fundamental ontology grounds the question of Being in the temporality
of Dasein--this is the task undertaken in the published portion of
Being and Time.2
There is thus an ambiguity, a twofold sense to the expression
"the question of Being."

Since the question of Being is the basic

problem of metaphysics, metaphysics, in its every occurrence--and the
tradition consists in the constant occurrence, the ongoing recurrence,
of metaphysics--arises as an "answer" to the question of Being.

The

"question of Being" designates the nature of that event which takes
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place in metaphysics.

It

is the event of transcendence, the "Being-

process," as Richardson calls it3, wherein an interpretation of the
Being of beings comes to pass.
Thus the "question of Being" is answered in every metaphysical
enterprise, in the sense that philosophy, which is always fundamentally
"metaphysical," emerges in the question of Being and as a response to
it.

Philosophy itself is the "answer" to the question of Being.
But fundamental ontology, as an inquiry into the intrinsic possi-

bility of the Being-question, seeks to ground that question in a source
giving rise to it as a "possibility."

Such a possibility arises only

in the movement of transcendence, so that fundamental ontology has as
its subject-matter transcendence or Seinsverstandnis itself.

The task

of the existential analysis of Dasein is to show how Dasein is itself
constituted by "the question of Being," in its essence, for the "existence" of Dasein, in which its essence lies, takes place as interpretation of Being, and thus in every case as something like an "answering" of the question of Being.

The "question of Being," for Heidegger,

names the structure of the "act" in which transcendence is realized.
Thus the analysis of Dasein must exhibit the horizon upon which the
answer, the interpretation of Being, is projected.
meaning of Being upon time.

Dasein projects the

Time itself, as the temporalization of

temporality, makes the question of Being possible, and is itself the
implicit horizon for any possible answer.

Time grounds the possibility

of the question of Being.
But if philosophy is always, as understanding of Being, an answer
to the question of Being, in what sense does fundamental ontology
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answer this question, which it asks for the first time explicitly, and
Precisely

therefore in a more fundamental way than the tradition?

because it asks the question explicitly in an attempt to overcome the
"forgottenness" of Being, it can do so only by "going beyond Being"
(~ekeina

tes ousias), and thus showing how the interpretation of Being

can only arise in something other than Being, beyond Being, namely,
time.

Its own way of asking the question, and of "answering" it--for

it •ust exhibit the saae structure as any other metaphysical enterprise--has the effect, as we shall see more clearly below, of subordinating Being to something else, so that the "primacy" of Being in the
tradition is already threatened at this early stage.

The fundamental-

ontological answer to the question of Being can be formulated this
way:

Being is time.

We shall examine the paradox implicit in this

answer below.
The twofold sense of the question of Being manifests precisely
that ambiguity or twofoldness which sustains the Heideggerian enterprise at its center.

In this ambiguity we have a clue to the relation

to be thematized more explicitly in the relation of fundamental ontology to aetontology.

We are atttempting to establish how this "twofold

relation" forms the central issue of Heidegger's early thought.
Fundamental ontology is not directly and immediately "about"
Being but attempts to establish the possibility of the
Being, of Seinsverstandnis as such.

understa~qing

of

The illllediate subject-matter of

research in fundamental ontology is not Being but Dasein.

Heidegger

summarizes, in the Basic Proble!..!....Q! Phenomenology, the outcome of the
analysis of Dasein as follows:
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In my treatise on Being and Time, I set forth what the existential analysis encompasses in its essential results. The outcome
of the existential analytic, the exposition of the ontological
constitution of Dasein in its ground, is this: the constitution
of Dasein's Being is grounded in temporality (Zeitlichkeit]. (BP
228)
In this way the projects of Being and Time and of Basic Problems are
brought into a common framework, inas•uch as Heidegger now proceeds to
treat the project of Basic Problems as presupposing, and fulfilling,
the existential analysis undertaken in Being and Time.

The second

"stage" in Heidegger's outline of fundamental ontology refers to the
investigations undertaken in Basic Problems of Phenomenology--the
so-called "science of ontology."
Basic Problems undertakes, at least in outline, the invest!gations that were to have been the theme of the unpublished Part One,
Divis.ion Three of Being and Time, under the title "Time and Being."

It

is these investigations that Heidegger refers to in the formulation of
the second stage of fundamental ontology: "2) the explication of the
basic problems contained in the question of Being--the temporal [temQorale] exposition of the problem of Being."

The "basic problems" are

the four basic problems of phenomenology, which together constitute
"ontology."

Ontology shows how each "problem"--the ontological dif-

ference, the basic articulation of Being, the possible modifications of
Being and the unity of Being, and the truth-character of Being--has its
root in Temporality (Temporalitat).

"The fundamental subject of re-

search in ontology, as determination of the meaning of Being by way of
time, is Temporality" (BP 17).

In the lecture course Basic Problems,

Heidegger gets as far as the temporale exposition of only one problem,
that of the ontological difference.
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Now Temporalitat
means temporality [Zeitlichkeit] insofar as temporality itself
is made into a theme as the condition of the possibility of the
understanding of Being and of ontology as such. The term "Temporali ty" [Temporalitat] is intended to indicate that temporality
represents the horizon from which we understand Being. (228)
Why does Heidegger seem to have two names for the "saae thing," primordial time?

How does the second stage of fundamental ontology, in

which the goal of fundamental ontology is achieved, differ from the
existential analytic--what, in short, is ontology?
The design of the completed portion of Part Two (BP), entitled
"The Problem of the Ontological Difference," suggests the character of
the relationship between fundaaental ontology and ontology, and therefore between Zeitlichkeit and Temporalitat:
19.

Time and temporality

20.

Temporality [Zeitlichkeit] and Teaporality

[Teaporali tat]
21.

Temporality [Temporalitat] and Being

22.

Being and beings.

The ontological difference

The chapter on ontological difference is organized according to
the model of the Platonic dialectic, with its double route of "ascent"
and "descent."
(~eitlichkeit)

In '!119 Heidegger elicits the concept of original time
on the basis of an analysis of the Aristotelean text

(Aristotle's "treatise on time" at Physics 4.10-14), and through a
phenomenological analysis of ordinary time.

By these means, the

concept of primordial time is established in advance of further
investigation into the relationship between temporality and

~ei~

verstandnis--just in the same way that Plato introduces the concept of
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the Good in the Republic (VI.502-509) prior to exhibiting its role in
the dialectic.
Heidegger himself introduces a thematic identification of the
problematic of time with that of the Good in Plato's Republic: " .
. . we are moving within one of Plato's fundamental problems" (BP
282-83); and he refers to "the Platonic order of inquiry" at BP 282.
Heidegger's "ascent" or analysis exhibits the "condition of the possibility" of the understanding of Being (Zeitlichkeit), while the
"descent" or synthesis displays the total structure of the relationship between time as horizon (Teaporalitat) and Seinsverstandnis.

In

the Republic Socrates says concerning the double structure of inquiry:
"Understand then," said I, "that by the other section of the
intelligible I mean that which the reason (logos) itself lays
hold of by the power of dialectics, treating its assu•ptions not
as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses (hupotheseis),
underpinnings, footings, and springboards so to speak, to enable
it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the
starting-point of all (pantos archein), and after attaining to
that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to
proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any
object of sense but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to
ideas and ending with ideas." Rep. VI.511 b-c.4
Section 19 ends with the question:
Seinsverstandnis possible" (BP 274/388)?

"How does temporality make
Section 20 undertakes the

"ascent" by showing that "temporality is the condition of the possibility of all understanding of Being; Being is understood and conceptually comprehended by means of time" (274).

Zeitlichkeit is the

ultimate term in the sequence of projections constituting the structure
of the understanding (BP 308,

~21).

Here Heidegger repeats, in summary

fashion, the analysis of the temporality of Dasein undertaken in
and Time.

Bei~

Thus, Being and Time itself represents the "ascent" to the
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epekeina tes ousias, Zeitlichkeit as the horizon of the understanding
of Being.
Analysis on the Platonic model yields insight (noesis) into the
final source of thought and being.

Only synthesis, however, yields

science (episteme), in that the latter exists only when the interconnections among all ideas, and the relation of these to the Good, are
brought into full view.

Heidegger's "science of Being" exhibits in

explicit fashion the interconnection between the understanding of the
Being of beings and t11te.

It

is from the standpoint of this "synthe-

sis," this view of the whole, that Zeitlichkeit is called Temporalitat.

"We call this entire problematic Temporalitiit" (228).

Tempor-

alitat is Zeitlichkeit from the standpoint of synthesis, that is, from
the standpoint of the possibility of giving an account (logos) of the
whole.

It is in the demonstration of the horizonal role of Temporality

in the understanding of Being that Heidegger completes the project
announced in Being and Time of "getting Dasein as a whole into our
grasp" (cf BT 281).
The identity of Temporalitat with Zeitlichkeit is clearly emphasized.

Analysis yields Zeitlichkeit as the condition of the possibili-

ty of the understanding of Being.

When the "synthetic" question, "how

does temporality make such understanding of Being possible?" (274,
italics added), is asked, then the question is how "time as temporality
[is] the horizon for the explicit understanding of Being as such . .
?" (274).

For this question of the "descent," that is to say "in

its role as condition of possibility of the understanding of Being,
both pre-ontological and ontological, we shall call Zeitlichkeit
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temporalitat" (274).
Section 20 undertakes the ascent by showing how Being-in-the-world
"is already, as such, understanding of Being" (292), and does so by
exhibiting the interconnections between "Being-in-the-world, transcendence, and temporality" (!20(e); 294).

Being-in-the-world is possible

for Dasein because Dasein oversteps beings toward world.

"Because

Dasein is constituted by Being-in-the-world, it is a being which in its
Being is out beyond itself.

The epekeina belongs to Dasein's own most

peculiar structure of Being" (299).
being" (300).

Thus, "Dasein is the transcendent

Transcendence "makes possible coaing back to beings, so

that the antecedent understanding of Being is founded on transcendence"
(300).

But if Being-in-the-world (which aanifests the projective

structure of "understanding of Being") is founded in transcendence,
then it is necessary to ask "in what is Dasein's transcendence itself
grounded?" (301).

"The ecstatic character of time aakes possible

Dasein's specific overstepping, transcendence, and thus also the world"
(302).

The "ascent" is completed in Zeitlichkeit, which is not only

"ecstasis" but the horizonal unity of the ecstases:

"The transcendence

of Being-in-the-world is founded in its specific wholeness on the original ecstatic-horizonal unity of Zeitlichkeit" (301).

Thus, "Zeit-

lichkeit is the condition of the possibility of the understanding of
Being" ( 301).
The understanding's glimpse of "that upon which it projects" "as
unveiled" (284), the end of the existential analyses undertaken in
Being and Time, does not yet guarantee that the way in which "the
understanding of the Being of beings" is "made possible by time" will
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be "transparent" (294) to us.

Hence the ascent, the existential

analysis, only prepares for the task which will complete the investigation undertaken by fundamental ontology into the constitution of
Dasein 1 s Being--namely, ontology, the "science of Being."

Section 21

undertakes the synthesis:
The task now is to comprehend how, on the basis of the temporality that grounds Dasein's transcendence, Dasein's Temporality
makes possible the understanding of Being. (302)
Here we have the program of the "descent" clearly formulated, namely to
show, on the basis of the eliciting of temporality as the horizon of
the understanding of Being, how that te•porality (now Temporality)
makes the understanding of Being possible.
We shall examine the movement of "synthesis" (!21) in greater
detail below.

The issue of the "science of Being" remains Seinsver-

standnis, the understanding of Being--for there is no "Being" by
itself.

"Being is given only i f the understanding of Being, hence

Dasein, exists" (19).

It is for this reason that one can say that

Heidegger's own name for the "synthesis" is die Kehre, the Turn from
"Being and time" to "time and Being."

For by showing how Temporality

makes the understanding of Being possible, the predominating role of
"Being" in its traditional interpretation as praesens is undercut,
since "Being" is no longer the ultimate term of metaphysical inquiry.
If

Being "is there" only where there is understanding of Being, and

understanding has its source in the temporalization of temporality,
then the inexplicit interpretation of Being as praesens, sustaining
both the everyday understanding of Being and that of the tradition,
itself rests upon the "forgotten" primacy of time.

Heidegger, it is

,
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true, does not announce the significance of this turning.

We can catch

a glimpse of the difficulty of the issue, why Heidegger does not
address it directly, if we use Gadamer's5 formula, that according to
Heidegger "Being is tiae."

This at first offensive formulation cap-

tures the entanglement of Heidegger's enterprise in the language of
Being, i.e. in the language of metaphysics, and therefore the impossibility of completing it in its own terms.

The phrase suggests the

infinite series of projections required, in spite of Heidegger's claim
regarding the li•iting of the series in the projection upon time6, if
we are to understand anything like "ti•e."

If all understanding is

understanding of Being, then how is time itself, upon which the
understanding of Being is projected, to be understood?

How is any

discourse concerning time itself possible, except that which reverts to
the language of Being (presence) and therefore already depends upon the
temporal projection?

The "turn" in Heidegger's thought, which at

first, at least, we must distinguish for•ally fro• the turn as initially conceived (from "Being and time" to "time and Being") is the
effect of Heidegger's grappling with the fundamental question of the
language required to address the el!ekeina tes ousias, the "origin" of
metaphysical understanding, i.e. of the understanding of Being.
The analogy with the Platonic "route of inquiry" has made it
clear that the "science of Being" for Heidegger corresponds to the
Platonic episteme, the synthetic view of the whole.

What has to be

shown is how time makes the understanding of Being possible.

This

means, precisely, to exhibit the interconnection of temporality with
the understanding of Being at every level, to exhibit the total
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structure of Dasein's transcendence in its grounding in temporalization.

The interconnection or "synthesis" is demonstrated in 121 on

the basis of an analysis of the Being of the handy.

Being is shown

here to be understood on the basis of a projection upon the ecstatic
horizon of praesens.

By thus making explicit what constitutes the

"Being" of beings in the understanding of beings, the science of Being
explicitly acco•plishes the differentiation of Being from beings
(122).

The ontological difference signifies the explicit carrying out

of this interpretation of the aeaning of Being, otherwise implicit in
all understanding of Being.

The synthetic view of the whole, which

presumably makes the Being of Dasein itself "transparent," accomplishes
the explicit carrying out of the ontological difference at the same
time that it establishes how the understanding of Being is grounded in
temporality.

For in the process of demonstrating that the projection

of the meaning of the Being of the (handy) being is directed toward
time as its horizon, the investigation shows that the "meaning" of
Being is time (praesens)--indeed, the two theses are demonstrated in
the same gesture.

In short, "Being" takes its meaning from the manner

in which it is projected, by everyday (pre-ontological) understanding,
upon time.

The "science of Being" shows in what this projection con-

sists: thereby the projection becomes "ontological," i.e. explicit with
regard to the meaning of Being.

"Being" does not lie beyond the sphere

of transcendence, but names the interpretive moment determining all
com-portment, all openness, toward beings.

In "stepping beyond" beings

to Being, beings are understood from praesens.

Being belongs to the

structure of transcendence, even for the "science of Being."

To
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demonstrate explicitly the manner in which Being is projected in the
understanding of Being is the goal of the science of Being and aakes up
its content.

Thus, the science of Being is wholly comprised by the

four "fundamental problems of phenomenology" and already makes up the
subject-aatter of the chapter on ontological difference in Basic
Problems of Phenomenology.
There is no indication here that Heidegger envisions a future
"science of Being" which will inquire into the true "meaning of Being"
--thereby putting philosophy on a secure grounding and turning it, at
last, into a science, accurate beyond all interpretation.

What is at

stake in ontology is not a "science" in the modern sense (a field of
inquiry continuing to expand in its research on the basis of methodological directives) but something like an episteae in the classical
sense of the grasping of a synthetic interconnection of elements, a
view of the whole founded in a grasp of the primal arche.

The "whole"

here is Seinsverstandnis, and it is Seinsverstandnis which is the true
subject-matter of the science of Being.

Being is the "object" of this

science, not only because Being is necessarily the "object" of all
philosophy, but because it is only by clarifying the way in which Being
is projected by the understanding that the nature of the understanding
itself can become clear.

And this is, in the first instance at least,

the aim of ontology: to apprehend the nature of the "event" that takes
place with the existence of Dasein, to understand how, in transcendence, philosophy as an interpretation of the Being of beings can
arise; how, in the "happening" (Geschehen) that Dasein is, something
like Seinsverstandnis can come to pass.
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We have seen that the function of ontology is to complete the
task of fundamental ontology by presenting the "synthesis" of the
whole, in the Temporal exposition of the understanding of Being.

In

this way, the possibility of such understanding is thoroughly grounded
in the teaporalization of temporality (assuming that the exposition is
completed).

Section 22 presents the resulting "view of the whole" in

the form of an explication of the ontological difference.

What is the

ultimate goal of this attempt to grasp, in rigorous, "scientific"
fashion the "wholeness" of Dase in. i.e. the full structure of transcendence?

What finally is achieved with the explicit carrying out of

the ontological diff erence?7
The question of ontology is how Seinsverstandnis is possible on
the basis of teaporality.

Seinsverstandnis, however, is nothing other

than the carrying out of the ontological difference, implicitly or
explicitly.

The understanding of Being is ordinarily

"pre-ontological," in that such understanding is usually merely
implicit.

The aim of !21 was to show what understanding of the Being

of beings was indeed implicit in pre-ontological understanding--in
everyday comportment toward beings--thereby making it explicit.

The

"meaning of Being" is, from the perspective of the problem of the
ontological difference, precisely that implicit projection made
explicit, namely the projection of Being as praesens.
Section 22 recapitulates the result of the ontological inquiry,
the explicit carrying out of the ontological difference, in order to
show how ontology thereby achieves an "objectification" (Vergegenstandigung) of Being, and thereby constituted itself a science.
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In order to understand further the "scientific" character of this
achievement, we must first recall that the understanding of Being takes
two foras, pre-ontological and ontological.

In the first, the under-

standing of Being remains implicit:
Being itself, if indeed we understand it, must somehow or other
be projected upon something. This does not mean that in this
projection Being must be objectively apprehended or interpreted
and defined, conceptually comprehended, as something objectively
apprehended . . . . Being is projected upon something fro• which
it becomes understandable, but in an unobjective way. It is understood as yet pre-conceptually, without a logos. (281)
The objectification of Being means to make explicit what is already
implicit in pre-ontological understanding.

"The understanding of Being

in general in the pre-conceptual sense is .

. the condition of the

possibility that Being should be objectified, thematized at all" (281).
Furthermore, "A scientific investigation constitutes itself in the
objectification of what has somehow already been unveiled" (320).

This

latter statement, representing Heidegger's formal definition of
science, is his addition to the classical concept of episteme.

Ontolo-

gy is a science precisely because it clarifies that understanding of
Being already operative in the everyday comportment of Dasein.

We must

be careful, therefore, not to mistake ontology for a distinct "science"
with a special "object," "Being," the investigation of which would
leave behind the field of inquiry opened up by fundamental ontology.
On the contrary, ontology is nothing other than the final moment of the
inquiry, the radical clarification of the internal structure (the ontological difference) of that field (transcendence).8
Ontology is accomplished when the understanding can "somehQ!__see,
~s

unveiled, that upon which it projects" (284; note reference to
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"seeing the sun" in the Platonic allegory of the cave), i.e., when i t
can see temporality as the horizon of the projection of Being.

This is

possible, however, only if this ontological difference is carried out
explicitly, if Being is "objectified" and therefore fully distinguished
from beings.

Thus Heidegger distinguishes between the "distinction"

(Unterschied) of Being and beings, and the explicitly carried out
difference (Differenz):
~-

The distinction [Unterschied] between Being and beings is there
[ist da], latent in Dasein and its existence, even if not in
explicit awareness. . . . Existence aeans, as it were, "to be in
the performance of this distinction." . . . The distinction
between Being and beings exists pre-ontologically, without an
explicit concept of Being, latent in Dasein's existence. As such
it can become an explicitly understood difference [Differenz}.
(319)9

ontology comes into its own as a science when it is able to
distinguish "the mode of knowing operative in ontology as science of
Being, and this requires us to work out the methodological structure of
ontological-transcendental differentiation" (20).

In the end, the task

is to establish the interconnection between Being and time; this aim is
served by ontology when it thematizes Being by showing that time is
"the condition of the possibility of all understanding of Being"
(274).

The science of ontology consists in the explicit differentia-

tion of Being from beings, accomplished by showing how Being is dependent upon time--that is to say, how the understanding of Being has its
horizon in Temporalitat.

Ontology makes explicit what interpretation

of Being i.s already implicit in the understanding of beings, namely
that Being is praesens.

The demonstration that time is the horizon of

the under-standing of Being has effected the carrying out of the ontological difference, and has therefore established the science of
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Being.
What, then, is achieved when the ontological difference is
carried out explicitly in the science of Being, and therefore the
~~

of all understanding of Being is made manifest?

This question

is equivalent to that concerning the ultimate significance of ontology
itself.
Pre-ontological understanding is the basis for the positive
sciences, which "constitute themselves in the objectification of beings
where the objectification holds itself in the tendency of everyday
direct apprehension" (321).

In short, the positive sciences are

founded in a projection based upon this pre-ontological awareness
(321).

More importantly for understanding what is at stake in ontol-

ogy, such a projection also underlies traditional ontology.

But

everyday understanding does not distinguish clearly between Being and
beings, so that, in traditional ontology, "Being itself is even treated
at first like a being and explained by means of determination of
beings, as at the beginning of ancient philosophy . . . . and at bottom
this interpretation has remained the usual one in philosophy right down
to the present day" (318-19).
In view of this reference to the tradition, what "difference"
does the explicit carrying out of the ontological difference make?
Does ontology add, to the series of possible philosophies, one more
philosophy, even if the final one, founded at last in a scientific
inquiry?

Or is it not clearly the case that ontology makes explicit

what is already implicit at the heart of all traditional philosophy
(that Being is understood as praesens)?

What, then, is the status of
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ontology?

Is ontology the "true philosophy" at last, or does i t

accomplish anything more than an exposition of the "forgottenness" of
Being in the tradition--and hence initiate the Destruktion?
Or is it not possible that both accomplishments are essentially
equivalent in view of the fundamental "methodology" which is at work
even, as Heidegger tells us, in this "scientific" text:
Reference to the fact that the Greeks understood Being by way of
the present, by means of praesens, is a confiraation not to be
overestimated for our interpretation of the possibility of
understanding Being by time; but it nevertheless does not
establish it basically. Still, it is testimony that in our own
interpretation of Being we are atte•pting nothing other than the
repetition of the problems of ancient philosophy in order to
radicalize them in this repetition by their own selves. (315-16)
The radicalization of philosophy, whereby the forgottenness of Being is
overcome, takes place in the self-repetition of the problems of
philosophy.

Repetition makes explicit what is already at work--the

interpretation of Being as praesens, the Temporal horizon of the
understanding of Being--in the tradition.

Ontology, the central moment

in repetition, overcomes the forgottenness of Being by showing what
"Being" truly is in the tradition.

Ontology discloses the essence of

philosophy, the carrying out of the ontological difference; since it
shows how philosophy answers the ontological question (the question of
the Being of beings), it constitutes, in the terms of MFL, the first
half of metaphysics.

Metaphysics is just the "essence" of philosophy;

it is the event always implicitly at work in philosophy.

The carrying

out of the ontological difference (transcendence) is the explication of
the structure of this event which determines philosophy as philosophy.
The moment of ontology, which exhibits what is concealed in the
tradition, i.e. i t exhibits the concealed "essence" of philosophy, is
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not by itself the goal of repetition.

Ontology overcomes the forgot-

tenness of Being in "objectifying" Being, but this means that Temporality is shown to be the horizon of the interpretation of Being.

At

the very moment of overcoming the forgottenness of Being, the center of
metaphysics is shifted from Being to time.
is the origin of possibility."

It is now seen that "Time

As origin, time can give rise to possi-

bilities not envisioned in the tradition.

The goal of repetition is

renewal, is, indeed, the transformation of the traditionlO.

If we keep

in view the structure of Heidegger's project as a whole (the two sides
of the metaphysics of Dasein) then we can see that ontology serves as
the moment of turning in philosophy, that it constitutes itself as the
passageway whereby the tradition itself can give rise to the renewal of
philosophy.

The overcoming of the forgottenness of Being is meant to

result, not in a new textbook on the true meaning of Being, but in the
potential transformation of philosophy qua philosophy.
Heidegger's own work does not, by itself, attempt to determine
the specific form of future philosophy--this remains true even for the
later work--but has as its sole aim the "transformation of the site" of
thinking, for the sake of a renewal of what, for the present, we can
call the possibilities of thinking.

This project is deeply radicalized

after the "turn" in Heidegger's thought, but the aim of the project
remains the same throughout Heidegger's work.
"In fact, that 'place' is, in every philosophy, an occupied
place, and it is in each case transformed" (MFL 157/200).

It is the

passage through the "place" of fundamental ontology that enables the
transformation of philosophy, which never exhibits, concretely
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speaking, the bare neutrality of ontology, but always takes place in
relation to a specific "whole of being"--so that a metontology is
required to complete the metaphysics of Dasein.

Philosophy always

"occurs" as a transformation of philosophy.
Ontology returns the traditional interpretation of Being to its
source.
325).

This source is time, "the origin of possibility itself" (BP
But the return and gathering of philosophy into its source,

temporalization, raises several further issues, particularly when we
look more closely at the nature of time.
"Time" answers the question of the •eaning of Being; we find a
formulation of this answer at the end of 120 of Basic Problems:
The transcendence of Being-in-the-world is founded in its
specific wholeness on the original ecstatic-horizonal unity of
te•porality. If transcendence makes possible the understanding
of Being and if transcendence is founded on the ecstatichorizonal constitution of temporality, then temporality is the
condition of the possibility of the understanding of Being.
(302)
The task that now follows, Heidegger says at the beginning of 121,
"is to comprehend how, on the basis of the

temporalit~

that grounds

Dasein's transcendence, Dasein's Te•porality makes possible the 1l!!..=
derstanding of Being" (302).

This task, as we have already suggested,

constitutes the "synthetic" inquiry following the "ascent" to temporality; it therefore constitutes the science of Being proper.

In this

section, Heidegger demonstrates how Temporality (temporality in the
"descent") makes the understanding of Being possible in a specific
sense, "namely, the understanding of Being in the sense of extantness
in its broadest signification" (302).

In the second part, (b), of this

section, Heidegger will show how Kant's interpretation of Being as

l
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"position" has the same source as the understanding of Being in its
extantness.

Thus his analysis of the horizon of this understanding of

Being (praesens) relates back to the concept of Being which underlies
the tradition.

It therefore constitutes the climax of the Destruktion,

since it exhibits the source of that understanding of Being which is
operative in the tradition.

It is precisely at this culainating point

that a repetition becoaes possible.

Indeed, Heidegger says here that

in our own interpretation of Being we are attempting nothing
other than the repetition of the probleas of ancient philosophy
in order to radicalize them in this repetition by their own
selves. (316)
To return to Heidegger's Temporal interpretatin of "handiness":
The overriding issue is how "Being-in-the-world itself [is] possible as
a whole" (301).
temporalization.

The problem, then, is the interconnection of world and
Heidegger goes so far here as to identify Dasein's

transcendence with "world-understanding" (302).
itself is always a "world-understanding."

Seinsverstandnis

Heidegger introduces the

concept of openness (one way of saying "world") here:

"The being we

call Dasein is as such open for . . . . Openness belongs to its being"
(300).

(See MFL 210:

panding into a world.")

"Time is essentially a self-opening and ex"There would be nothing like a horizon for us

if there were not ecstatic openness for . . . and a schematic determ!nation of that openness, say, in the sense of praesens" (308).

The

concept of the horizon is that of a limitation (schematic determination) placed upon openness, so that beings can have a "determinate" way
of appearing within the open domain.

The horizon should not, of

course, be conceived as "out-side" the open region but rather as the
"schema" of the region itself.

Both horizon and schema are ways of
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expressing the "limit" character intrinsic to openness, without which
there would not be any determinate beings or relatedness among beings.
The type of relatedness approp-riate to the ecstasis of the present is
functionalit~

(Bewandtnis); functionality is the "way of Being" of the

type of being that we encounter most "nearly," equipment (Zeug) encountered in its handiness.

Praesens is the "horizonal schema of the

ecstasis of enpresenting" (equipment is "made present" in enpresenting)
because it is the way the Being of equipment is "sketched out" in
advance for its being encountered within the open realm.
determines the character of its "appearing."

The horizon

That praesens is a

schematic determination of openness means that the "world" manifested
in beings is fundamentally a world of functional relations.

Praesens

signifies that which makes functionality as such "possible" and thus
lets the handy be encoutered

I!§

handy.

That openness and thus world as such is determined as a "whole"
by the horizon of praesens means that it is not possible to separate
self-projection, ecstasis, and horizon, as if there were first of all
"something" (or someone) that projected across an open space toward an
already-established horizon.

Rather, the "something" is just

temporalization (self-projection) which, in each ecstasis, "has a
horizon that is determined by [the ecstasis] and that first of all
completes that ecstasis' own structure" (306).

Temporalization is, as

Heidegger will soon say (MFL 209) "worlding" of world, so that selfprojection, ecstasis and horizon can only be conceived as belonging in
a unity to this event as a whole.

Self-projection is temporalization,

the event as such; the event has a projective character, i.e., it
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occurs in ecstases; and the event is determinate in character, i.e., it
takes place in relation to a horizon or "scheaatic determination."
Thus we should not reify any of the aspects of Heidegger's analysis of
temporalization, the unity of which Heidegger expresses as follows:
Temporality in general is ecstatic-horizonal self-projection
simply as such, on the basis of which Dasein's transcendence is
possible. (312)
We now turn to the demonstration of how a specific understanding
of Being is indeed made possible through Temporality. It is through
such a demonstration that the ontological difference is carried out
explicit!~,

since it is here that the usually implicit dependence of

our understanding of beings upon a temporal determination of Being is
made explicit.
On a day-to-day basis, beings for the most part are encountered
as extant, as beings accessible to us in the sense that we know something about them but, perhaps, do not really know how to "manage" with
them, in the way that a shoemaker, for example, understands how to
"deal appropriately" with the equipment found in his shop.

Although we

usually encounter beings in the privative mode of unfamiliarity, i.e.,
as merely extant, "this privative mode of the uncoveredness of the
extant can be comprehended ontologically only from the structure of
primary familiarity" (304).

But this primary familiarity lies in deal-

ing with beings appropriately--the capacity to do this is to "understand" beings in their mode of Being as equipment.

Heidegger has

already shown, in '120 (not to mention U5-18 of BT), how "the
understanding of equipment traces back to the understanding of
functionality, sig-nificance, and world, and hence to the ecstatichorizonal constitution of Dasein" (305).

He has also already shown (in
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t20) how commerce with the handy "constitutes itself with respect to
its temporality in a retentive-expectant enpresenting of the equipmental contexture as such" (304).

The problem now is to exhibit how

temporality is, indeed, con-stitutive (as ecstatic-horizonal) of the
understanding of the handy as such; to show, in other words, how
"handiness" is understood on the basis of the complete ecstatichorizonal structure of temporality, i.e. of Teaporality.
Handiness is not by itself a merely "positive" phenomenon--as
extantness seems to be--but the handiness of the handy is encountered
just as much in the

unavailabilit~

indeed being "at hand."

of a piece of equipment as in its

Thus handiness is not understood through

"categories" like being (being-extant) and not-being, but through
"variations of a single basic phenomenon, which we may characterize
formally as eresence and

abse~,

and in general as

pra~"

(305).

Heidegger defers further analysis of this double structure of praesens
until later in the section (pp. 309 ff.).

Here he is concerned to show

how, if handiness has a "praesensial meaning, then this would signify
that this mode of Being is understood Temporally" (305).

Thus the

question is what praesens does indeed mean with respect to "time and
temporality in general" (305).
Heidegger first distinguishes praesens from the "now."

The now

characterizes intratemporality, i.e., temporal relations among the
handy and the extant, "whereas praesens is supposed to constitute the
condition of possibility of understanding of handiness as such" (305).
Now, the very description of the handy as intratemporal presupposes
that we already understand handiness as such and, presumably,
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understand it through something like praesens.
Again, the saying of the "now" is the way that the enpresenting
of something, and threfore the moment, the Augenblick, can express
itself.

But the Augenblick (for example) is one of the ways that time

temporalizes itself, specifically in the enpresenting of the present.
Therefore, it would seem, praesens is identical with the present in the
sense of "the enpresenting of . . . " [das Gegenwartigen von
(306/434-5), i.e., with one of the ecstasis of temporality.

.]
But this

is not correct:
The name "praesens" itself already aeans that we do not aean by
it an ecstatic phenoaenon as we do with present and future, at
any rate not the ecstatic phenomenon of temporality with regard
to its ecstatic structure. (306)
The focus is, rather, upon soaething else:
whereby the ecstasis completes itself.

the horizonal structure

Thus praesens is distinguished

from enpresenting as horizon (of projection) is distinguished from
ecstasis (projection as an "act").

But we must be careful here.

The

"horizon" (and thus Teaporality) does not represent a pre-established
framework already somehow "ready" for the projection of the ecstasis
upon it.

Heidegger emphasizes very sharply that the "connection

between present and praesens" (306) is not accidental.

The connection

lies in the fact that the horizon belongs to the ecstasis and is
determined by it:
is determined

"Instead, each ecstasis as such has a horizon that

~and

that first of all completes the ecstasis'

structure" (306, emphasis mine).

Q!m

Indeed, it is the ecstasis which is

"the condition of possibility of a specific 'beyond-itself,' of
transcendence, the projection upon presence" (306).

That praesens as

horizon lies "beyond the ecstasis as such" is "due to the character of
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the ecstasis" (306, emphasis mine).

Strictly speaking, then, Tempor-

ality is not the "horizon" of temporalization, but is simply temporalization in its complete structure:

"Temporality [Temporali tatl_is

temporality [Zeitlichkeit] with regard to the unity of the horizonal
schemata belonging to it, in our case the present with regard to
praesens" ( 307 / 436) .
The connection between enpresenting and that upon which it
projects is this:

The projection of enpresenting upon praesens

~

As the condition of the possibility of the "beyond itself," the
ecstasis of the present has within itself a schematic predesignation of the where out there this "beyond itself" is. (306)
There are two essential consequences of this interconnection between
horizon and ecstasis, between praesens and the present.

First:

Because praesens arises with and in the projecting (the ecstasis)
itself, and because "as removal to . . . , the present is a being-open
for what is encountered (Offen-

sein ftir Begegnendes] which is thus

understood antecedently upon praesens" (306-7m/436), then the Being of
present beings is indeed understood "from the original horizonal schema
of the ecstasis of temporality" (307).

Thus "understanding" which

itself is "being-open for what is encountered," is "schematized" in its
(teaporalizing) ecstasis by praesens.

What is encountered in the open

already has its Being "sketched in," schematically pre-determined, as
"soaething present":
Everything that is encountered in the enpresenting [the ecstatic
opening-out toward
.] is understood as something present
[Anwesendes]--that is, understood upon presence--on the basis of
the horizon, praesens, already removed in the ecstasis. If
handiness and unavailability signify something like presence and
absence--praesens modified and modifiable thus and so--the Being
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of the beings encountered within the world is projected
praesensially, which means, fundamentally, Temporally. (307)
This is what Heidegger has set out to prove.

Of course, the

"proof" here does not consist in establishing a relationship between
already received philosophical notions, but rather in constructing the
concepts of praesens, ecstasis, and Temporality by exhibiting their
interrelationship on the basis of the inquiry into the horizonal
character of time.

In this way the "wholeness" of Dasein, with respect

to the constitution of its Being, is brought into view, and the project
of Being and Time, insaofar as it lies in an attempt to get "Dasein as
a whole into our grasp," is completed--or is, rather, completed with
respect to the one ecstasis of the present.

Through the disclosure, in

this way, of the Being of Dasein as a whole, Heidegger has shown how
te•porality is the basic condition of transcendence as such:
Temporality is itself the basic condition of the possibility of
all understanding that is founded on transcendence and whose
essential structure lies in projection. (307)
But this leads us to the second conclusion to be drawn from the
disclosure of the complete (i.e., ecstatic-horizonal) structure of
transcendence.
such" (307).

Temporality is "original self-projection simply as
That the coaplete structure of self-projection is

articulated in the disclosure of its ecstatic-horizonal unity means
that there can be no projection "beyond" the horizon, UJ!on which the
schemata themselves would be further projected:
Because the ecstatic-horizonal unity of temporality is intrinsically self-projection pure and simple, because as ecstatic it
makes possible all projecting upon . . . and represents, together
with the horizon belonging to the ecstasis, the condition of possibility of an upon-which, an out-toward-which in general, it can
no longer be asked upon what the schemata can on their part be
projected, and so on in infinitum. The series, mentioned
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earlier, of projections as it were inserted one before the other
--understanding of beings, projectin upon Being, understanding of
Being, projection upon time--has its end at the horizon of the
ecstatic unity of temporality. (308)
To establish this in a more primordial way, Heidegger says, "we would
have to go into the problem of the finitude of time" (308).
What does the finitude of time mean?

At the horizon of the

ecstatic unity of temporality not only each ecstasis but temporality
itself "has its end" (308).

"But," Heidegger adds, "this end is no-

thing but the beginning and starting point for the possibility of all
projecting" (308).

It is the unity of end and beginning that consti-

tutes the finitude of time.

The concept of primordial time is, in

fact, that of a unity in which end and beginning are somehow the
"same."

What is involved in this relationship, not of identity, but of

sameness constituted, as we maintain, by repetition?
By now we are quite familiar with the fact that the highest
ontological concept is that of possibility, and that the theme of
possibility is so intimately related to that of finitude that it is
precisely at the point at which possibility as such comes fully into
view that ontology gives way to the problematic of finitude, that is,
to metontology.
metontology.

This is the "formal" transition from ontology to

The investigation into the constitution of Dasein as a

whole comes to an end with the discovery of Temporality, the origin of
possibility:
Fundamentally it must be noted that if we define temporality as the original constitution of Dasein and thus as the origin
of the possibility of the understanding of Being, then Teaporality as origin is necessarily richer and more pregnant than anything that may arise from it. This makes manifest a peculiar
circumstance, which is relevant throughout the whole of philosophy, namely, that within the ontological sphere the possible
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is higher than everything actual.

(308)

The question, if we are to understand the Umschlag, is how possibility
does give rise to concrete possibilities, "possible actuality":

What

is the connection between Temporality as origin and concretely existing, finite Dasein?
The "finitude of time" is discussed aost extensively in '11165 and
74 of Being and Tiae, and is discussed there in terms of repetition and
QOSsibili~.

The concretization of possibility occurs through the

repetition of a concrete possibility.
In order to exhibit properly the extent to which Being and Time
is itself concerned with the "concretization of possibility" i t would
be necessary to undertake an extensive interpretation of the second
Division of BT.

This is not possible here; all that we shall attempt

is to indicate certain issues in ,165 and 74 that show how the analysis
of primordial time contains within itself the iapetus for an "overturning" into metontology, i.e., into the problematics of finitude.
We recall that in Heidegger's discussion of Leibniz, the primordial unifying character of drive is "concretized" only in the
restrictedness of the viewpoint, which in turn is constitutive for
drive.
From the standpoint of the problematic of Dasein 1 s existence,
temporalization is significant only in relation to Dasein's concrete,
factical existence.

Thus, in 165 of BT we read that "anticipatory

resoluteness . . . is Being towards one's ownmost, distinctive
potentiality-for-Being" (372).

But

This sort of thing is possible only in that Dasein can, indeed,
come towards itself in its ownmost possibility, and that it can
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put up with this possibility as a possibility in thus letting
itself come towards itself--in other words, that it exists. This
letting-itself-come-towards-itself in that distinctive possibility which it puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the
future as coming towards. (372)
Given then that the "l?!.imary phenomenon of primordial and authentic
temporality is the future" (378), Heidegger proceeds to demonstrate the
unity of temporality in its three ecstases.

Here he is engaged in

"opening up" the meaning of Care in its temporal structure.

Antic!-

patory resoluteness, which "understands Dasein in its own essential
Being-guilty" (373) takes over thrownness; but this lets futural Dasein
"be its . . . 'been' ['Gewesen']" (373/326).

"Anticipation of one's

uttermost and ownmost possibility is coming back understandingly to
one's ownmost 'been'" (373).

At the same time, "resolute being-

alongside what is ready-to-hand in the Situation . . . is possible only
by making such an entity present" (374).

Heidegger summarizes his

analysis of the temporality disclosed in anticipatory resoluteness as
follows:
Coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness brings itself
into the Situation by making present. The character of "having
been" arises from the future, and in such a way that the future
which "has been" . . . releases itself from the Present. This
phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the
process of having been; we designate it as "te11poraliu." Only
in so far as Dasein has the definite character of temporality, is
the authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of anticipatory
resoluteness, as we have described it, 11ade possible for Dasein
itself. Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic
care. (374)
Heidegger is here effecting a transition between his earlier
analysis of the way in which resoluteness, as authentic disclosedness,
"brings the Being of the 'there' into the existence of the Situation"
(347).

"[W]hen the call of conscience summons us to our potentiality-
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for-Being, it does not hold before us some empty ideal of existence,
but calls us forth into the Situation" (347).

This, says Heidegger

later on in the text, is "the primordial truth of existence" (355).
What is at stake in resoluteness, which brings Dasein into, and
maintains it in, the Situation, is that it "be held open and free for
the current factical possibility" (355).

And it is here that the

question of the potentiality-for-Being-a-whole is factically answered
by Dasein (357).

In other words, it is in the sort of "openness" to

beings and to Others that is constitutive of the Situation that Dasein
finds its wholeness at this initial level of the analysis.

In its

wholeness, Dasein is disclosive of the "reality" of its Situation.

But

this is a way of being finite--for Dasein to hold resolutely to the
truth of its Situation (in the midst of beings), and thereby to
disclose the truth of the Situation.
Heidegger's opening up of the temporal diaension of the Situation
raises the issue of historicity, which must be understood as a
historicity belonging specifically to situated Dasein.

That is to say,

the disclosure of the meaning of Dasein's Being as primordial temporality takes place on the basis of the analysis of the Situation and as an
elaboration of it.

Teaporalization itself does not "depart from." the

Situation, does not take place in vacuo, but shares in its finitude:
The authentic future is teaporalized primordially by that temporality which aakes up the aeaning of anticipatory resoluteness;
it thus reveals itself as finite. (378)
Indeed, temporality actually "constitutes" the finitude of the Situation, since the nullity (being-guilty as being-the-basis of a nullity)
which we understand in resoluteness, and which brings us into the
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Situation, is itself founded in futurity:
The primordial and authentic future is the "towards-oneself" (to
oneself!), existing as the possibility of nullity, the possibility which is not to be outstripped. The ecstatical character
of the primordial future lies in the fact that the future closes
one's potentiality-for-Being; that is to say, the future is
closed to one, and as such •akes possible the resolute existentiell understanding of nullity. Primordial and authentic
coming-towards-oneself is the •eaning of existing in one's
ownmost nullity. (378-79)
At the present level of the analysis, the "possibility of nullity"
constitutes the meaning of the "primordial finitude of time."
With the further development of the analysis of the "temporality
of Being-in-the-world," i t becomes possible to further "concretize" the
significance of temporalization.

Dasein's temporalization in its full

concreteness is its "historizing" [Geschehen] (427/375).

In his dis-

cussion of "The Basic Constitution of Historicality [Geschichtlichkeit]" (174; 434/382), Heidegger expands, so to speak, his earlier
analysis of the Situation on the basis of a richer analysis of teaporalization.

It is here that the concept of "possibility" becomes

most concrete:
The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself,
discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing,
and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over. In one's coming back resolutely
to one's thrownness, there is hidden a handing down to oneself of
the possibilities that have co•e down to one, but not necessarily
as having thus come down . . . . The more authentically Dasein
resolves--and this means that in anticipating death it understands itself una11biguously in terms of its ownmost distinctive
possibility--the •ore unequivocally does it choose and find the
possibility of its existence, and the less does it do so by
accident. Only by the anticipation of death is every accidental
and 'provisional' possibility drive out. Only Being-free for
death, gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into
its finitude. Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of
possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one
and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate [Schicksals].
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This is how we designate Dasein's primordial historizing, which
lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself
dof!!! to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has
inherited and yet has chosen. (435/383-84)
But, Heidegger says, "the resoluteness which comes back to itself
and hands itself down, then becomes the repetition of a possibility of
existence that has come down to us" (437).

Possibility is concretized

The indications that we have elicited from Being and Tiae
concerning the nature of the concretization of possibility for Dasein-and thus of the nature of the metontological transition at what are
calling its "formal" level--are not meant to constitute a proof of the
way that primordial temporality necessarily gives rise to a determinate
possibility of repetition, and therefore contains within itself the
concept of a "possible actuality" in this sense.

In order to complete

a proof, the horizons of the future and of the past would have to be
investigated in the same manner in which Heidegger analyzes the horizon
of the present in praesens.

In other words, the full structure of time

in its finitude would have to be exhibited.

It would then, presumably,

become clearer still that the finitude of time means that temporalization always "occurs" in relation to the thrownness of Dasein, and thus
in relation to the possibility of its taking over determinate possib.ili ties made available to it through its very "situatedness."
Whether we think of the situatedness of Dasein in terms of its
Situation or its historizing, that Dasein is thrown means that it has
available to its potentiality-for-Being only certain possibilities for
disclosure, possibilities which belong, indeed, to its "time" .and
"place."

"Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes
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to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein" (436).
and formal sense of the metontological Umschlag is this:

The first

Implicit in

the ecstatic-horizonal character of temporalization itself lies the
necessity that disclosure take place in a "historizing" ("historizing"
is the metontological term for "teaporality"),11 i.e., in the taking
over of a determinate possibility in relation to a determinate tradition from out of a determinate situation (of which one's "generation"
is an eleaent).

The concept of the finitude of time, arrived at

through the ontological analysis--in the terms of tlO of MFL, on the
basis of the neutrality of Dasein--gives rise to the concept of
Dasein's essential concreteness.

This means that Heidegger's own

project stands under the law of finitude, and cannot stand outside the
tradition to establish its basis and measure in a genuinely neutral,
i.e., ontologically independent, Dasein.

Rather than abandoning the

project, however, Heidegger undertakes a more decisive questioning of
finitude as the "source" of Dasein (cf. KPM 244).

"The laying of the

foundation of metaphysics is rooted in the question of the finitude of
man in such a way that this finitude itself can first becoae a problem"
(KPM 225).

Regarding the finitude of the ontological project, Heideg-

ger says in KPM:
In any case, there is reason to believe that the explication of the essence of finitude required for the establishment of
metaphysics must itself always be basically finite and never absolute . . . . It remains, therefore, only to develop the problematic of finitude as such. (KPM 245)
This development can occur, however, only insofar as the "ontological" project places itself into the tradition in such a way as to
repeat, on the same ground as that which gives rise to the tradition,

169

the source of the possibility of "the laying of the foundation" of
metaphysics.

The role of ontology is taken over by a questioning which

is intrinsically historical:

"[T]he basic attitude of the questioning

is in itself historical; it stands and maintains itself in happening,
inquiring out of happening for the sake of happening" (IM 45).

The

finitude of fundamental questioning aeans that it places itself within
happening [Geschehen] for the sake of a renewal of "philosophy" (as
"happening") on the basis of a transformation occurring within the
"event," happening, itself.

This transformation takes place with the

Verwindung, torsion, of metaphysics upon itself, and gains its significance from die Kehre, the turning "of" the history of Being.
The metontological problematic is that of the irruption of metaphysics, i.e., of the understanding of Being, into the midst of being
as a whole.
by "history."

The possibility of such an event is what Heidegger means
Human existence, as finite, is "for" such happening:

With the existence of man there occurs an irruption into
being as a whole such that, by this event, being becomes manifest in itself, i.e., manifest as in being . . . . However, this
prerogative of not simply being one being among other beings,
which latter are not manifest to one another, but, in the midst
of beings, of being delivered up to them as such and of being
answerable to oneself as in being, in short, this prerogative of
existing, involves in itself the necessity of an understanding of
Being. (KPM 235-36/205-6)
Here "Being" means first of all the "beingness" of beings.

The meton-

tological "turn" means that questioning turns to the problem of the
possibility of this event, the irruption into the midst of beings of an
understanding of Being, whereby beings become manifest as such and as a
whole.
The metontological overturning of the transcendental-horizonal

170

from of inquiry follows also from the second consequence of the finitude of primordial time, namely that the ontological project undercuts
its own possibility by destroying the feasibility of a "science of
Being" in the very act of completing it.
The aim of fundamental ontology is to "get Dasein as a whole into
our grasp"; the aim of the inquiry into the question of the meaning of
Being is to make the Being of the questioner transparent to itself.
The aim of ontology is to "objectify" Being, that is, to aake explicit
the understanding of Being already iaplicit in pre-ontological awareness, and to do so on the basis of a Temporal analysis of the horizon
of the understandability of Being.

Through this analysis, which is

finally to make Dasein transparent to itself, understanding is to be
made to "soaehow see, as unveiled, that u2on which it projects" (BP
284).

But the "basic condition for the possibility of understanding

the actual <!.! actual is to look into the sun, so that the eye of
knowledge should become sunlike" (285).
brightness" is the horizon itself (284).

But that which gives

"lumin~

Thus in looking upon the

horizon itself, the understanding sees the "sun," the luminous source
of understanding; and, in doing so, it understands the horizon, and
therefore understands understanding itself.

Seinsverstandnis becomes

transparent to itself.
But if all understanding is projection, the question remains, in
spite of Heidegger's asseveration concerning the limited number of
projections in the series of projections (308), in relation to what
horizon the horizon itself is understood.

Is the ecstatic-horizonal

structure of Temporality understood in terms of that ecstatic-horizonal
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structure?

But in that case no "ground" is obtained for that

understanding--since it is its own ground--and it becomes difficult to
see in what sense the understanding is made "transparent."

But if, on

the other hand, the series of projections does not come to an end with
Temporality, then the understanding is also in this case not made
transparent to itself.

Here the problem is the ancient one of the

possibility of the "knowledge of knowledge," with its involvement in
the issues of self-reference and of finitude.

For if primordial time

is finite, then this means that in the ontological project finitude
"grasps" finitude.
finitude?

Can finitude, in principle, become transparent to

Is not the very meaning of finitude that it cannot become

transparent to itself, that it cannot "leap over its own shadow"?

The

question arises whether the ontological project, as a project of
horizonal inquiry, does not undercut its own possibility through the
results of the inquiry.

The finitude of the project makes it impos-

sible that it should become transparent to itself--but that it should
become transparent to itself is essential to the completion of the
project: the objectif !cation of "Being" in the explicit carrying out of
the ontological difference, whereby the possibility of ontology in
general is exhibited.

The project of gathering philosophy into its

"end" cannot be carried through to its end; the foundation cannot be
established and the Turn cannot be carried out in the (foundational)
terms of traditional metaphysics.
The failure of the transcendental-horizonal inquiry, implicit
already in the concept of the f initude of time, leads to the second or
radical sense of the metontological Umschlag.

Here the "metontologi-
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cal," i.e. finite, character of the project is recognized and carried
out in its consequences.
David Krell, in his essay on metontology12, seems to suggest--if
I read hi• correctly--that the failure of the ontological project and
the recognition of the radical finitude of inquiry leads, in essence,
to the abandoning of the project of "fundamental" inquiry as such.

In

other words, finitude is to be equated with failure, rooted so deeply
in any human project that any such project is permeated through and
through with error.

Here there seems to be a kind of incipient nihil-

ism, as if thought had to be abandoned in the face of the finitude of
all questioning inquiry.
If this were the case, then it would not be possible to determine
that human thought is finite, since this itself is the "positive" result of a determinate course of inquiry.

If finitude is identical with

error (in the sense of the untrue) then finitude is not true, either-and there is no reason to speak of the failure of thought attendant
upon finitude.
Heidegger's response to the radical problematization of fin]tude
is of a different order.

Now the problem of the "origin of metaphys-

ics" takes on the character, not of a fundamental-ontological inquiry
into the horizon of the meaning of Being, but of an inquiry into the
possibility of the "irruption" of finite Dasein into the midst of being
as a whole.

Indeed, what we called, in Chapter One, the rigorously a-

theistic character of Heidegger's questioning becomes even more severely "anti-meta-physical" in that the problem becomes how anything like
the question of Being, and thus "Being," can arise from the midst of
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the "extant" whole of beings.

The metontological inversion means that

"transcendence" must be understood from the standpoint of the problematic of finitude (KPM, Part Four): that ontology returns to the
"metaphysical antic" from which i t takes its rise (MFL, Appendix); that
the unconcealment of beings takes place only in relation to the
concealment of beings as a whole (On the Essence of Truth).

We shall

proceed shortly to an exaaination of the last of these documents, which
we shall take as the exemplary "metontological treatise."

We now turn

to the aetontological problematic of the happening of truth, the
unconcealment of beings in the midst of the concealment of being as a
whole.

NOTES
1. Fundamental ontology, in Being and Time, consists in questioning
the questioning entity Dasein. The fundamental-ontological question is
how the question of Being as such is possible--and this questioning is
itself the radicalization of the question of Being. The ontological
questioning of metaphysics constitutes a doubligg of the question of
Being; this doubling is correlated with the double structure of metaphysics, as ontology (the questioning of metaphysics, i.e., of the
possibility of the question of Being in general) and metontology (the
questioning of Being in any concrete "instance" of metaphysics).
2. Being and Time must be read as "about" the question of the meaning
of Being, so that its goal is not soaething like a "theory of Being"
but is rather about the structure of all understanding of Being in
general. The first half of Being and Time inquires into the constitutive structure of Dasein as a whole (Care) and the second half
addresses the temporal significance of that structure. There is very
11 ttle about "Being" in Being and Time but auch about temporalization
and world. The question of Being is, formally understood, nothing
other than the "movement" of temporalization itself.
3.

Richardson, p. 36.

4. The Republic, tr. by Paul Shorey, in the Loeb Classical Library.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1970. pp. 113-115.
5. In H.-G. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics.
University of California Press, 1976, p. 216.
6.

Berkeley:

See John Sallis, "End(s)", p. 21.

7. The "achievement" of the explicit carrying out of the ontological
difference is that philosophy is gathered into its "end" and the
oblivion of Being is "overcome," as Sallis notes in the article
referred to above.
8. Heidegger notes, in a "digression" required in order to ward off a
fatal misunderstanding" (BP 281), that what is accomplished in finding
in temporality that upon which "Being itself, as Being, is projected"
(282) is nothing other than ontology:
The basic act of objectification . . . has the function of
expli~itly projecting what is antecedently given upon that on
which it has already been projected in pre-scientific experience
or understanding. If Being is to become objectified--if the
understanding of Being is to be possible as a science in the
sense of ontology--if there is to be philosophy at all, then that
upon which the understanding of Being, qua understanding [my
italics], has already pre-conceptually projected Being must
174
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become unveiled in an explicit projection (281-82).
9. One should add, even if only parenthetically, that Heidegger has
already introduced here the theme of the "thinking of difference as
difference"--so that Identity and Difference will have to be seen as
something like a "repetition" of the present ontological investigation
in Basic Problems of Phenomenolog~.
10. There is an essential connection between repetition and transformation. The repetition of the "essence" of philosophy, in effecting a
retrieval of the origin, introduces the possibility of a transformation
of "metaphysics." But such transformation could only be the "effect"
of the slow process of retrieval, and not a directly obtainable goal.
11. Thus Heidegger calls the problem of temporality, in MFL ,10, a
"metontological" proble•.
12. See our response to Krell in the Introduction, above.

CHAPTER V
"On the Essence of Truth" as a Metontological Treatise
In the Appendix to The

Meta~hysical

Foundations of Logic Heideg-

ger sketches the "logic" of the metontological reversal:
Since Being is there only insofar as beings are already
there (im Da], fundamental ontology has in it the latent tendency
toward a primordial, metaphysical transformation which becomes
possible only when Being is understood in its whole problematic.
The intrinsic necessity for ontology to turn back to its point of
origin [von wo sie ausgegangen war] can be clarified by reference
to the primal phenomenon of human existence: the being "man"
understands Being; understanding-of-Being effects a distinction
between Being and beings; Being is there only when Dasein
understands Being. In other words, the possibility that Being is
there in the understanding presupposes the factical existence of
Dasein, and this in turn presupposes the factual extantness of
nature. Right within the horizon of the problem of Being, when
posed radically, it appears that all this is visible and can
become understood as Being, only if a possible totality of beings
[Totalitat von Seiendem] is already there.
As a result, we need a special problematic which has for
its proper theme being as a whole [das Seiende im Ganzen]. This
new in-vestigation resides in the essence of ontology itself and
is the result of its overturning (Umschlag], its 1t.tl'1:J/bcA_r{. I
designate this set of questions metontology [Metontologi~J. (MFL
157m/199)

Ontology turns back into the "metaphysical ontic in which it implicitly
always remains" (158) because, like every project of finite Dasein,
even ontology itself is the project of a being.

Ontology has an on-

tical foundation (BP 19), and the first task of ontology is the characterization of this ontical foundation (BP 20); that is to say, the
first task of ontology is the investigation of the ontical-ontological
entity Dase in.
The second task of ontology (BP 20) is completed with the Temporal analysis of Dasein.

As we have seen, however (Chapter IV),
176
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"precisely the radicalization of fundamental ontology brings about the
above-mentioned overturning of ontology out of its very self" (MFL
157).

The horizonal analysis results in the discovery of the radical

finitude of time, and thus of the essential situatedness of all questioning of Being, including that of the fundamental-ontological inquiry
itself.

As a result, a special problematic is needed which investi-

gates that situatedness as such:

Because Dasein is ontical, this

inquiry takes the form of an investigation of the "metaphysical ontic,"
the "possible totality of beings" from which ontological questioning
takes its rise.
The metontological inquiry is the result of the overturning of
ontology that takes place with the disclosure of the finitude of time.
But this "overturning" means that the problem concerning the question
of Being becomes how it can arise in the midst of "being as a whole."
This problem, in a certain sense, goes beyond even that of the "finitude" of Dasein.

For the problematic of finitude arises in view of a

conception of transcendence itself as the "locus" of the disclosure of
Being, so that finitude is conceived as a property, as it were, of Dasein considered by itself.

But the metabole signifies, not a mere

reiteration of the ontological problematic (as if

~~tqg_and Ti~

were

to be written a second time, as the result of the return of the
hermeneutic circle to its "point of origin"), but a radicalization of
the problem of "origin," i.e. of the problem of the locus of disclosure
of the Being of beings.

The new "special problematic" is concerned

with the unconcealment of beings in the midst of being as a whole, and
the problem of finitude becomes that of the interrelation of
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unconcealment to the

~9-~cealment

of being as a whole.

Thus the temporal analysis results in the
Turn [Kehr.!!], where ontology itself expressly runs back into the
metaphysical ontic in which it implicitly always remains. Through the
movement of radicalizing and universalizing, the aim is to bring
ontology to its latent overturning [Umschlag]. Here the Turn [Kehre]
is carried out, and it is turned over into the metontology. (MFL
158m/201)
In its concrete significance, the Turn means the metontological overturning of ecstatic-horizonal inquiry--i.e., of the inquiry into the
horizonal "source" of the understanding of Being--into the questioning
of how unconcealment can "occur" in the midst of being as a whole.
The problem becomes how "with the existence of man there occurs
an irruption into the totality of being such that, by this event, being
becomes manifest in itself, i.e., manifest as being" (KPM 235m).

This

is the question of the origin of metaphysics, which is the "fundamental
event which comes to pass with the irruption into being of the concrete
existence of man" (251m).

In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics the

problem of the ground of the possibility of metaphysics is still conceived in terms of the finitude of man:

"Dasein must be constructed in

its finitude and with regard to that which makes the comprehension of
Being intrinsically possible" (241).

Finitude, however, is already

brought into connection with the oblivion of Being:

"The finitude of

Dasein--the comprehension of Being--lies in forgetfulness [yergessenheit]" (241).

Thus

An analytic of Dasein must, from the beginning, strive to
uncover the Dasein in man according to that mode of Being which.
by nature, maintains Dasein and its comprehension of Being, i.e.,
primordial finitude, in forgetfulness. (242)

Heidegger is clear about the difficulty of a reflection on
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finitude, since finitude must problematize itself in such a reflection:
In any case, there is reason to believe that the explication of the essence of finitude required for the establishment
of metaphysics must itself always be basically finite and never
absolute. It follows that this reflection on finitude, which is
always to be renewed, cannot succeeed by exchanging and adjusting
various points of view in order finally and in spite of everything to give us an absolute knowledge of finitude, a knowledge
which is surreptitiously posited as being "true in itself." It
remains, therefore, only to develop the problematic of finitude
as such . ( 245)
But the development of the "problematic of finitude as such," as the
problematic of the "dependence of Dasein on being as a whole" (244),
can only be accomplished through the articulation of the nature of that
"dependence."

It is with this task that the essay "On the Essence of

Truth" (ET) is concerned!.

Let us turn, then, to an examination of

this text.
There are two foci to ET, one overt and one hidden.

The first is

that previously treated under the rubric of finitude; the second is
that of history (Geschichte).

Richardson, in his commentary, sees both

issues2, but he does not see that human "finitude" no longer is the
issue per se, but rather the concealment of being as a whole.

Nor does

he distinguish Heidegger's meditation here on historical occurrence
from his earlier inquiry into the historicity of Dasein in
Time.

Bei~_and

It is these developments in Heidegger's thought which must be

emphasized, however, if we are to understand the concrete consequences
of the metontological Umschlag.

At the same time, we wish to try to

grasp the "movement" of this text as a whole in order to understand it
as the "metontological" treatise par excellence.
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Section 1.

The Usual Concept of Truth

The analysis proceeds, as is Heidegger's wont, from the "given"
situation of thought to the ground or conditions of the possibility of
that initial state.

Thus Heidegger offers neither a criticism of the

concept of truth as correspondence nor a more refined version of that
theory--in fact, Heidegger is not engaged in developing a "theory" of
truth, but in opening up the conditions underlying the possibiity of
such theories, which are based, in our tradition, on the experience of
truth as homoiosis or adaeguatio.

Heidegger accepts that experience as

the "given" which initiates the movement of inquiry.

Philosophy for

Heidegger cannot escape beginning with that which is "proximal and for
the most part"--the everydayness of Dasein, the received scholarly
tradition concerning Leibniz, the traditional understanding of judgment
in logic, or the common view of the nature of truth--but, as is
appropriate to the finitude of the inquirer, must begin with what is
"given" to it.

In the end, distance is obtained from this necessary

beginning through the explication of how it is possible for the initial
situation to arise: for example, the everyday understanding of time is
explicated through the structures of primordial temporality.
way the her11eneutic circle is "completed."

In this

But the opening up of the

hermeneutic circle constitutes the "clearing" whereby the meaning,
implicit in the original situation, is first discovered.
Heidegger's inquiry into the essence of truth shows how it is
possible for the truth of essence to be hidden as an issue: it therefore shows, after having begun with the traditional question of the
essence of truth, why it is indeed "necessary" to begin this way.

Our
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attention necessarily falls first of all upon beings and their interrelationships, including the relationship of statements to complexes of
fact.

The latter relationship is understood ontically as a problem of

"correspondence" because the condition of the manifestness of beings is
overlooked in such manifestness, and this precisely because "manifestness" occurs for the sake of the disclosedness of beings.
Section 2.

The Inner Possibility of Accordance

Thus Heidegger's first step is to call attention to the "open
region" within which objects appear.

The immediate question is how it

is possible for two such dissimilar things as a statement and, say, a
coin to "correspond."
In order to bring out the character of the "initial situation"
already coming into clearer focus at this stage of the analysis, I
shall translate verstellen as "to represent" in the following crucual
passage:
Correspondence here cannot signify a thing-like approximation between dissimilar kinds of things. The essence of the
correspondence is determined by the kind of relation that obtains
between the statement and the thing . . . . the statement regarding the coin relates "itself" to this thing in that it represents
it [vor-stellt, places-it-before] and says of the represented
thing how, according to the particular perspective that guides
it, it is disposed. What is stated by the representational
statement is said of the represented thing in just such manner ~
that thing, as presented, is. The "such-as" has to do with
representing and what it represents . . . . to represent here
means to let the thing stand opposed as object. As thus placed,
what stands opposed must traverse an open field of opposedness
[Entgegen] and nevertheless must maintain its stand as a thing
and show itself as something withstanding lein Standiges]. This
appearing of the thing in traversing a field of opposedness takes
place within an open region, the openness of which is not first
created by the representing but rather is only entered into and
taken over as a domain of relatedness. (BW 123-24m)
In this discussion of the "essence" of correspondence Heidegger
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presupposes the whole of his analysis of the Kantian ontology in Kant
and the Problem.of Metaphysics.

The open region is a field of op-

posedness; the ontology appropriate to it is that which concerns the
grounding of objectivity and of objective, representational presentation.

But here Heidegger does not focus on the "internal" structure of

that open region (its transcendental horizon), but seeks to

~lace

the

open region itself, as it were, upon its "ground" in the concealment of
being as a whole.

Although the term "metontology" is never again used

by Heidegger after MFL, we see in the present text the operation of the
metontological Umschlag discussed in MFL, namely the task of accounting
for "ontology" on the basis of the problematic of das Seiende im

The "ontology" with which we have begun, however, is the
"natural" one appropriate to ;:_epresentational thinking.
KPM:

(We read in

"An insight into the primordially representational character of

thought is not less important for our interpretation than is an exact
comprehension of the sensible character of the imagination" (KPM 154).)
In the representing statement's subordinating "itself to the directive
that i t speak of beings

such~

they are" (BW 124), i t achieves the

conformity to beings that we call "correctness," truth in the ordinary
sense.

Correctness is possible because of the openness of comportment

(Verhalten);
for only through the latter can what is opened up really become
the standard for the representing correspondence. Open comportment must let itself be assigned this standard. This means that
it must take over a pregiven standard for all representing.
( 124)
Heidegger's term Verhaltnis, the "bearing which originally and always
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comes to prevail as comportment (Verhalten]" (124), suggests the finite
relatedness of Dasein to what-is as a whole.

Verhalten means the

revealing relatedness to beings characteristic of Dasein, the comportment which "stands open to beings.
comportment" (124).

Every open relatedness is a

It is on the basis of open comportment that speech

can conform to beings, because comportment enables speech to take its
directive from beings, to take beings as its standard.

But comportment

can do this because it itself takes over the pregiven standard of objectivi~

for its representing.

The question, then "arises of the

ground of the inner possibility of the open comportment which pregives
a standard" (125).
Section 3.

The Ground of the Possibility of Correctness

The representative statement can be predirected to an accord with
the object
only if this preg1v1ng has already entered freely into an open
region for something opened up which prevails there and which
binds every representing. (125)
But the "openness of comportment as the inner condition of the possibility of correctness is grounded in freedom.

The essence of truth is

freedom" ( 125).
Heidegger adds that "in this connection 'essence' is understood
as the ground of the inner possibility of what is initially and generally admitted as known" (125).

Here "essence" serves the role per-

formed, in The Metaphysical Foundations of_hQg_ic, by "transcendence,"
which is there the dimension sought through the regression.

We find in

ET the same movement of regression to the "ground of the inner possibility of" the "given"; the different result of the regressus marks the
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distinction between the approaches of ET and MFL.

Of course, in MFL

the regression arrives at transcendence, and thereby at freedom, as the
ground of the possibility of

11

logic.

11

Here, however, the regression

continues, as we shall see, "beyond" freedom to the "essence" of freedom itself.
The regression to essence shows that truth as correspondence is
possible only on the basis of freedom.

Part of the meaning of "free-

dom" as an issue is that truth has an intrinsic relationship to man.
Thus Heidegger raises the question here whether "to place the essence
of truth in freedom--doesn't this mean to submit truth to human
caprice?" (126).

The rhetorical question merely marks the tO(!OS of

the problem of this relationship.

But it allows Heidegger to remind

us of the traditional metaphysical conception of the division between
truth as it is in itself, "the imperishable and eternal," and the
essentially un-true character of the human realm, so that truth "can
never be founded on the transitoriness and fragility that belong to
man's essence" (126).

This metaphysical motif is brought up in order

to highlight the reversal in the concept of essence undertaken in the
Heideggerian text--essence is not otherworldly, "metaphysical," but it
concerns an origination which takes place in the midst of being as a
whole, and in relation to the existence of man.

The problem of this

origination is the "metontological" problem.
Section 4.

The Essence of Freedom

If we can allow that we do not know what freedom is, nor what man
is, nor what the relation between freedom and man is, then we may be
prepared for a "transformation of thinking" (127).

What is at stake in

185

this transformation of thinking is suggested by the route taken in the
present essay, in particular by the movement toward the turn from the
question of the essence of truth to the question of the truth of
essence.

In ET, Heidegger seeks, through the regression to essence, to

engage just that dimension of "possibility" which "enables" something
like "truth" to arise.

That is to say, the same pattern is repeated

here in ET that characterizes Heidegger's work in general:

A "destruc-

tion" is undertaken of the given position through a regression to the
"ground of the possibility" of that position.

Specifically, here the

destruction consists in a regression to the ground of the possibility
of the view of truth as correctness.

The sought-for "essence" signi-

fies that which makes possible the traditional position; but to elicit
the essence means to awaken, as it were, possibility itself.

The

"repetition" achieved at the crux of the inquiry opens up the dimension
of possibility as such, so that the traditional view is no longer the
sole necessary "offspring" of the source.

This is what is meant by the

turn from the essence of truth to the truth of essence:

the turn from

the "single vision" of correspondence to the possibility of a multiplicity of "truths" arising from the source of possibility itself.

The

constant horizon of Heidegger's inquiry remains the "transformation of
thinking" (127).
With the reminder that the connection between truth and freedom
involves us in the "question of the essence of man" (127), Heidegger
proceeds to a deepening of the question of essence, i.e., of the
essence of freedom.

Freedom is significant only in relation to beings:

"Freedom now reveals itself as letting beings be" (127).

What does
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"letting be" mean?
To let be--that is, to let beings be as the beings which they
are--means to engage oneself with the open region and its
openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing that
openness, as it were, along with itself. (127)
Let us note the doubleness or ambiguity introduced here with the
concept of "letting beings be."

This "anti-metaphysical" concept

signifies the way in which freedom (as the essence of truth) is
oriented toward the "antic"; freedom is, one might say, for the sake of
the disclosure of beings !!§. what the}! are; indeed, there "are" only
beings.

But precisely because freedom is determined "as freedom for

what is opened up in an open region" (127), freedom is also engagement
with the open region and its openness.

This subtle duality replaces

the metaphysical duality of the sensuous and the supersensuous.
Engagement with beings is at the same time engagement with the open
region, apart from which beings could not come to stand within it.
Thus while on the one hand we could not conceive of "beings" apart from
an engagement with the open region (so that positivist and empiricist
traditions overlook the dimension which enables us to encounter
beings), on the other hand there is no meta-physical supersensuous
realm which lets beings be.

The chorismos or metaphysical gap is no

longer to be conceived as a "vertical" distance opened up between two
subsistent orders, but is itself the open dimension which constitutes
the possibility of the appearance of beings as such.
The "truth itself" then is not meta-physical but is the open
region which the Greeks designated as ta aletheia (127).

Heidegger in

the 1930 essay translates aletheia as '"unconcealment' rather than
'truth'" (127), in order to think the ordinary conception of truth as
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correctness "back to that still uncomprehended disclosedness and disclosure of beings" (128).

Thus Heidegger wishes at the period of this

essay to preserve the distance between "primordial" truth and the
"truth" of everyday conception by using different names for each.

Per-

haps it is in part for this reason that he once again retracts the
translation "truth" for aletheia in the late period:
Insofar as truth is understood in the traditional "natural"
sense as the correspondence of knowledge with beings, demonstrated in beings, but also insofar as truth is interpreted as
the certainty of the knowledge of Being [meta-physical truth],
aletheia, unconcealment in the sense of the opening may not be
equated with truth. Rather, aletheia, unconcealment thought as
opening, first grants the possibility of truth. For truth
itself, just as Being and thinking, can be what it is only in the
element of the opening. (BW 388-89 (The End of Philosophy and
the Task of Thinking))
Likewise, Heidegger in On Time and Being no longer uses "time" to mean
primordial time, and he restricts "Being" to its meaning as "Presence."
The engagement with the open region lets beings be by withdrawing
in the face of beings in order that they might reveal themselves
with respect to what and how they are and in order that representative correspondence might take its standard from them. As
this letting-be it exposes itself to beings as such and transposes all comportment into the open region. Letting-be, i.e.,
freedom, is intrinsically ex-posing, ek-sistent . . . . Eksistence, rooted in truth as freedom, is exposure to the disclosedness of beings as such. (128)
What is at stake in the concept of ek-sistence is the problem of the
foundation of history (Geschichte).
The historical issue here is not to be confused with the issue of
the historicity of Dasein in Being and Time.

It is here that Richard-

son founders in his commentary on ET, failing to see what amounts to
its central issue.

On the Essence of Truth is a metontological text,

meaning that it is no longer

concerned with the analytic of Dasein
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(though this analytic is of course not "jettisoned"), but with the
foundations of the historical being of humanity.

"Historical" signi-

fies the relationship of the emergence of an interpretation of the
Being of beings, something that takes place with ek-sistence, to a
possible totality of beings.

The problem of Geschichte is that of the

"happening" of disclosure in the midst of being as a whole.

Heideg-

ger1s early period is defined by his fundamental-ontological inquiry,
whereas the present text addresses the metontological problematic of
the historical "irruption" of the Da-sein in man for the sake of the
disclosure of beings in their Being.
Exposure to the disclosure of being as such (128) begins with the
qy_estioning that asks what beings are.

Ek-sistence means this exposure

to unconcealment as such and not simply to beings; in questioning, the
opening up of beings occurs, the unconcealment, as Heidegger says, of
"beings as such as a whole" (129).

In this formula we find the expres-

sion of a new restriction in the concept of metaphysics.

Whereas Hei-

degger uses the term "metaphysics" in MFL to refer to the dual structure of

1)

the fundamental questioning concerning the possibility of

the event of transcendence (ontology) and 2) the concrete event made
possible through ontology, he now uses "metaphysics" to refer to the
dual structure of the concrete event itself.

That is to say, "ontol-

ogy" now means the understanding of the beingness of beings, and is
conceived as a moment in the structure of every metaphysics; "theology"
is that second moment in metaphysics which takes into account the
"grounding" of being as a whole in a highest being (cf. Identity and
Difference, pp. 57-61).

The twofold structure of metaphysics is
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retained (as onto-theology), but is itself conceived as a "residue,"
one might say, of. the genuine twofold:

the questioning of the

I!Q.SSibility of anything like the historical irruption of "metaphysics"
in the midst of being as a whole.

This questioning of the possibility

of metaphysical disclosure constitutes the burden of the texts of
Heidegger's middle period.

The context of the questioning and its

"object," as it were, is the series of historical "irruptions" of
metaphysics (Seinsgeschichte).

Thus the twofold of "ontology" and

"metontology" is preserved in the more radical questioning of the
middle period.

The "questioning" takes the place of ontology (and can

be conceived as a radicalization of the latter), and what it questions
is the possibility of the irruption of metaphysics into the whole of
beings.

To inquire into the possibility of the sequence of metaphysi-

cal transformations of the beingness of beings, each of which takes
place in relation to being as a whole (here the "metontology" has
become the Seinsgeschichte) is what Heidegger means in the Letter on
Humanism when he says that "thinking is the thinking of Being" (BW
196)3.

Here he also calls Being the "quiet power of the possible"

(196).
On the Essence of Truth is an inquiry into the "conditions" which
make the disclosure of "being as such and as a whole" possible.

As

such, it does not yet treat of the "sequence" of transformations of
metaphysics (Seinsgeschichte), but of the conditions of any such
disclosure, as an unconcealment occurring in relation to the concealment of being as a whole, "in general."

On the Essence of Truth is

about the "foundations" of history (Geschichte):
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History begins only when beings themselves are expressly drawn up
into their unconcealment and conserved in it, only when this
conservation is conceived on the basis of questioning regarding
beings as such. (ET 129)
Thus the phrase "ek-sistent Da-sein" no longer refers to the
"existing" individual

12.~.

but rather to the historical event (ek-

sistence) of disclosure (Da-sein).

Thus "truth" does not belong to

man, and placing the essence of truth in freedom does not reduce truth
to human proportions; rather
freedom, ek-sistent, disclosive Da-sein, possesses man--so
originally that only it secures for humanity that distinctive
relatedness to being as a whole as such which first founds all
history. ( 129)
It can hardly be strongly enough emphasized that at the heart of
Heidegger's work is the question of man, in the sense that the question
of Being (which is now the question of the possibility of unconcealment
in general) can only be taken up as the question of the relationship of
the possibility of disclosure to man, to the humanity "by" which such
disclosure must occur.

"Freedom" is the locus of the question of this

relationship, a question which is at the same time the question of the
foundation of history.

For freedom signifies the possibility of the

occurrence of such disclosure (of "being as such as a whole") among any
"segment" of historical humanity.

The problem of history is that of

how, first of all for Western, "metaphysical" man, and then also for
any possible humanity, something like an interpretation (being as such,
beingness) of being (as a whole, i.e., world) can arise.
The inquiry remains bound at every step to the problematic relationship of the event of disclosure to human being.
That man ek-sists now means that for historical humanity the
history of its essential possibilities is conserved in the
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disclosure of being as a whole. The rare and the simple
decisions of history arise from the way the original essence of
truth essentially unfolds [west]. ( 129-30)
If "truth" is not separable from man, placed over against him in a

meta-physical realm, then neither is untruth simply the property of
fallible man.
(130).

"Rather, untruth must derive from the essence of truth"

But if the essence of truth is freedom, in what does the

essence of untruth consist, and how are "truth" and "untruth" thereby
related?

If the two are interrelated in essence, then it turns out

that we can speak of the essence and non-essence of truth.
Section 5.

The Essence of Truth

The principal theme of this section is attunement (Gestimmtheit):
"As engagement in the disclosure of being as a whole as such, freedom
has already attuned all comportment to being as a whole"

(131).

What

is at stake in the concept of attunement is the relation of man to
being.
The discussion of attunement completes the analysis of eksistence as comportment.

Comportment, Verhalten, has replaced

y~r-

stehen as the central term signifying the manner of man's relatedness
to beings.
beings.

Referring back to Section 2:

"Comportment stands open to

Every open relatedness is a comportment.

Man's open stance

varies depending on the kind of beings and the way of comportment"
(124).

Comportment takes its standard from beings, so that statements

can stand in a relation of representative correspondence with them.
Thus the inquiry into the essence of truth, in determining that the
openness of comportment is grounded in freedom, and thus that the
essence of truth is freedom, has taken the lead from man's "natural"
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comportment toward beings.
But attunement concerns, not the representative presentation of
beings but precisely what is not openly presented along with such
representation, namely being as a whole.

"Every mode of historical

man's comportment--whether accentuated or not, whether understood or
not--is attuned and by this attunement is drawn up into being as a
whole" (131).

In this way the unconcealment of beings is "placed" in

relation to the Other that is its ground, the concealment of being as a
whole.

We are witnessing. in On the Essence of Truth, the transfor-

mation of the twofold of metaphysics (ontology/metontology) into the
twofold of unconcealment/concealment (aletheia).
That which the theme of attuning addresses is the Other to the
openness of beings, "forgotten" precisely through the openness of
comportment to beings.

Whereas in Being and Time Verstehen takes

precedence in the analysis over Befindlichkeit, and thus existence over
thrownness, in ET the analysis of attunement is more "fundamental" than
the discussion of comportment.
The concealing of being as a whole is the condition which allows
for the disclosure of beings:
Precisely because letting beings be always lets beings be in a
particular comportment which relates to them and thus discloses
them, it conceals being as a whole. Letting-be is intrinsically
at the same time a concealing. (132)
It is "being as a whole" (not "Being") itself which "brings everything
into definite accord" (132).

Thus it is not man, nor even man's ''mood"

which attunes, but man in his comportment is brought into attunement
along with the openedness of being as a whole.

The attunement is more

primary than comportment, in that it "prevails throughout and
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anticipates all the open comportment that flourishes" in letting beings
be (131).
Section 6.

Untruth as Concealing

We can now begin to see why untruth is spoken of as the "nonessence" of truth, rather than as the essence of untruth.

What is at

stake is not untruth as the "opposite" to truth, but the full structure
of the essence of truth, i.e. of aletheia.
The concealment of being as a whole, untruth proper, is older
than every openedness of this or that being. It is also older
than letting-be itself which in disclosing already holds concealed and comports itself toward concealing. (132)
The openedness of beings rests, as a possibility, upon the concealment
of being as a whole, the essence of truth upon its non-essence.
As we have seen, what is at issue in On the Essence of Truth is
no longer "finitude" but "the concealing of what is concealed as a
whole" (132):

Heidegger calls this the mystery.

To be sure, "mystery

as such holds sway throughout man's Da-sein" (132-33): but it is
clear in this very line that the inquiry into the essence of truth has
moved into a region more fundamental than that of the being of "man."
Even i f Da-sein is "man's," the mystery holds sway throughout it and is
more primordial than the ek-sistence of Dasein.

Thus the level of

analysis has moved beyond that of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,
with its grounding of the question of Being in the finitude of man.
"Finitude" now belongs to Being:
[T]he Un~ of the primordial Unwe~ of truth, as untruth, points
to the still unexperienced domain of the truth of Being (not
merely of beings). (133)
The "resolutely open bearing [das entschlossene Verhlltnis]" in
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which all comportment is grounded is a bearing toward concealment which
"conceals itself in the process."

"Verhaltnis" signifies the totality

of man's relatedness to being, i.e., attunement and comportment in
their unity.

But in taking his bearings toward beings, on the basis of

his COll[!Ortaent toward beings, he tends to acquiesce "in this or that
being and its particular openedness" (134).
entschlossene Verhaltnis conceals itself:

This is the way that the
by residing "in what is

readily available" (134), and thus "letting forgottenness of the
mystery take precedence and disappearing in it" {134).

At the same

time, it is precisely because of this forgottenness of the mystery that
man can carry on his daily affairs in his concern with the "everyday":
Thus left, humanity replenishes its "world" on the basis of the
latest needs and aims, and fills out that world by means of
proposing and planning. From these man then takes his standards,
forgetting being as a whole. (134)
In this way Heidegger "derives" the possibility of taking beings
as the standard (in "representation").

Representational thinking is at

least schematically "overcome" in such a demonstration, since the
latter undermines the authority of the sole legitimacy of the appeal to
beings as a standard in representation and representational thinking.
What remains undone, and what cannot be accomplished in Qn

the~~se~

of Truth, is to show how other "standards" are possible than the
objectifying standard derived from the open comportment toward beings
as present4.
Man's forgetting of being as a whole is not something he "does"
but is based upon that "bearing by which Dasein not only ek-sists but
also at the same time in-sists, i.e., holds fast to what is offered by
beings, as if they were open in and of themselves.

As ek-sisten!.i_
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Dasein is insistent" (135).

It is Dasein's very ek-sistence which

delivers him over to his in-sistence; Dasein's open comportment after
all, his freedom, is for the sake of letting beings be.

Dasein does

not leave his own nature behind in taking beings as the standard, by
falling into a concern with beings alone.

It is precisely by virtue of

his relatedness to being as a whole that he is led into a neglect of
being as a whole.

Man's openness toward beings is possible only on the

basis of the mystery, or the concealing, not only of being as a whole,
but the concealing of that very concealing.
Thus "mystery" names the total structure of man's relatedness to
being.

It is not only forgotten in and with that very relatedness, but

is the ground of the forgetting itself.

Heidegger's analysis then,

does not "change" anything in our relationship to being as a whole and
beings, but opens up the character of that relatedness in order to let
it remain in its own "essence" (non-essence).

Thus the goal of inquiry

is not to make explicit what was implicit, but rather to let the "implicit" remain "implicit."

No "science of Being" is possible.

The

concept of "mystery" has replaced that of "phenomenon."
Section 7.

Untruth as Errancy

The insistent turning toward [Zuwendung] what is readily available and the ek-sistent turning away [Wegwendu~] from the
mystery belong together. They are one and the same. Yet turning toward and away from is based on a turning to and fro proper
to Dasein. Man's flight from the mystery toward what is readily
available, onward from one current thing to the next, passing the
mystery by--this is erring [irren]. (135/196)
This turning to and fro is itself the "ground" of history, and itself
belongs to a "finitude" more fundamental than the finitude of man.
Dasein is "constituted" through this turning; man's being is impaled
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upon the "cross" of a contradiction constitutive of his essence:
The full essence of truth, including its most proper non-essence,
keeps Dasein in need by this turning to and fro. Dasein is a
turning into need [Wendung in die Not]. (137/198)
Dasein is so radically bound to this "needh that there is no metaphysical realm into which Dasein might flee from his relatedness to
beings and to being as a whole.

Even an inquiry into the essence of

truth remains within that turning into need, from which arises the
necessity (Notwendigkeit) of thought.

The Turn itself signifies this

''turning into need," whereby thought remains true to its own finitude:
"Then resolute openness toward the mystery [Ent-schlossenheit zum
Geheimnisj is under way into errancy as such" (137/198).

The Turn

means a turning into finitude--which can no longer be conceived as the
"finitude" of man.

And openness toward the mystery releases Dasein

into errancy as such.

Here we have a "clue" to the nature of the

overcoming of metaphysics in Heidegger's difficult thought of the Turn
as a turning into "oblivion as oblivion" and man's transformed relationship to Being as a "corresponding" to the withdrawal of Being
itself.

We shall restrict our remarks on the Turn to the context

provided by "On the Essence of Truth."
The essay "On the Essence of Truth" manifests the structure, and
therefore the essential "content," of Heidegger's "regressive" inquiry.
Thus the "regression to origin" is undertaken through Section 5, wherein Heidegger locates the essence of truth in ek-sistent freedom.

The

structure of the twofold begins to come to the fore in Section 6, as
the relationship between the unconcealment of beings and the concealing
of being as a whole.

This

~elation

is now thematized as turning in
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Section 7.

The fundamental themes of Heidegger's work are here laid

out in order and in their "methodological" interconnection:
to origin, the twofold, the turning within the twofold.

regression

Regression to

origin establishes the thought of that "unity" which, when thought
through to the end, necessarily fulfills itself in an overturning
(Umschlag) into that other to ontology (das Seiende im Ganzen) which
"precedes" it.

But this 11etabole is actually constitutive of the

relationship between the moments of the twofold (see in this respect
Heidegger's full development of the concept of metabole in his lecture
on Aristotle's Physics B,15).
The "turning to and fro" [Zu- und Weg-wenden] of Dasein is a
turning "within" the twofold, i.e., within the full structure of the
"mystery."

The "regression to origin" situates Dasein within that

original condition--thrownness in Being and Time, but here, more
fundamentally, the mystery--from "out of which" the question of Being
arises and "to which" it returns in a reflection on its own origins.
Heidegger speaks in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic of the
"recoil" of the question of ground "back into one ground (thrownness in
itself)" (MFL 215).

In Introduction to Metaphysics we read:

But if we consider the question of Being in the sense of an
inquiry into Being as such, it becomes clear to anyone who follows our thinking that Being as such is precisely hidden from
metaphysics, and remains forgotten--and so radically that the
forgetfulness of Being, which itself falls into forgetfulness, is
the unknown but enduring impetus to metaphysical questioning.
(18-19)

To inquire into "Being as such" means first of all to inquire into that
unknown impetus, namely the oblivion of
thought is the "mystery."

Being~~

such--the matter of
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Section 8 will bring the whole of the previous discussion in ET
into relation to the meaning of philosophy as such--a question that
remains the constant issue of Heidegger's work.

Section 9, the "Note"

added in 1943, situates the essay itself within the question of the
possibility of the Turn and brings into play the theme of "transformation."

In this essay, then, the whole of the fundamental structure

of Heidegger's work--the themes of origin, twofold, and turn, bounded
by the fundamental "context" of "f initude" and by the essential "aim"
of transformation--is brought into play.
At the present juncture, we have found that Dasein "is" the
turning to and fro within the twofold, i.e. , within the "structure" of
the mystery.

The Turn means first of all the turning to and fro within

the mystery, and therefore the "movement" of all history; Heidegger's
own thought, therefore, insofar as it thinks the Turn, is in a certain
sense distinguishable from any other philosophy only in that it is
itself the thought of this movement.

Heidegger's enterprise does not

attempt to take a position "beyond" the movement constitutive of
philosophy, i.e., of Dasein.

In thinking finitude, it attempts to

enter into the movement proper to finitude and thus to disclose it.
This disclosure, however, eventuates, not in an objectification of
finitude, but in a more decisive "turn" into it.

Heidegger's thought

wishes to be "under way into errancy as such" (137).

To see how this

is so, let us return to a consideration of the theme of errancy in
Section 7.
"History" is founded in errancy.

We have already encountered

this foundation in the ek-sistent freedom of Dasein, the "fulfillment
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and consummation of the essence of truth in the sense of the disclosure
of beings" ( 129).

.The ek-sistence of man means "that for historical

humanity the history of its essential possibilities is conserved in the
disclosure of beings as a whole" (129-30).

The happening of "truth"--

here the openedness of beings--takes place with ek-sistence (in
and Time, "projection").

~eing

In ek-sistence, however, man takes his

standards from beings, and is thereby turned away from the mystery.
Man's ek-sistent insistence is not a mere "happenstance," but is
fundamental to man's being; it is founded in a "flight from the
mystery," and this is "erring" (135).

"Errancy is the free space

[Spielraum] for that turning in which in-sistent ek-sistence adroitly
forgets and mistakes itself constantly anew" (136/196).

But it is only

because of errancy that any historical "openedness of beings"--for the
sake of which insistent ek-sistence "adroitly" forgets itself--can
occur and take its course.

"The errancy in which any given segment of

historical humanity must proceed for its course to be errant is
essentially connected with the openness of Dasein" ( 136).

"History" is

the history of "error."
Errancy, the heir to the "falling" of Being and Time, characterizes Dasein's relationship to the mystery.

It is not a "flaw" in an

otherwise pristine type of being, because it belongs to the "turning to
and fro," in relation to the mystery, which is fund11ment11lli characteristic of Dasein's being.

The falling movement, Wirbel or "turbulence"

of Being and Time6 is now understood as the "turning to and fro proper
to Dasein."

This movement is constitutive of the structure of human

"finitude," and is the foundation of the very possibility of history.
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The turning to and fro could not be thought apart from the
possibility of a glimpse of the constant "center"--the mystery--which
lets us think this turning as such.

This is the way that Heidegger

puts it in Grundfragen der Philosophie (1937/38):
Nur das Eine ist sofort deutlich: In diesem Weltalter der
volligen Frraglosigkeit wird die Philosophie als das fragende
Heraufrufen des Fra~rc!!&.~ten unausweichlich zum Befremdlichsten. Deshalb ist sie das Notwendigste. Das Notwendige hat
seine machtigste Gestalt im &infachen. Das Einfache aber nennen
wir jenes unscheinbar Schwerste, das, wenn es ist, jedermann
sogleich und fortan als das Leichteste und Greiflichste erscheint
und doch unantastbar das Schwerste bleibt. Das Einfache ist das
Schwerste, well das Vielfache die Zerstreuung erlaubt und begtinstigt und alle Zerstreuung als Gegenspiel der Sammlung den
Menschen auf seiner standig Flucht vor ihm selbst--will sagen vor
seinem Bezug zum Seyn selbst--bestatigt und so entlastet und das
Schwergewicht des Daseins aushangt. Das Vielfache ist das
Leichte--auch dort, wo seine Besorgung scheinbar Mtihe macht.
Denn: Immer ist der Forgang vom einen zum anderen Erleichterung,
und gerade diesen Fortgang versagt das Einf ache und zwingt zur
standigen und standig sich bereichernden Rtickkehr zu dem Selben.
Nur wenn wir das Einfache wagen, kommen wir in den Spielraum des
Notwendigen. Das Notwendigste der Philosophie--gesetzt, daa sie
wieder das Befremdlichste werden muB--ist jene einfache Frage,
durch die sie, die Fragende, zuerst zu sich selbst gebracht wird:
die Frage nach der Wahrheit. (GrF 13)
Approximately:
Only one thing is immediately clear: In this age of utter
questionlessness philosophy as the questioning evocation of the
question-worthiest inevitably becomes something most strange.
Accordingly it is the most necessary thing. The necessary has
its most powerful shape in the Simple. But the Simple is what we
call that unpretentious gravity which, when it is, appears to
everyone at once and henceforth as the most facile and easiest to
grasp, and yet incontestably remains the most serious. The
Simple (Onefold) is the most burdensome, because the Manifold
allows and encourages dispersal and all dispersal confirms, as
the counterpart to gathering, man in his constant flight before
himself--not to mention before his relation to Seyn itself--and
thus relieves him of the burden of Dasein and sets it aside. The
Manifold is the facile--precisely where concern makes travail
appear. For: The advance from one to another is always alleviation, and just this advance denies the Simple and compels to
constancy, and to a constantly enriched return to the Same. Only
if we dare the Simple, do we come into the region [Spielraum] of
the necessary. The greatest necessity of philosophy--supposing
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that it must again become something most strange--is that sim~le
question, through which this, namely questioning, is first
brought to itself: the question concerning truth.
What is striking in this difficult passage is the intertwining of the
Simple and the Manifold, in the sense that it is precisely the "alleviating" advance within the Manifold that compels this very advance to a
"constantly enriched return to the Same."

This return does not, there-

fore, represent an "escape" from the turbulence in the sense of an
event which lifts Dasein out of or above history; it is rather a
moment, as it were, in that very movement whereby that movement comes
"home" to itself.

It is as part of the "turning to and fro" con-

stitutive of Dasein that the "turn" to the Simple itself occurs.

Thus

whenever Heidegger says in ET that
. . . as leading astray, errancy at the same time contributes to
a possibility that man is capable of drawing up from his eksistence--the possibility that, by experiencing errancy itself
and by not mistaking the mystery of Da-sein, he not let himself
be led astray (136),
he does not mean that Dasein simply "escapes" from errancy.

It

is

precisely in experiencing errancy itself, "as such," that man "turns"
into the mystery and thereby is no longer led astray.

But because the

mystery is not a phenomenon to be grasped in its transparency, but is
rather concealment and even the concealment of concealment, to arrive
at the "mystery," in the sense of "resolute openness toward the
mystery," is to be "under way into errancy as such" (137).
It is only here, with the turning into errancy as such, that "the
question of the essence of truth gets asked more primordially"; it is
only here that "the ground of the intertwining of the essence of truth
with the truth of essence reveals itself" (137).

What is at stake here
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in the turning from the essence of truth to the truth of essence is a
possible transformation of thinking, effected through the "glimpse"
into the mystery; the glimpse into the mystery "changes" nothing except
to liberate thinking into that mystery which, in errancy, always
remains the concealed ground of thinking.

The "essence of truth"--

truth as conformity to the repre-sentational presentation of beings,
the interpretation of beings in terms of presence--has its ground in
the mystery which, concealing itself, makes possible Dasein's taking
the standard of its co•portment from beings themselves.

The turn

toward the mystery brings the disclosure that "freedom itself originates from the primordial essence of truth, the rule of the mystery in
errancy" (137).

In this way the authority, as it were, of beings in

their disclosedness, and therefore Dasein 1 s propensity to take its
standard from beings, is undercut.

But this does not mean that Dasein

now dwells in the meta-physical "truth," stable in itself and free from
the transformations of history.

Rather, Dasein opens itself in a new

way to that very process of transformation itself (into the "truth of
essence").

All of philosophy takes its rise from this very same

"moment" of "glimpse into the mystery" (137) (cf. the essay "The Turn"
with its discussion of "insight into that which is").

Heidegger says

that
The glimpse into the mystery out of errancy is a question--in the
sense of that unique question of what being as such is as a
whole. This questioning thinks the question of the Being of
beings, a question that is essentially misleading and thus in its
manifold meaning is still not mastered. The thinking of Being,
from which such questioning primordially originates, has since
Plato been understood as "philosophy" and later received the
title "metaphysics." (137)
Heidegger 1 s own attempt to think the mystery as such repeats the
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question which constitutes philosophy as such.

Therefore it is not

necessary to assume that Heidegger's thought breaks free of the "finitude" constitutive of human thought as such.

Even in the "ontological"

question man is "especially subjected to the rule of the mystery and
the oppression of errancy" (136}.

The "thinking of Being" that Hei

degger's work undertakes has, in fact, precisely the task of showing
how, within the "needful condition of being constrained by the one
[mystery] and the other [errancy]" (137-37}, something like the
question of Being can arise.
The "thinking of Being" cannot go "beyond" the domain of this
"needful condition"; it cannot escape the "turning to and fro," but
rather represents a unique intensification of Dasein's relation to that
turning which is "constitutive" of metaphysics.

The thinking of Being

means to think this turning as such (which itself "is" Da-sein).

To

think Being "by itself" means to radicalize the thought of the "relationship" within the twofold until that relationship (aletheia) can be
thought "as such."

Thus, with the metontological inversion, Heidegger

addresses the possibility of there being anything like the question of
Being, and thus "Being," arising in the midst of being as a whole.

At

the initial stage of the questioning--in this metontological reinitiation of the question concerning the possibility of the question
of Being--it cannot be assumed that there is any "other" to the whole
of beings.
ical.

In this sense, Heidegger remains radically anti-meta-phys-

The metontological problem, definitive of the "middle period,"

is how "Being" can be thought from the condition of the "needful
condition" of man.

And because Heidegger's own thinking, like all
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"thinking," is a "turning into need," it cannot escape this condition,
but can only "turn" within it.
Section 8.

Philosophy and the Question of Truth

A concern with the meaning of "philosophy" is always at work in
Heidegger's thought.

In one sense, the central concern of his work is

the meaning of philosophy ("thinking").

Here he brings philosophy

immediately into proximity with language:
In the thinking of Being the liberation of man for eksistence, the liberation that grounds history, is put into words.
These are not just the "expression" of an opinion but are always
already the ably conserved articulation of the truth of being as
a whole. ( 138)
Heidegger contrasts philosophy with sophistry, which bases itself upon
the unquestioned character of being as it is already opened up.

Thus

philosophy, which puts the "liberation that grounds history" into
words, has sophistry as its "insistent" counterpart.

But sophistry

with its foundation in common sense does not reach to the "original
truth of being as such as a whole" (138).
Philosophy itself, however, has an essentially discordant
structure, i.e., one which is "split in two":
But because the full essence of truth contains the non-essence
and above all holds sway as concealing, philosophy as a
questioning into this truth is intrinsically discordant [in sich
zwiespaltig]. Philosophical thinking is gentle releasement
[Gelassenheit der Milde] that does not renounce the concealment
of being as a whole. Philosophical thinking is especially the
stern and resolute openness [Ent-schlossenheit der Strenge] that
does not disrupt the concealing, but entreats its unbroken
essence into the open region of understanding and thus into its
own truth. (138/199)
Here Heidegger harmonizes the discordancy of the twofold.

Metaphysics

fails to understand itself as thus "ambiguous," as sustaining an

205

inherent relationship to the concealment of being as a whole even while
opening up the disclosure of beings as such.
Heidegger concludes chapter 8 with the following paragraph:
The present undertaking takes the question of the essence of
truth beyond the confines of the ordinary definition provided in
the usual concept of essence and helps us to consider whether the
question of the essence of truth must no be, at the same time and
even first of all, the question concerning the truth of essence.
But in the concept of "essence" philosophy thinks Being. In
tracing the inner possibility of the correctness of statements
back to the ek-sistent freedom of letting-be as its "ground,"
likewise in pointing to the essential commencement of this ground
in concealing and in errancy, we want to show that the essence of
truth is not the empty "generality" of an "abstract" universality
but rather that which, self-concealing, is unique in the
unremitting history of the disclosure of the "meaning" of what we
call Being--what we for a long time have been accustomed to
considering only as being as a whole. (139)
Here the question of Being is raised as a question in relatiQ!! to the
way that metaphysics understands it, i.e., as the manner of Being of
being as a whole; it is furthermore correlated with the turning from
the essence of truth to the truth of essence.

That is to say, the

domain of the essence of truth, i.e., of the openedness of beings (the
unconcealment of being as such as a whole) is that of metaphysics, the
province of the traditional understanding of Being.

To raise the

Being-question anew is to raise the question of the truth of essence,
Le., of the source of the possibility of "truth," of unconcealment as
such.

In "On the Essence of Truth," Heidegger has arrived at the QOint

of commencement for any such questioning: the relation between disclosure and its "ground" in the concealment of being as a whole.
The regression to the "ground" of historical disclosure, undertaken in "On the Essence of Truth," can only arrive at the "condition"
for the possibility of any such disclosure, namely the mystery and its
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concealment in errancy.

The issue concerns the relatedness of man to

being as a whole (das Seiende im Ganzen).

The movement of regression

can only grasp the basis for "any" given moment of history--the inquiry
in ET is, as it were, restricted to the synchronous moment of disclosure.

As a regression to the ground of the essence of truth, it can

locate the "origin" of disclosure in the concealment of being as a
whole, and therefore understand historical disclosure

~such,

but it

cannot thereby provide the means to understand the relation among various possible moments of disclosure.

The question of this relationship

is what is meant by the problem of the "truth of essence":
"source" of the

~equ™

of historical disclosures?

what is the

"On the Essence of

Truth" establishes the starting-point for an inquiry into the Seinsgeschichte, but does not provide the "means" for such an inquiry.

In-

deed, it cannot do so, as Heidegger points out in the "Note" of 1943
( 140) .

How, then, is the source or origin of the sequence of
transformations of metaphysics to be addressed?

But this is precisely

the {!roblem of Heidegger's "middle period," with this introduction to
which we shall bring our own investigations to an end.

Here we can do

no more than to suggest what it means to question Being "by itself":
To question Being means, not to "leave" being as a whole behind-something that is impossible for finite Dasein--but to question
co~~~alment

ever more radically.

~elf

To question Being means to articulate

the "language" of the interrelationship of concealment and unconcealment (aletheia, the twofold).

Thinking the truth of Being means to

think self-concealment "as such" and as the source of unconcealment.
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Section 9: Note
"Truth signifies sheltering that lightens as the basic
characteristic of Being" (140).
"being as a whole."

There is no longer any mention here of

Thus "the answer to the question of the essence of

truth is the saying of a turning [die Sage einer Kehre] within the
history of Being [Seinsgeschichte]" (140).

The Turn itself is visible

in the transformed language regarding concealment:
Because sheltering that lightens belongs to it, Being appears
primordially in the light of concealing withdrawal. The name of
this lighting [Lichtung] is aletheia. (140)
The "truth of essence" is the "source" of the essence of truth because
"sheltering that lightens is--i .e., lets essentially unfold--accordance
between knowledge and beings" (140).

Although the questioning in ET

seems to remain "on the path of metaphysics," "it accomplishes a change
in the questioning that belongs to the overcoming of metaphysics"
(141).
What Heidegger seeks is something on the order of a transformation of thinking.

Indeed, he says that the truth of Being is sought

"as the ground of a transformed historical position" (141).
The course of the questioning is intrinsically the way of a
thinking which, instead of furnishing representations and
concepts, experiences and tries itself as a transformation of its
relatedness to Being. (141)
The transformation occurs with die Sage einer Kehre, and is therefore a
transformation which occurs "in" language, and which is at the same
time a transformation "of" language.7

NOTES

The lecture '.'On the Essence of Truth," thought out and delivered
in 1930 but not printed until 1943, provides a certain insight
into the thinking of the turning from "Being and Time" to "Time
and Being." This turning is not a change of standpoint from
Being and Time, but in it the thinking that was sought first
arrives at the location of that dimension out of which Being and
Time is experienced, that is to say, experienced from the
fundamental experience of the oblivions of Being. (BW 208)
2.

Cf. Richardson, pp. 211 ff.

3. As he tells David Krell in the interview, "Work Sessions with
Martin Heidegger," by David Farrell Krell, Phil~sopQ.uodcy, vol. XXVI,
1982, p. 133.
4. The concept of standard is, we might point out, a "topological"
theme, and the problem of the "transformation of the site" of
metaphysics is that of opening up the possibility of other "standards," topological measures, than that appropriate to objectifying,
representational thinking. The question of such non-metaphysical
"standards" is the issue of what Heidegger calls "poetizing thinking."
5. This text is essential to an understanding of the structure of
Heidegger's work.
6. What Wirbel makes manifest in Being and Time is that thrownness "has
the character of throwing and of movement" (BT 223/179). In "On the
Essence of Truth" Heidegger finds that "movement" to have the character
of "turning to and fro," which, as we are attempting to show, is
constitutive of histo~.
The theme of Wirbel seems to have its roots in Plato;
specifically, perhaps, in the "Myth of the true Earth" with which the
Phaedo concludes (lllc-112b). The "hollows" mentioned there suggest
that something like finitude is at issue.
7. The problem of "transformation" cannot be discussed without
reference to language, nor can the explication of the "inquiry into
origin" be completed without an explanation of the relation of that
inquiry to the "problem" of language. It is the inquiry into language
that enables Heidegger to "solve" the problem of origin without having
to leave behind the finitude of Dasein. We cannot take up this
difficult and very fundamental issue here.
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